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Public legal education is generally understood as a set of informal 
educational practices aimed at improving access to justice and social cohesion that 
predominantly focus on marginalised or disadvantaged populations. Public 
knowledge of law and its associated informational and educational practices 
provide a decisive locus for the legitimizing function of the normative ideal of the 
rule of law with its underpinning assumptions of security and stability. These ideals 
occlude a legacy of violence and political oppression that haunt the legal order, an 
erasure that is perpetuated when legal education is inattentive to its political-
philosophical underpinnings. The pivotal role of public legal knowledge also 
carries the possibility of alternative critical engagements with justice systems that 
fundamentally interrogate the juridical-political order. This alternative possibility is 
explored in light of readings drawing from Critical Theorists of the Frankfurt 
School (Walter Benjamin, Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer), through whom we 
encounter a reading of the problem of law as evidence of the violent founding (and 
preservation) of any political community. Their insight not only helps us to think 
differently about the inherent instability of the liberal legal order, but also suggests 
alternative pedagogical approaches attuned to the danger of the positivistic and 
technocratic rationalities of law. What these thinkers share, above all, is a lack of 
faith in progress in the advance of human civilization and modern institutions of 
justice. The refusal of a linear historicism of law (as process, trial or as tradition 
becoming law) also engages a negative utopianism that offers a way to think about 
public legal education as a form of counter-education. This opens a space of 
contestation with the presuppositions of law and legal orthodoxies, as community 
educators attempt to work with and against law. A sustained concern of the thesis 
is to reconceive the public’s ability to analyse and critically engage with law and 
the justice system as fundamental to the constitution of the body politic, and to 
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This research project has evolved over two decades of working at the intersections 
of law, education and poverty. It began in the North East of England in the 1990s 
with the Citizen’s Advice service supporting people with a multitude of complex 
and interrelated legal issues; helping them to secure welfare entitlements, defend 
evictions and negotiate with creditors. Working in welfare rights and subsequently 
teaching and supporting others in the field, provided an early grounding in law and 
education, albeit only with a partial and limited knowledge of the workings of the 
justice system. What became increasingly urgent to attend to in the daily work of 
advocacy and legal advice was the abject effect that a lack of knowledge of rights 
and entitlements alongside a basic understanding of the legal system had on 
people’s lives. Moreover, with a limited supply of expert advice how this lack of 
knowledge served time and again to compound marginalisation and trap people in 
cycles of poverty and disadvantage. It also led to growing discomfort about the 
power imbalances, dependencies and hierarchies inherent in the relation between 
adviser and client. In later years, this led to a growing interest in the value of legal 
education as a way of intervening more holistically in the lives of people who 
would repeatedly encounter legal problems. Developing strategies for self-
advocacy and legal techniques to defend and protect the rights of the most 
disempowered people against more powerful actors became central to my work and 
research interests. What was most fascinating, then and now, in the creation of ad 
hoc educative spaces, was the fertile ground they provide for reimagining what law 
means and how alternative voices exploring and engaging with the justice system 
could serve to remake and rethink the political and legal landscape. This thesis has 
grown out of those spaces and from those people, from the belief that the most 
fertile imaginaries for justice come from those for whom justice can’t be taken for 
granted.  
Over the last decade this belief has guided my research and teaching 
endeavours. In 2011, I co-founded a charity and education foundation to support 
public legal education in the United Kingdom. A decade of designing and testing 
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public legal education practices left many structural and theoretical questions 
unanswered. The purpose of this thesis is to address the central research question 
of how political and philosophical theories influence public legal education 
practices, and how, in turn, these practices come to shape the juridical-political 
order in which they are deployed.  The emphasis on political-philosophical 
underpinnings results in some limitations to the scope of the project, in particular 
the lack of systematic exposition of public legal education practices as they exist 
today or that might be gleaned from a systematic literature review of global 
practices. Moreover, the approach to political theory has focused on the 
development of liberal and subsequently neoliberal legal theory, its proponents and 
detractors. Wider research into the Roman law origins and ancient Greek 
emergence proved incredibly fruitful but have also largely been discarded due to 
the confines of scope. Other critical theoretical perspective have also much more to 
offer in this field, in particular postcolonial responses to Western liberal legal 
tradition and its imperial origins.1  and Some of the core subsidiary questions with 
which the study engages are how public legal education practices contend with and 
are implicated by an ever more juridified world? How can law be demystified for 
people who encounter it in their everyday lives, often at times of crisis, and how 
can they bring to bear their own understanding of law, which is grounded in lived 
experience and through immensely plural perspectives encompassing moral, 
religious and ethical views?  What pedagogies are suited to the need not only to 
provide tangible material help to those who are reliant on law, to enable them to 
access basic entitlements and services, but also to recognise the limits of law and 
its political contingency? Is it possible to create a space of critique in which law is 
revealed as a site of struggle and contestation, while being attentive to the 
immediate problems people have?  These interests and concerns derived from 
challenges in practise have guided the research topics with which this thesis 
contends. The necessary limitations of space leave a wider, more empirically based 
enquiry into the range of practices and outcomes in the field, particularly beyond 
the more readily accessible literature on Western theories and practices for another 
day.  
                                               
1 Peter Fitzpatrick, P. (2001). Imperialism. In Modernism and the Grounds of Law 




Exploring and addressing these concerns has thrown up more questions 
than answers. The research has traversed a number of fields to provide a critique of 
public legal education by situating it within historical, philosophical and 
theological frameworks. These interdisciplinary frames aim to be faithful to the 
rich seams of thinking and voices of individuals whom I have had the privilege to 
teach about the law outside of the formal educational settings of law schools and 
academies. While knowledge of law is taken to mean the knowledge of some 
aspect of the body of enforceable rules within a given society, and the processes 
through which enforcement is given effect, this can be a constraint to more critical 
engagements about how the law in action works, and how it might change. As 
Roscoe Pound would direct us to consider, the profound distinction between law in 
the books and the law in action, between the formal rules that purport to govern 
societal relations and those that in fact govern them, so too the challenges for 
public legal education practices become more complex.2 Discussions in 
communities engage with legal history, religious beliefs and problems of morality, 
the power imbalances that occur when negotiating legal relations, and the social 
and economic contexts in which problems are experienced and resolved. Unlike the 
experience of teaching at law school, these discussions often take on an enormous 
sense of urgency, given the problems at hand – which may include the risk of 
losing home, liberty, income, an important relationship or any combination of 
these. Precisely because of the difficulties at practice level to shift focus away from 
the pressing material problems that communities who participate come with, the 
thesis takes on the task of keeping in view the proximity of individual experiences 
of material deprivation and suffering within a much wider horizon of historico-
philosophical thought. This emphasis has offered some ways (rather than a single, 
purposeful path) to think about how educational encounters can avoid the closures 
of purely positivist and stultified, instrumental teaching about the law, and in doing 
so to open up alternative educational encounters with the law.  
The thesis begins by developing a working definition of public legal 
education as a range of information and education practices aimed at building the 
knowledge, skills and confidence in the general population of laws and legal 
processes. Improving understanding of rights and legal issues, together with the 
                                               
2 Roscoe Pound, "Law in Books and Law in Action ," American Law Review 44, no. 1 
(January-February 1910): 12-36  
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confidence and the practical skills to take action on a legal problem seeks to help 
individuals and communities to deal with disputes and gain access to justice. 
Modern practices can potentially encompass any of the body of enforceable rules 
that govern society. The enormous potential scope of public legal education 
inevitably creates definitional challenges which are discussed as they arise in 
different jurisdictions in Chapter One. While generally excluding the commonly 
understood practices of lawyering which involve tailored legal advice, advocacy 
and representation, the diffuse nature of practices can involving face-to-face non-
legal assistance such as form filling or information sharing, mediums such as 
television and radio as well as community based education and digital information 
activities amongst many others. The field becomes muddied further when we 
consider the fact that while many non-lawyers engage in practices, lawyers 
frequently do support interventions from teaching in the community to peer 
reviewing legal information. This wide scope opens important questions about the 
varying motivations of actors engaged in the field. Probing the motivations behind 
a range of public, private and civil society actors invites an exploration of the 
complex political, economic and social forces within which public legal education 
is evolving, and reveals the polyvalent forms and uses of legal education that 
abound in the field. The various permutations and evolutions will be the focus of 
the first two chapters. Chapter One begins with an investigation of the differing 
and partially competing rationales for public legal education through the early civil 
rights and Poor Law movements in the US and Canada, and the subsequent law 
centre movement in the middle of the 20th Century. Over this period, the empirical 
framework of legal needs studies 
 emerged as part of a wider scholarly shift to socio-legal studies, with an 
increasing number of small-scale and population wide legal needs studies that are 
analysed along with the access to justice literature for their salience to public legal 
education practices. More than half a century of scholarship and activism could not 
overcome the problem of extensive legal exclusion and failed routes to justice. 
 Despite the agitation and activism of the early years, even when the 
political will to mobilise to enforce rights is present, the gaps and failings of access 
to justice initiatives are palpable in the studies we encounter. When the political 
will is absent, as became the case with the collapse of the Poverty Law movement, 
and is now a feature of the contemporary post-crash legal landscape, hard won 
 10 
rights to equality and welfare have become ever more illusory.3 Legal needs studies 
over forty years reveal that unequal distribution of legal knowledge is also attended 
with wider systemic issues of competence and capability relating to social class, 
educational background, race and disability. These factors were, and still are, 
entrenched barriers to accessing justice. The diagnosis of Abel-Smith in 1973 
remains entirely apposite today, “Many - if not most - people cannot - at least do 
not - overcome them [these entrenched barriers] for most types of legal claims.”4 
Little has changed in the assessment of needs and associated hurdles that the most 
disadvantaged groups encounter.5 
We discover the persistence and acceleration of the lack of knowledge of laws 
and legal processes in modernity precisely accompanies the rise in new rights, and 
the growth in both civil and criminal law within increasingly complex societies and 
their social and economic arrangements which have led to the proliferation of laws. 
This fact of modernity gives rise to a more penetrating question about the 
                                               
3 For an analysis of post-crash labour reforms, see Clauwaert, S. and Schömann, I. The 
crisis and national labour law reforms: a mapping exercise, 20 Working Paper 2012.04 
European Trade Union Institute. For a study into the decline of global social and economic 
rights see Ignacio Saiz, “Twenty Years of Economic and Social Rights Advocacy Marking 
the Twin Anniversaries of CESR and the Vienna Declaration and Program of Action,” 
Centre for Social and Economic Rights (2015), 7. 
4 Brian Abel-Smith, Michael Zander and Rosalind Brooke, Legal Problems and the 
Citizen: A Study in Three London Boroughs, (London: Heinemann Educational 
Books,1973). See also Michael Cass, Legal needs of the poor: Research report. Law and 
poverty series, (Australian Government Publishing Service, 1975), Jerome E Carlin and Jan 
Howard, “Legal representation and class justice,” 2 UCLA Law Review (1964-1965): 381. 
5 The surveys that fall within the Paths to Justice tradition have recently been reviewed 
by Pleasance. P., Balmer. L. and Sandefur. R., Paths to Justice: A Past, Present and Future 
Roadmap (2013). 
http://www.nuffieldfoundation.org/sites/default/files/files/PTJ%20Roadmap%20NUFFIEL
D%20Published.pdf Accessed 19th May 2014. See also American Bar Association, Legal 
Needs and Civil Justice: A Survey of Americans: Major Findings from the Comprehensive 
Legal Needs Study (Chicago: American Bar Association, 1994); Barbara A. Curran, The 
Legal Needs of the Public: The Final Report of a National Survey (Chicago: The 
Foundation, 1977); Hazel Genn, Paths to Justice: What People Think and Do about Going 
to Law (Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, 1999); Margaret Y. K. Woo, Mary E. Gallagher 
eds, Chinese Justice: Civil Dispute Resolution in Contemporary China, (Cambridge: 
University Press, 2011).  
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ambiguity that follows from the impetus to advance social equality and freedom 
through law. As Teubner observes, following Habermas:  
 
The ambivalence of juridification, the ambivalence of a guarantee of 
freedom is made clear in the telling phrase “the colonisation of the 
life-world,” which was coined by Habermas. Social modernization at 
the expense of subjection to the logic of the system and the destruction 
of intact social systems is the essence of this idea.6  
 
The insights of one of the later scholars of the Frankfurt School become more 
pressing with a feature of modernity that the analyses move on to explore. The 
final part of the first chapter considers the increasing orientation of public legal 
education toward an economic-juridical rationality. This idiom of public legal 
educations exhibits an orientation of the rule of law to the exigencies of liberalised 
and competitive economisation. Thus, we find education and awareness raising 
become increasingly prominent in the development context, as part of international 
investment strategies releasing ‘dead’ capital via the expansion of international rule 
of law efforts.7 The re-emergence of interest in public legal education after a period 
of decline following the earlier movements of the 60s and 70s shows a renewed 
interest in the connection between public legal education and the rule of law. In 
part, this has been in response to reduced public expenditure for public legal 
assistance, but the fundamental link to public knowledge about the law and the 
                                               
6 Gunther Teubner, “Juridification: Concepts, Aspects, Limits, Solutions” in Robert 
Baldwin, Colin Scott, and Christopher Hood, A Reader on Regulation (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2019), 4. 
7 Stephen Golub, “Beyond the Rule of Law Orthodoxy: The Legal Empowerment 
Alternative”, Rule of Law Series, Democracy and Rule of Law Project Number 41 (2003), 
https://carnegieendowment.org/files/wp41.pdf. [accessed on 18th February 2019]. It should 
be noted that, as a feature of legal empowerment initiatives, these practices are a critique of 
‘top down’ rule of law orthodoxies: see Pilar Domingo and Tam O’Neil, The Politics of 
Legal Empowerment: Legal Mobilisation Strategies and Implications for Development ODI 
(2014), https://www.odi.org/publications/8485-politics-legal-empowerment-legal-
mobilisation-strategies-and-implications-development [Accessed 18th February 2019]. On 
the contested expansion of rule of law as a development tool more generally, see Daniel 
Zolo, “The Rule of Law: A critical Appraisal” in The Rule of Law History, Theory and 
Criticism Editors: Costa, Pietro, Zolo, Danilo (Dordrecht: Springer, 2007, 31).  
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universal applicability of law is also discernible in policy debates.8  In the United 
Kingdom, the liberalisation of laws to allow commercial enterprises to enter legal 
practice has been framed in terms of consumer and citizen empowerment, a trend 
toward liberalisation that is likely to be taken up elsewhere.9 This accompanies 
rapid technological change and large-scale reforms, driven by digital justice 
initiatives in which legal information is crucial.10   
We take up these examples of privatisation, austerity and liberalised markets in 
a theoretical vein with a critique of neoliberalism, pursued by Wendy Brown, 
following Foucault. Their analysis points to a catastrophe in which a new world-
ordering rationality that demands sacrifice in the name of progress and growth is 
revealed, and to which public legal education becomes a conduit. Citizen-
consumers are tasked with competing for the legal ‘goods’ with which equality, 
welfare and protection against more powerful actors and the state is promised.  For 
the losers in this game of un-equals, the resulting losses caused by rights and 
entitlements that cannot be vindicated are cast as necessary sacrifices for the good 
of community:   
 
As we are enjoined to sacrifice to the economy as the supreme power 
and to sacrifice for “recovery” or balanced budgets, neoliberal 
austerity politics draws on both the religious and secular, political 
meanings of the term. We appear to be in the orbit of the second, 
secular meaning of the term insofar as sharing is called for, rather than 
                                               
8 The reduction of public funding occurred under the auspices of the Legal Aid, 
Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012. 
9 Legal Services Act 2007, (1) (g). For a comparative perspective and agenda for 
reform in the United States and Canada see Deborah L. Rhode and Alice Woolley, 
“Comparative Perspectives on Lawyer Regulation: An Agenda for Reform in the United 
States and Canada,” Fordham Law Review. Volume 80, Issue 6, (2012). 
10 Yaniv Roznai and Nadiv Mordechay, “Access to Justice 2.0: Access to Legislation 
and Beyond,” (December 22, 2015). The Theory and Practice of Legislation, Forthcoming; 
Hebrew University of Jerusalem Legal Research Paper No. 16-12. Available at SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2707360 The proposal for online courts is detailed in Michael 
Briggs L.J., Civil Court Structure Review Final report, Courts and Tribunals Judiciary  
referencing the over-arching need for public legal education (2016), 62. 
https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/civil-courts-structure-review-
final-report-jul-16-final-1.pdf [Accessed 2 May 2017]. 
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assumed, the call itself is issued in a moral-political idiom, and the call 
implies overcoming self-interest for the good of the team. …sacrifice 
Girard writes is “a deliberate act of collective substitution performed at 
the expense of the victim and absorbing all the internal tensions, feuds 
and rivalries pent up within the community.11 
 
Legal education in the public realm becomes a strategy of economic innovation, 
smoothing the conflicts of daily life in order to facilitate market expansionism. In 
this conception, the state itself steadily develops the contours of the firm, and its 
citizens adopt the role of entrepreneurial subject, to be either winners or losers in 
the game of survival. Welfare, redistribution, reparation are all to be dismantled 
under a neoliberal regime of legal and economic rationality. These structural 
features become intrinsic to our understanding how and why public legal education 
can appear at once as a set of radical political practices aimed at securing political 
representation and agency, while immediately after becoming co-opted as a mode 
of socialisation and to repress political change. 
The second chapter takes up these themes by considering how classical 
liberal conceptions of the rule of law deployed and construed legal knowledge. 
Rather than a marginal concern of jurisprudence, the question of what people know 
about the law within a given population is a fundamental aspect of the rule of law, 
both in formal and substantive constructions and by extension is a central argument 
for the advancement of public legal education initiatives.  The modern liberal legal 
formulation, with its putative safeguards for individual liberty and institutional and 
procedural oversight has been in decline in the West since its restatement as an 
Enlightenment ideal.12 Liberal legality with its roots in conquest and colonisation 
howeverYet in an era of populism and political polarisation, its rhetorical and 
symbolic force continues to be lauded by both right and left, while notably 
remaining a growth industry in the developing world.13  The chapter subsequently 
                                               
11 Wendy Brown, Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism Stealth Revolution (New York, 
Zone Books, 2015) 216-7. The theme of sacrifice will be revisited in chapter three as we 
consider the inauguration of law in proto-religious communities in Greek myth and tragedy 
explored by both Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno and Walter Benjamin.  
12 Brian Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), 60-72.  
13 The UK and US together account for 60% of global legal services revenue, half of the 
Global 100 firms are based in the US and 14% in the UK. Recent years have seen a major 
expansion of US and UK law firms into China, other Asian countries, and sub-Saharan 
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traces the concerns for public knowledge of the law in rule of law theories, from 
classical to natural law and subsequent positivist accounts. The critique emphasises 
the role of publicity at the heart of the legitimating assumption of the universal 
applicability of law.  
We will trace the shift between natural law theories maintaining a direct 
relation of the divine origins of political authority to the promulgation of law as an 
extension of the providential plan. Natural law, with its corollary of natural reason 
in which all humans partake, must be accompanied with the dissemination of civil 
laws, since nature alone (and natural reason) provides insufficient security and 
stability for an evolving political community. Following first Hobbes, then Locke 
and Rousseau, we explore how the rights of property and individual liberty come to 
form the basis of the social contract between citizen and state.  For our purposes, 
legal education and publicity of laws forms a pivotal and transitive legitimising 
function for political sovereignty. Whereas classical liberal theory constructs this in 
ways that recognise, at least in principle, a juridical-political episteme of popular 
sovereignty as an element of constitutive import, this is increasingly undermined, 
reaching an apotheosis in the twentieth century. The economisation of the state and 
of governance tout court is evidenced through the growth of limited knowledge of 
legal rules imbued in the population in order to facilitate economic competition and 
the free flow of capital.  
The Enlightenment offers a crucial nexus through which to analyse the 
shift to the notion of the reasoning subject who becomes the source and subject of 
the law. For Kant the motto ‘dare to know’ links the will or the courage to know, to 
come to understanding, with the opposite condition of self-incurred subordination 
or tutelage.14 The individual will must become part of a collective process; a 
prerequisite to enlightenment is that both the individual and society as a whole 
need to participate in this movement of will, of the urge to come to reason. This 
ideal of universal subjectivity shaped through education provides a core element of 
the critique we will move on to. Rather than bring about individuation and 
fostering autonomous subjects in the interest of governing together, the contention 
we will consider with the Frankfurt school is whether the kind of democratic and 
                                               
Africa (UK Legal Services in 2015, The CITYUK http://www.thecityuk.com/research/our-
work/reports-list/legal-services-2015/). Accessed 26 July 2015. 
14 According to the translator’s note, the term was first coined by the Roman poet 
Horatio, Epodes I, 273. 
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legal education envisaged by Kant in fact served to subsume individuality under 
the sign of universality and in the blind pursuit of instrumental reason. 
A subsequent theoretical reading of the association of law, legal 
knowledge, and legitimation of the state engages substantively with the work of 
Walter Benjamin and the group of writers associated with the Frankfurt School. 
The third chapter brings to bear a constellation of concepts and critical dialectical 
tools to understand the difficulty posed in the vexed and contested space in which 
the paucity of legal knowledge in the public domain is linked to the constitutive 
and constituted function of the law and the modern state. The central question 
posed concerns how the nature of the polity being produced through educational 
practices is conceived. We firstly investigate the assumption of the peaceable, 
predictable and democratic functions of the rule of law by introducing the 
interdisciplinary strands of critical theory that emerged from the Institut, home to a 
group of predominantly German Jewish thinkers including Max Horkheimer, 
Theodor Adorno and, more distantly, Walter Benjamin. The writings emerging 
from the Institut would come to have a significant impact on educational theory 
both in Europe and the U.S.15  
Critical Theory offers several strands of critique responding to liberal legal 
theory during the fall of the Weimar Republic and the rise of fascism. Contrary to 
‘traditional theory’, Critical Theory aims to disrupt the logic of progress inherited 
from Enlightenment thought and challenges us to think about the increasingly 
irrational conditions of modernity brought about by late capitalism that provide the 
conditions in which public legal educators practice. Of importance to developing 
alternative strategies in the realm of education and law is the historical and 
philosophical exegesis that disavows historicism presented as the inevitable 
progression of past to present. The task of a negative dialectical critique is to break 
with a mechanistic and instrumentalised world-view and to place necessity (i.e., 
that law is a naturalised feature of life and that things must be as they are) and 
contingency (of the political and social constitution of reality) into dialectical 
tension to allow new configurations to emerge.  
                                               
15 The educational salience of critical theory will be explored in more detail in chapter 
four. For an introduction into links between critical theory and critical pedagogy see Nigel 
Blake and Jan Masschelein, “Critical Theory and Critical Pedagogy” in The Blackwell 
Guide to the Philosophy of Education, Eds., Nigel Blake, Paul Smeyers, Richard Smith and 
Paul Tandish, (London, Blackwell, 2009). 
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Critical Theory thereby seeks to locate tensions and contradictions between 
the encompassing social apparatus and awareness of the alienation of the 
individual’s power to fashion the world according to their rational powers. In this 
contradiction of human life, being simultaneously the product and producer of law 
and society (while being subjected to social cultural forms from which the rational 
individual is incapable of being freed), lies the potential, if not fully realisable, for 
Critical Theory to conceive of another possible world. By repudiating claims to 
improvement, productivity and use value attached to theories of Enlightenment 
progress and to the liberal ideal of the rule of law, Critical Theory aims to reveal 
the underlying conditions that perpetuate social injustice.  
We extend these ideas somewhat further by bringing to bear an alternative 
theoretical framework through a reading of Walter Benjamin’s Critique of 
Violence.16  Violence is analysed through its relation to law in either its law-making 
or law-preserving characteristics. Law (Recht)17 maintains an inexorable relation to 
violence, in which violence is always interred within the legal order as the 
instrument or mechanism of law’s self-preservation. By conflating law with justice, 
legal theories mask this self-preservation. Benjamin’s Critique exposes the 
inherently unstable process of formation and decay of all legal and political 
institutions. He refutes natural and positive law theories since natural law consigns 
justice to transcendentalism, whereas positivistic accounts (while offering a more 
credible ground) nevertheless degenerate into historical violence. Both fail to 
secure justice in the concrete conditions of oppression that concerned Benjamin.18 
The analysis of legal violence, in turn, introduces the problem of fate - a central 
concept of myth - which is unequivocally aligned by Benjamin with the order of 
law.  
                                               
16 Walter Benjamin, Critique of Violence, Selected Writings, Volume I. 1913-1926 
(Belknap Press: Harvard University Press, 1996).  
17 In German Recht is distinguished from Gesetzt, the former relates to concepts of 
rights and obligations in the abstract rather than concrete sense of particular laws, and 
appears as the primary reference for Benjamin. Rather contrary to the English, the whole 
normative sphere is called by the name: Recht, droit, dritto, and not law, loi, legge. 
Translators note in Giorgio Agamben, ‘The Time that Remains, A Commentary on the 
Letter to the Romans’ (2005) 119. 
18 Walter Benjamin, The Right to Use Force, Selected Writings, Volume 1, 231. 
Benjamin explains: “it is never reason that decides on the justification of means and the 
justness of ends: fate-imposed violence decides on the former and God on the latter.” 247 
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Mythic violence and legal violence coincide in establishing uncontrolled 
rule over life and death in Benjamin’s analysis, a threat that both orders are unable 
to relinquish. Mythic violence encompasses all manner of manifestation of legal 
and political institutions, insofar as they are a source of power or force that must be 
projected as the basis of their self-legitimisation. His critique identifies the role that 
the intelligibility or occlusion of law plays in the legitimisation of state and its 
attendant violence. Benjamin weighs mythic and legal violence in tandem by 
pointing to the legal maxim that ignorance of laws (das Unkenntnis des Gesetzes), 
much like blind fate, brings no relief from punishment.19 Law achieves its extortive 
force because the boundaries of mythic and secular orders rely on a deliberate 
ambiguity precisely to foreclose infringement of their respective spheres as their 
necessary condition of self-preservation. Benjamin’s contention is that modern 
sovereignty, and thus modern law attempts to emulate a theological structure. This 
results in an array of what Benjamin terms phantasmagoria – mystifications and 
mythifications that obscure the important ethical and political demands that 
profane justice places on us.  
Myth forms a central motif in Benjamin’s philosophy, and his exposition 
of quotidian reality that is, in his view, inexorably entangled with the archaic forms 
of thought that have been marginalised from philosophical-historical enquiry.20 
Their continuing role secures law’s foundations with devastating consequences for 
the attribution of culpability for individual transgressions and the legitimacy of the 
modern legal order as such. The analysis points to a precondition of law in which 
guilt is the cipher for the capture of life in law: “The cipher of this capture of life in 
law is not sanction (which is not at all an exclusive characteristic of the juridical 
rule) but guilt…in the original sense that indicates a being-in-debt – in culpa 
esse.”21 What is important for the present enquiry is the illumination of guilt or 
indebtedness that is presupposed and maintained by law. 
                                               
19 “Von diesem Geiste des Rechts legt noch der moderne Grundsatz, dass Unkenntnis 
des Gesetzes nicht vor Strafe schuetzt.” Contrary to what the word ignorance suggests, the 
concern is not an epistemological one, but rather is a problem internal to the sphere (to the 
rule) of law. I am grateful to Anton Schütz for clarifying this important point. 
20 Winfried Menninghaus, Walter Benjamin’s Theory of Myth, in, On Walter Benjamin, 
Critical Essays, and recollections, ed Gary Smith (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1988). 
21 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (1998: Stanford 
University Press), 26. 
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The chapter reveals that guilt is an operative mechanism through which life 
itself becomes the focus of the juridico-political order, and through which sacrifice 
can readily be potentialised. Human life is thus juridified and indebted to the law 
for survival: 
The state must kill, not once but over and over again, each time 
establishing not only its right to exist but even the fact of its existence. 
We learn from this that archism, for all the supreme confidence that it 
projects, is both deeply anxious and deeply vulnerable and in this way 
we can start to think about ways to resist and possibly even defeat the 
endlessness of all manifestations of archism (including neoliberalism, 
fascism, liberalism and capitalism).22 
In this sense, the thesis contends that education in law may either serve to reaffirm 
a particular normative order or offer strategies to disrupt the problematic relation 
between the presupposed guilty form of life captured in law’s operation. It will be 
argued that a critical pedagogical approach to legal education needs to find other 
avenues if it is to provide a space in which practices can distance themselves from 
the predetermined end of the application of law as the means of remedying 
systemic social and economic disadvantage, itself a product of the operation of the 
juridico-economic rationality of modernity. My study will examine the underlying 
juridical and political intersections in Benjamin’s reading on law, violence and fate 
to make a preliminary argument in which this relation between law and life is 
presented as the problem that any educational intervention would pose at its core. 
The final chapter takes up a closer analysis for the educational 
philosophies revealed through a categorical selection of public legal education 
practices. Despite the sparse literature in this arena, a somewhat more schematic 
approach enables us to review these through a number of fields including law-
related education or civics education originating in the middle of the Twentieth 
Century, development-oriented accounts of legal education and a relatively new 
aspect of legal capability literature since 2000 in the Anglo-American context. We 
find that the adaptive and socialising features of the education models frequently 
fall into a disciplinary frame insofar they seek to insert newcomers – either by birth 
or as migrants - into the normative order. The difficulties which these practices fall 
into variously concern the co-opting of programmes to suit changing state 
objectives, or the inability to sustain work where the political motivation involves 
                                               
22 James Martel, “Why does the state keep coming back? Neoliberalism, the state and 
the Archeon.” Law and Critique Volume 29, Issue 3:359-375 (2018), 370. 
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precisely critique of power relations that stray into the terrain of the political – 
juridical realm.  
Later critical theories that adopted the work of the Frankfurt School to the 
field of education are explored with a specific concern for their capacity to 
fundamentally decenter or problematize the structural problems raised by inserting 
subjects, albeit for emancipatory goals into a progressive reading of law and 
history. The utopian horizon which dialogically builds agency between teacher and 
student is reimagined through an alternative negative construction following the 
stance of Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno. While later proponents, 
particularly Jürgen Habermas would argue that to debunk instrumental reason 
results in an aporetic project devoid of normative ground with no other instance of 
human rationality to appeal to, this thesis argues for the need to re-evaluate the 
pedagogical space that emerges through a dialectical reimagining of the past, in the 
interest of the present.   
The primary inspiration for final pedagogical readings in Chapter Four 
originates from references to education and the concept of study in the writings of 
Walter Benjamin. He describes an educative power that “stands outside the law”23, 
that carries with it the potential to interrupt the violent imposition of law. This will 
suggest that a return to the negative utopian roots of Benjamin’s writings offers an 
alternative avenue to the positive emancipatory utopian orientations of later critical 
pedagogy theories. The thesis concludes by examining the concept of educative 
power which is related to the study of law through a number of elusive references 
in Benjamin’s 1934 essay on Franz Kafka.24  
Kafka’s work provides an exemplary depiction of the way in which the 
secrecy and ambiguity of law is deployed and operates with murderous force. His 
literary representations of the hidden structures of power draw from his perception 
of the archaic modern in which the primordial past maintains itself in the present. 
His allegories unearth the necessary occlusion of law so as to hide its 
groundlessness, and thereby arouse suspicion as to the mechanism or machinery of 
self-legitimation. Yet through this brutal and relentless presentation of the 
administrative and bureaucratic state, we also glimpse an alternative reading in 
which an educative frame for law emerges that does not re-establish or reapply 
                                               
23 Walter Benjamin, ‘Critique of Violence’, Selected Writings, Volume I, 250. 
24 “Law that is studied, but no longer practiced”, is not justice but “only the gate that 
leads to it” Walter Benjamin, ‘Franz Kafka’, Selected Writings Volume II, 815. 
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law’s violence. The figure of the student and the question of study appear in 
numerous short stories and novels by Kafka.25 Study is conceived variously as a 
reversal, an unburdening from future goals, lacking a preordained object and 
appears to be free to leave a violent sovereign behind.26 The curious figure of 
thought appears that, according to Giorgio Agamben, points to the deactivation of 
law, “to a law that is studied but no longer practiced”27 The thesis puts forward that 
this concept of de-instrumentalised learning, which refuses the necessary 
application of law clears the ground for a counter-hegemonic engagement with the 
law. Educational possibilities open up in this space of legal education in which a 
mode of thinking about and critique of the law reveals the self-grounding 












                                               
25 The major novels include, Amerika, The Trial and The Castle, as well as numerous 
short stories including, “A Report to an Academy,” in Collected Works (Norderstedt: 
Books on Demand, 2015) and “The New Advocate,” in Metamorphosis and Other Stories, 
trans Michael Hoffman (London: Penguin, 2015). 
26 Ibid. 816 
27 Agamben, State of Exception, 2005. 
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1  




This chapter traces the ‘radical’ roots of public legal education over the 
last half century in the occident. 28 The focus on the predominantly Western, 
European and North American examples by no means suggests that these are the 
only practices of importance or indeed the best examples of work in the field. The 
exclusion of wider material stems from the problem of sheer scope, the 
proliferation of predominantly grey literature  and oral practices which mitigates 
systematic review, as well as limitations arising from the many linguist challenges. 
The literature review has therefore followed a more creative or transformative 
methodology sourcing material from eras of political or societal upheaval. 29  
Public legal education emerged alongside the activism and reform tied to 
the civil rights movement and the development of legal services for the poor. At a 
time of prominence for public legal education advocacy around the world, 
                                               
28 In relation to public legal education, Lois Gander adopts term ‘radical’ as follows: 
“its meaning was never fixed…to Saul Alinsky, foremost radical of them all, a radical was 
an irreverent ’political relativist’ who constantly searched for the causes of man’s plight 
and for explanations of his irrational world but who was never satisfied with his own 
findings. “The Radical Promise of Public Legal Education in Canada”, (MA diss, 
University of Alberta, 1999), 7. https://www.cplea.ca/wp-
content/uploads/2017/01/radpromofple.pdf [Accessed October 9 2014]. According to 
Foucault, the term ‘radical’ dates from the end of the seventeenth century from the English 
assertion of original rights deriving from a time prior to the Norman invasion. Unlike 
revolutionary claims which were structured around the rights claimed from public law 
(derived from natural rights), radical claims: “consisted in the assertion of original 
rights…a position which involves continually questioning government, and 
governmentality in general, as to its utility.” The Birth of Biopolitics, Lectures at the 
College de France 1978-1979.  Michel Senellart, ed., trans. Graham Burchell (Chippenham 
and Eastbourne: Palgrave Macmillan 2008), 41.  
29 Jill K Jesson, Lydia Matheson and Fiona M Lacey. Doing Your Literature Review: 
Traditional and Systematic Techniques. London: Sage Publications (2011) 
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particularly the last decade, these historical and political antecedents reveal 
pressing challenges in the contemporary field.30 These challenges emerge with a 
revival in public legal education as a corollary of the retrenchment of legal aid in 
the wake of the global financial crisis and global narratives of austerity, the 
advance of disruptive digital technologies in the legal sector and investment 
oriented expansion of rule of law programmes.31 In response, at one end of the 
                                               
30 In the United Kingdom an independent Task Force was commissioned to explore the 
role and value of legal education for the public; see Public Legal Education and Support 
Task Force (2007) Developing Capable Citizens: The Role of Public Legal Education. 
www.pleas.org.uk/uploads/PLEAS%20Task%20Force%20Report.pdf [accessed February 
2015]. Efforts are recorded in the context of legal reform in China, see Randall 
Peerenboem, “The New China Model for the Era Post Global Financial Crisis” in 
Routledge Handbook of Asian Law, Christopher Antons ed. (London: Routledge, 2017), 66. 
European Parliament members made calls for action to promote legal literacy in 2013 “to 
give every citizen of the Union the opportunity to acquire a basic knowledge of legal 
matters.” Written declaration, under Rule 123 of Parliament's Rules of Procedure, on 
promoting legal literacy, European Parliament 0013/2013. 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+WDECL+P7-
DCL-2013-0013+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN&language=EN [Accessed 24th January 2019]. 
31 The trend toward limiting legal aid expenditure has accelerated but predates the 
global financial crisis and was already in evidence as a European consensus to establish a 
minimum level of legal assistance was not achieved despite attempts at harmonisation. See 
Christopher Hodges, “The Europeanisation of Civil Justice: Trends and Issues” Civil 
Justice Quarterly, Volume 26, (2007) and Kiraly, L and Squires, N, “Legal Aid in the EU: 
from the Brussels Convention of 1968 to the Legal Aid Directive of 2003,” Coventry Law 
Journal, Volume 16 number 2 (2011), 27-46. On comparative changes in legal aid 
provision see Richard Abel, “Law Without Politics: Legal Aid Under Advanced 
Capitalism, UCLA Law review, Volume 32, (1984-85) 474 - 643. Nevertheless, there is 
surprisingly little research in the comparative availability of legal aid funding, see 
International Comparison of publicly funded legal services and justice systems, MoJ 
Research Series 14/09, October 2009 
http://www.justice.gov.uk/publications/docs/comparison-public-fund-legal-services-justice-
systems.pdf.  Some European reports suggest that while there has been an overall increase 
of legal aid across those states providing data between 2008 and 2010, this represents 
increased spending on individual cases with a reduction in cases overall. “All in all, in the 
member states there seems to be a tendency to grant more aid to a smaller number of 
users.” (European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice Evaluation Report of European 
Judicial Systems, 2010), 82. 
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spectrum public legal education and legal empowerment activities are construed as 
grass-roots driven, legally inspired tools for resistance. At the other end, education 
and information initiatives are portrayed as ameliorating limited access to 
advocacy and representation in the courts32 while also aiming to promote order, 
prevent crime and cement social cohesion.33 Moreover, the contemporary shift in 
emphasis to self-help and increasing citizen responsibility for resolving their own 
legal issues is noteworthy among a wider array of market-oriented processes that 
have accompanied the turn to neoliberalism since the 1980s.34 In this configuration, 
                                               
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/cepej/evaluation/2012/Rapport_en.pdf [Accessed 17th 
May 2014].  Rule of law and democratic accountability arguments predominate in the 
associated field of international development. Examples include the Commission for Legal 
Empowerment of the Poor hosted by United Nations in 2008. Reporting that up to four 
billion people around the world are effectively excluded from the rule of law, the 
Commission argues that legal empowerment requires that states: “foster and institutionalize 
access to legal services so that the poor will know about laws and be able to take advantage 
of them.” “Making the Law Work for Everyone,” Working Group Reports, (New York: 
UNDP, 2008) Vol 1.p 6. 
32 As Hodges comments on emerging European trends: “The provision of significant 
government expenditure on legal aid is no longer consistent with the prevailing economic 
policy.” Hodges, “The Europeanisation of Civil Justice: Trends and Issues,” 107. See also 
Julie Macfarlane, Identifying and Meeting the Needs of Self-Represented Litigants, The 
National Self-Represented Litigants Project. Treasurer's Advisory Group on Access to 
Justice (TAG) Working Group Report (2013). 
https://lawsocietyontario.azureedge.net/media/lso/media/legacy/pdf/s/self-
represented_project.pdf [Accessed 18th February 2019]. 
33 The socially integrative function of public legal education has a long pedigree that 
will be explored at greater length as an aspect rule of law theories in chapter 2 and adaptive 
educational theories in chapter 4. For the present purpose, the development of public legal 
education as a means of containing political unrest is noted by Garth, Neighborhood Law 
Firms, 197. Further, some of the earliest programmes developed under the auspices of the 
Office of Economic Organisation were couched in terms of juvenile delinquency 
prevention. On the evolution of the U.S. programmes see Earl Johnson Jnr, Justice and 
Reform: The Formative Years of the OEO Legal Services Program, (New York: Russell 
Sage Foundation 1974), 23-24. 
34 These regimes of neoliberal governance will be more fully examined in the following 
chapter. On the range of practices and tactics associated with neoliberal governance see 
Wendy Brown, Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution (New York: Zone 
Books, 2017), 201-213. 
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public legal education is becoming a more formal part of top down justice reform 
strategies, in contrast to the ‘radical’ movements of the 1960s and 70s.35 As a 
consequence, tension between potentially expedient solutions serving to undergird 
neoliberal policy, and radical alternatives that undermine or subvert legal 
orthodoxies will be a central focus for this thesis.  
The chapter proceeds by introducing the definitions and scope of public 
legal education in its various manifestations around the world. The broad terrain 
reveals a complex history that has formed and shaped the movement in divergent 
ways over the last half century. As the attempt to define the genre reveals, many 
practices and approaches arise out of oral traditions and informal activities, which 
by their nature have escaped full exposition; nor indeed have they produced much 
in the way of theoretical exegesis. This has rendered research into the field 
challenging and has necessarily resulted in a somewhat fragmented view of the 
landscape.  
The chapter moves on to explore the history of public legal education 
movements in the Anglo-American context of the civil rights struggles with which 
they were closely associated. The study will focus on the shifting political terrain 
in which public legal education emerged that enabled early educative efforts to 
flourish. In this idiom, public legal education is charged with political and social 
activism. The genealogy reveals how the movement developed in parallel with 
early attempts to establish legal services for the poor. The historical analysis of the 
Anglo-American experience of public legal education aims to offer insights into 
how contemporary development in the field of public legal education can reconnect 
with its more radical precursors and reflect on how to sustain practices in light of 
declining publicly funded services. 
A strand of literature through which to consider the development of public 
legal education consists in the socio-legal scholarship that has influenced much of 
the thinking around public legal education today, as well as providing an empirical 
evidence base for public legal education policy initiatives.36 The literature 
                                               
35 It is also worthwhile to note how these strategies fundamentally differ from 
community-based strategies of self-help; indeed, these narratives run in quite opposing 
directions insofar as presenting participants as political influencers. Lisa Wintersteiger and 
Tara Mulqueen, “Decentering law through public legal education.” Onati Socio-legal 
Series, volume 7, number 7 (2017).  
36 For example, Pleasence et al, Causes of Action: civil law and social justice, (Legal 
Services Research, 2004) was cited in the proposal for a national strategy for public legal 
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highlights a remarkable continuity from the earliest legal needs studies in the 1930s 
to the present, painting a picture of widespread legal exclusion in which large 
sections of the population are unaware of basic legal rights and the processes 
through which legal redress can be sought.37 The literature reveals how traditional 
legal services with a primary focus on advice and representation fail to address the 
systemic underlying knowledge and skills gaps evidenced across numerous legal 
needs studies.38  In the U.K., for example, historically high per capita expenditure 
                                               
education, see “Toward A National Strategy for Public Legal Education: A Discussion 
Paper,” Legal Action Group, Citizenship Foundation and Advice Services Alliance 2004. 
https://lawforlife.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/towards-a-national-strategy-100.pdf 
[Accessed 19th February 2018]. Australian examples include legal needs surveys to bolster 
best practices for public legal education. Law and Justice Foundation of New South Wales, 
“Justice Made to Measure: NSW legal needs survey of disadvantaged areas – Access to 
justice and legal needs,” Volume 3 (Law and Justice Foundation of New South Wales, 
2006), 104 cited in Johann Kirkby, A Study in the Best Practices of Public Legal 
Education, A Report for the Winston Churchill Memorial Trust Australia (Victoria Law 
Foundation, 2010),16. 
https://www.victorialawfoundation.org.au/sites/default/files/resources/Churchill%20Report
_Joh_Kirby_WEB_0.pdf [Accessed 20th February, 2018]. 
37 Hazel Genn, Paths to Justice: What People Do and Think about Going to Law 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1999).  Nigel Balmer et al, “Knowledge, Capability and the 
Experience of Rights Problems,” (London: PLENET, 2010) http://lawforlife.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2010/05/knowledge-capability-and-the-experience-of-rights-problems-lsrc-
may-2010-255.pdf [accessed 12th November 2014]. Collard, S, Deeming, C, Wintersteiger, 
L, Jones, M & Seargeant, J, Public Legal Education Evaluation Framework, (Bristol: 
University of Bristol Personal Finance Resource Centre, 2010). 
http://www.bristol.ac.uk/media-library/sites/geography/migrated/documents/pfrc1201.pdf 
[Accessed November 2014]. 
38 A useful review of legal needs surveys over the last 30 years is available in Access to 
Justice and Legal Needs Volume 7: Legal Australia-Wide Survey, Legal Need in Australia, 
Coumarelos et al, 2012 (Law and Justice Foundation of New South Wales). The surveys 
that fall within the Paths to Justice tradition have recently been reviewed by Pleasance et al 
Paths to Justice: A Past, Present and Future Roadmap, (2013). 
http://www.nuffieldfoundation.org/sites/default/files/files/PTJ%20Roadmap%20NUFFIEL
D%20Published.pdf Accessed 19th May 2014. However, once legal advice has been 
accessed, lack of knowledge appears to have no bearing on the outcome, with capability 
effectively handed over to the lawyer or advisor Nigel Balmer, Alexy Buck, Ash Patel, 
Catrina Denvir, Pascoe Pleasence, Knowledge, Capabilities and the Experience of Rights 
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on legal aid relative to comparable jurisdictions has not appeared to make any 
significant impact on levels of legal knowledge in the public sphere.39 What renders 
the continuity in legal need less remarkable, perhaps, is the persistence and 
intensification of juridification in modernity. Juridification paradoxically registers 
a significant expansion of social and economic rights at the same times as a 
substantial contraction of freedom. The current revival in public legal education is 
driven by this proliferation of law and the juridification of entirely new spheres of 
existence that have resulted in an ever-widening gap between the public’s 
knowledge of the law, and the legal frameworks that bind them as legal subjects. 40  
This dilemma was already apparent to the pioneer legal activists 
attempting to advance minority rights in the early days of the civil rights 
movement, a dilemma they construed as an aspect of the crisis of the rule of law. It 
                                               
Problems Legal Services research Centre, (2010): 43 https://lawforlife.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2010/05/knowledge-capability-and-the-experience-of-rights-problems-lsrc-
may-2010-255.pdf [accessed on 11th March 209] 
39 Roger Bowles and Amanda Perry, International comparison of publicly funded legal 
services and justice systems (Ministry of Justice series 14/2009), 
https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100208125113/http:/www.justice.gov.uk/pub
lications/docs/comparison-public-fund-legal-services-justice-systems.pdf [accessed March 
11th 2019]. National legal needs surveys focused on the problem of knowledge of legal 
systems and legal rights suggest that the majority of the population is unaware of basic 
legal rules and processes, with the associated difficulties for individuals to vindicate their 
rights and the risk of experiencing civil justice problems Buck et al., “Do Citizens Know 
How to Deal with Legal Issues? Some empirical insights,” Journal of social policy, 
Volume 37 Issue, 4 (2008), 661–681 (2008). Sean Hannon Williams, “Sticky Expectations: 
responses to persistent over-optimism in marriage, employment contracts, and credit card 
use.” Notre Dame Law Review, Volume 84, Issue, 2, (2009): 733–791. 
40 On the expansion of litigation and the growth of lawyers alongside a rapid increase in 
financial transactions see Marc Galanter, “In the Winter of Our Discontent: Law, Anti-Law, 
and Social Science Annual Review of Social Science, Volume 2 (2006), 5 and Marc 
Galanter, “Law Abounding: Legalization around the North Atlantic, The Modern Law 
Review, Volume 5 Number 1(1992).  Jurgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative 
Action, Vol. 2, Boston: Beacon Press, 1987, p. 359. Scott Veitch, Emilios Christodoulidis, 
Marco Goldoni, Juridification in Jurisprudence (Abingdon, Routledge, 2018) 312-318. 
Gunther Teubner, “Juridification: Concepts, Aspects, Limits, Solutions” in Robert Baldwin, 
Colin Scott, and Christopher Hood, A Reader on Regulation (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2019). 
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was a crisis that demanded nothing less than fundamental political democratic 
change – a call which, however briefly, captured the imagination of U.S. politics.41 
Fifty years on, these features of the legal landscape have been intensified in such a 
way as to suggest a profoundly altered relationship between citizen and state, a 
relationship that marks the ‘great turn’ from classical liberalism to new political 
and regulatory forms of governance following the end of the cold war.42 Rather than 
revisiting the extensive literature on legal need as such, the chapter aims to draw 
together the particular perspectives that offer critical purchase for questions 
engaging with public knowledge of the law specifically. Public knowledge of the 
law, which is here distinguished from knowledge gained through specialist study or 
professional pursuit of legal training, encompasses an understanding of the legal 
system and broad awareness of legal rights and processes. 43  While initially 
appearing as epistemological-juridical concerns, that is to say the concern of 
people’s lack of awareness of their rights and entitlements and the ability to access 
them in the courts, this underlying problem soon begins to reveal a more 
fundamental juridical-political concern. This poses a more pressing question: how 
is law configured as binding the relation of citizen and state?  
                                               
41 For 1960s activist lawyers and subsequently presidential speechwriter, Edgar Cahn 
and his wife Jean, the explosion of rights and grievances without redress alongside the 
widening discretion of officials were all contributing factors that render law increasingly 
impotent as a tool to mount progressive defense of poor and disadvantaged communities. 
See Edgar S Cahn and Jean Camper Cahn, “Power to the People or the Profession? The 
Public Interest in Public Interest Law” The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 79, No. 5 (April 1970): 
1005-1048. 
42 Although rooted earlier in the century, rapid expansion of policies associated with the 
dismantling of the social state and the alignment of legal and economic policies directed 
toward the privatization of public spheres came in the 1970s and 80s, see Pierre Dardot and 
Christian Laval, The New way of the World: On Neoliberal Society, Trans Elliott, 
(London/New York: Verso, 2014), 147 – 155. 
43 Legal need can broadly be understood as the gap between the instance of problems 
with a legal dimension—for which some kind of legal remedy exists (justiciable 
problems)—and the frequency with which those experiencing problems access legal help. 
See Genn, Paths to Justice, 1999. A conceptual framework, albeit not exhaustive, of the 
competencies involved in legal knowledge have been offered by Collard et al. Public Legal 




The study finally moves to focus on the United Kingdom to consider the last 
decade of reforms that include a range of liberalising and privatising features in 
which public education is tied to the rule of law. Deregulatory policies in the legal 
services sector appear to respond to a new demand to ensure the public have a 
better understanding of their rights and duties, a concern given impetus by a 
broader rule of law objective. 44  The global financial downturn of 2008 and ensuing 
austerity measures simultaneously provided conditions for the retrenchment of 
public investment in legal assistance, leading to substantial reductions in access to 
advice and legal services for low to middle income populations. This correlates 
with an increase in the numbers of people involved in court proceedings without 
the help of a lawyer. Liberalising reforms in the legal services sector reveal a turn 
away from classical laissez-faire toward increasingly expansive regulatory 
activism. As large parts of the welfare system come under wholesale attack, the 
sharp increase in drivers for population groups seeking assistance with legal 
problems is coeval with competition-oriented reshaping of the legal services 
market. In conjunction with these changes, the impact of reforms toward a ‘digital 
by default’ justice system and the implementation of an Online Court has driven 
the need for members of the public to understand legal rules and procedures in 
order to use online justice systems. These various factors illustrate a complex and 
often contentious intersection of public knowledge of law and the rule of law that 
can be read within a set of governmental strategies and rationalities.   
 
 
Defining public legal education  
 
 
Public legal education commonly involves multidisciplinary and largely 
informal educational practices that exist at the margins of the legal academy and 
legal profession.45 As a consequence, much remains undocumented, and much of 
                                               
44 The objective of enhancing the citizen’s rights and duties was enshrined in the Legal 
Services Act 2007 (1) (g). 
45 Lisa Wintersteiger, Legal Need, Legal Capability and the Role of Public Legal 
Education (London, Law for Life, 2015). Susan Macdonald, “Beyond Caselaw - Public 
Legal Education in Ontario Legal Clinics,” Windsor Year Book of Access to Justice, 
Volume 18, Number 3 (2000).  
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what follows needs to be construed as remnants of a richer, larger but 
discontinuous tapestry:  
 
[T]he understanding of PLE has been maintained largely through oral 
tradition and action rather than in written commentary or analysis. To 
describe PLE it is necessary to come at that understanding through a 
review of key events, organizations, activities, products, ideas, values, 
and issues that have shaped or emerged from the PLE experience.46  
 
The literature that has been retrieved should also be considered in light of what is 
missing; oral practices rarely made it to formal curricula and few academic 
scholars took an interest in the field. Its proponents and practitioners were 
outsiders, its early pioneers were often women, sometimes black – and most of 
their stories did not make it into either law or history books.47 Moreover, informal 
and non-formal learning is itself contrasted with and de-valorised against the 
formality of learning in schools and academic settings precisely for its tendency to 
elude stringent recording. While the contrast is less insistent in today’s life-long 
learning society, historically at least we can note that:  
 
As enlightenment-based rationality and science were applied to 
learning, ways were sought and developed to improve upon the 
supposedly more primitive and simple everyday learning.  Formal 
learning, when effectively provided, was assumed to have clear 
advantages.  It opened up the accumulated wisdom of humankind, held 
in the universities.  This sort of accumulated, recorded and 
propositional knowledge allowed each generation to know more and 
better than their predecessors, as science (or art) advanced.48   
 
                                               
46 Gander, “Radical Promise”, 13. 
47 I am grateful to Lois Gander for emphasising this important point in discussion about 
the literature that does exist, which is largely produced by male academics and does not 
reflect the experience of practitioners active in the field during the 1960s. 
48 Helen Colley, Phil Hodkinson, and Janice Malcolm, Non-formal learning: mapping 
the conceptual terrain, a consultation report (University of Leeds, 2002). For a discussion 
and critique of life-long learning approaches see Gert Biesta, The Beautiful Risk of 
Education (London: Paradigm Publishers, 2013), 43-59 http://www.infed.org/archives/e-
texts/colley_informal_learning.htm [Accessed 20th February 2019]. 
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Public legal education encompasses a raft of activities spanning television and 
radio, information leaflets, community teaching and awareness raising campaigns, 
to grass-roots organising on specific issues that include a legal component, such as 
domestic violence, stop and search, housing possessions and welfare entitlements.49 
Neither aimed at vocational legal learning nor providing formal educational 
qualifications, the field nevertheless has come to be recognised in its own right, 
even if it remains resolutely ‘homeless’.50 The broad terminology applied to the 
field contributes to difficulties in defining the genre and also varies significantly 
across jurisdictions and therefore remains, to an extent, contested. Various terms 
by which it has become known include justice education, law-related education, 
legal literacy, legal empowerment and community legal education.51 The lack of 
clear boundaries has been attributed to the ’fluidity’ of the concepts it comprises 
(‘public’, ‘legal’, ‘education’), leading to some confusion as to whether public 
legal education is, “an activity, a discipline, a field, a network, or a social 
movement.” 52 A clear definition thus remains somewhat elusive. 
Public legal education is directed toward improving knowledge of laws 
and legal processes in the general population. While some fields are attentive to the 
intersection of plural traditions in which traditional laws intersect and in some 
                                               
49 Public Legal Education and Support Task Force (2007) Developing Capable Citizens: 
The role of Public Legal Education, 
www.pleas.org.uk/uploads/PLEAS%20Task%20Force%20Report.pdf [accessed February 
2015]. Pat Pitsula, Review of the Role of Public Legal Education in the Delivery of Justice 
Services November 4, 2002): 2. Mojab S., McDonald S. (2008) “Women, Violence and 
Informal Learning” in: Kathryn Church, Nina Bascia, Eric Shragge eds., Learning through 
Community, Springer, (Dordrecht: Springer, 2008). 
50 According to Pat Pitsula, “PLE has not yet found a natural ‘home’ – whether in 
advice or legal services, education or elsewhere.” Review of the Role of Public Legal 
Education in the Delivery of Justice Services (Vancouver: Ministry of the Attorney 
General, 2003) 19. The scope of activities involved in public legal education often overlaps 
with other disciplines. Some closely associated fields include citizenship education, legal 
information and advice (though not advocacy), as well as financial capability.  
51 Although terms can be used somewhat interchangeably, Anglo-American practices 
largely fall under public legal education or law-related education for younger audiences. 
Australians prefer the term community legal education, European examples apply the term 
legal literacy, and international development models encompass public legal education in 
the wider context of legal empowerment initiatives.  
52 Lois Gander, “The Radical Promise.”13.  
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cases are overlaid by colonial legal systems, defining the nature of legal knowledge 
is relevant. Often people misunderstand their legal rights, are apply wider 
judgments or fairness, cultural norms or morality to what they understand the law 
to be. This has been a prominent finding of legal needs surveys that have focused 
attention on the public’s understanding of law and legal services as well as legal 
capability in order to understand how people experience legal problems in their 
lives.53 The specific focus on legal rights and legal processes can include a vast 
array of topics within the civil and criminal fields.  In practice, its reach tends to be 
restricted by focusing on groups that are particularly prone to legal problems and 
who struggle to access or exercise their rights. The participants and beneficiaries of 
public legal education programmes are commonly from marginalised groups 
experiencing specific barriers to justice such as minority groups, young people, 
prisoners and welfare recipients.54 Particularly as it appeared in the middle of the 
twentieth century in North America, the demand to improve legal education and 
prevent legal exclusion was shaped by an idealistic and subversive strategy for 
resisting legal and social hegemony and aimed at breaking cycles of poverty and 
political disenfranchisement.55 The disparate popular education movements that 
have emerged around the world since have sought recognition for legal education 
                                               
53 See Pascoe Pleasance, Nigel Balmer and Catrina Denvir, “How people understand 
and interact with law” (The Legal Education Foundation, 2015). 
https://www.thelegaleducationfoundation.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/12/HPUIL_report.pdf [Accessed 24th February 2019]. For a recent 
review and guidance on legal needs surveys and their relationship to access to justice see 
Legal Needs Surveys and Access to Justice Open Society Initiative and Organisation for 
Economic Co-Operation and Development (2019) https://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/sites/g2g9a36c-en/index.html?itemId=/content/publication/g2g9a36c-en 
[Accessed September 2019]. 
54 Carol McEown and Gayla Reid, Public Legal Education review: reflections and 
recommendations on public legal education delivery in BC (Legal Services Society, BC. 
May 2007). Suzie Forell and Hugh McDonald, Beyond great expectations: modest, 
meaningful and measurable community legal education and information, Justice Issue 21. 
(Law and Justice Foundation, 2015). 
http://www.lawfoundation.net.au/ljf/site/articleIDs/D1D67F87F681ECBACA257F0F0021
C08A/$file/JI_21_Beyond_great_expectations.pdf [Accessed 22nd January 2019]. 
55 Lois Gander, “The Radical Promise.” Bryant Garth, Neighbourhood Law Firms for 
the Poor: A Comparative Study of Recent Developments in Legal Aid and in the Legal 
Profession (Dordrecht, Kluwer,1980).  
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as a fundamental aspect of access to justice. The need for concerted efforts to 
expand education provision has also been articulated as intrinsic to democratic 
accountability, the promotion of human rights, poverty alleviation, and combating 
social exclusion and structural inequality.56 As we will explore in greater depth in 
chapter two, the wider discourse that has emerged on public legal education and 
the rule of law reveals complex and conflicting objectives of popular education 
about the law in an increasingly ‘law-thick’ world.57  
In the United Kingdom, a concerted effort to grapple with the definition 
and scope of public legal education was undertaken by a broad coalition of 
agencies under the auspices of the Public Legal Education and Support Task Force, 
convened in 2006. The Task Force developed a working definition for public legal 
education:  
 
Public legal education provides people with the awareness, knowledge 
and understanding of rights and legal issues, together with the 
confidence and skills they need to deal with disputes and gain access 
to justice. Equally important it helps people to recognize when they 
need support, what sort of advice they need and where to get it.58  
 
The Task Force definition also places an emphasis on legal capability as the goal of 
public legal education interventions:  
 
Public Legal Education is the tool we need to achieve legal capability. 
It has a key role in helping citizens to understand the law and to use it 
more effectively in their daily lives, bringing many different individual 
and social benefits. PLE is the missing element in the creation of the 
legally-enabled citizen.59  
                                               
       56 On the association of legal need and social exclusion and inequality see 
Pleasance et al., Causes of Action: Civil Law and Social Justice (2011), see Rebecca 
Sandfur, “Access to Civil Justice and Race, Class, and Gender Inequality,” Annual Review 
of Sociology, Vol. 34: 339-358. 
57 Gillian K Hadfield, “Life in the Law-Thick World: The Legal Resource Landscape 
for Ordinary Americans,” in Samuel Estreicher and Joy Radice eds. Beyond Elite Law: 
Access to Civil Justice in America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2016). 
58 PLEAS Task Force (2007), 13. 
59 PLEAS Task Force (2007), 15. 
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Subsequent efforts to map and conceptualise legal capability in the United 
Kingdom have provided a framework for evaluating practices.60 Alongside social 
agendas including crime reduction, social justice and human rights efforts, the Task 
Force definition encompasses the wider capacity of citizens to engage with 
government. However, this function is couched in terms of “capacity to enhance 
public understanding of how government can configure support, information, and 
help.”61 The definition falls short of a wider democratic element linking the 
practices with participation in political life. Of further note in the U.K. is the fact 
that public legal education was placed on a tentative statutory footing under the 
auspices of the Legal Services Act 2007. The Act aimed to liberalise the legal 
services market and improve consumer confidence by increasing public 
understanding of the citizen's legal rights and duties, an innovation in the 
regulatory sphere which will be explored in greater depth in chapter two.62  
The statutory contexts in which public legal education appears in different 
jurisdictions vary according to how practices are framed and the periods in which 
legislation incorporating elements of public legal education occur. Australian 
literature employs the terminology of community legal education. This is defined 
as: “a learning process about the law which empowers people who share common 
problems or issues through knowledge, skills and/or attitudinal changes to be able 
to do things differently.”63 It enjoys a more integrated role within wider legal 
services provision than in the U.K., having been written into legislation 
establishing legal aid commissions in Australia in the 1970s.64 In the United States, 
the 1970s also brought about legislative innovation in the field. The terminology of 
public legal education and law-related education are used somewhat 
                                               
60 These comprise four domains, each of which combine elements of knowledge, skills 
and attitudinal aspects of recognising and contending with legal issues. See Collard et al, 
Public Legal Education Evaluation, (2010). 
61 PLEAS Task Force (2007), 12. 
62 Legal Services Act s1 (g). The wider implications of placing public legal education 
within the framework of regulatory objectives is explored in greater depth in Chapter 2.  
63 Cassandra Goldie, Community Legal education Handbook, Second edition. (Law 
Foundation of New South Wales,1997), 11. The Australian development is closely aligned 
to the emergence of Neighbourhood Law Centres and is explored in more depth in the 
following section. 
64 Forell and Mcdonald, “Beyond Great Expectations,” 2015. 
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interchangeably, with activities closely tied to civic engagement. The U.S. Law-
Related Education Act of 1978 defined such activities as: “education to equip 
nonlawyers with knowledge and skills pertaining to the law, the legal process, and 
the legal system, and the fundamental principles and values on which these are 
based.”65 The American Bar Association, active in the field since the 1950s, 
describe their work in supporting law-related education as: “education about the 
rights and responsibilities of citizens in our constitutional democracy; it is 
education about the role of law in the democratic adventure; and it is education 
about how the rule of law protects our freedoms.”66 The history of public legal 
education as it emerged in Canada and the United States will be explored in greater 
depth below, but it is worth noting at this point the early adoption of a statutory 
basis for public legal education and their framing of legal education as a feature of 
constitutional democracy. 
Another field of activity of public legal education can be found in the 
international development sphere. Of note is the recent insertion of access to justice 
activities under Goal 16 of the United Nation Development Goals.67 International 
development literature includes public legal education as a means of building legal 
literacy or legal awareness, aimed at improving the capacity of minority groups to 
seek legal protection despite barriers caused by language, general literacy and 
geographical remoteness. Examples from African women’s rights initiatives 
                                               
65 Educating the public about the law: the work we do and why, Division of Public 
Education American Bar Association 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/publiced/pedbrochure.pdf 
[accessed 25th January 2019]. 
66 American Bar Association, “What is Law-Related Education?” 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_education/Programs/national-law-related-
education-conference/past_conference_programs/2013_law-
relatededucationconference/law-related_educationconferencehistory/ [Accessed on 24th 
January 2019]. See also Whitler, John D. “Public Legal Education,” Journal of Family Law 
Volume 12 (1972): 269. 
67 For example, Goal 16 of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals targets 
include promoting the rule of law at national and international levels and ensuring equal 
access to justice for all. Further, to ensure public access to information and protect 
fundamental freedoms, in accordance with national legislation and international 
agreements. “About the Sustainable Development Goals,” United Nations, 
http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/sustainable-development-goals/goal-16-peace-
justice-and-strong-institutions/targets.html. [Accessed 23rd January 2019]. 
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document a variety of practices, including dissemination of multi-lingual materials, 
posters and t-shirts, and training aimed at raising awareness of customary and 
statutory law.68 Methods including radio programmes, dance, song, and drama have 
offered means of reaching women and embedding a culture of women’s rights by 
educating policy makers, police, prison guards and the judiciary.69 Another branch 
of development-oriented practices are encompassed under a broader rubric of legal 
empowerment. Legal empowerment comprises: “the use of legal services, often in 
combination with related development activities, to increase disadvantaged 
populations' control over their lives.”70 This wider definition of legal support 
responds to the failure of traditional legal aid services to meet the needs of poor 
and marginalized communities. Conceived as alternatives to ‘top down’ rule of law 
initiatives, delivery strategies focused on education, building legal literacy and 
awareness raising are a growing feature of the legal landscape in the global south. 
These models also seek to remedy the lack of trust in the justice system by 
disadvantaged communities in both civil and criminal jurisdictions.71 According to 
Maru, legal empowerment:  
 
[G]rows out of the tradition of legal aid for the poor and seeks, as legal 
aid has sought for centuries, to help people protect their rights. For 
much of the world’s population, legal aid in its classic form is either 
impractical or inadequate: lawyers are costly and scarce; lawyers are 
ill equipped to deal with the plural legal systems prevalent in most 
                                               
68 Jean Kamau, Jane Wambui Kiragu, Cheryl L Cooper, “Review of Strategies for 
Promoting Legal Literacy,” Economic Commission for Africa, African Women’s Centre 
(1997), 15. http://repository.uneca.org/bitstream/handle/10855/15794/bib-
64287.pdf?sequence [accessed 23rd January 2019]. 
69 Kamau, “Strategies for promoting legal literacy”, 25-27. 
70 Benjamin van Rooj, “Bringing Justice to the Poor, Bottom-Up Legal Development 
Cooperation,” Hague Journal on the Rule of Law, Volume 4 (2012) 4: 286. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S1876404512000176  
71 For an analysis of the empowerment perspectives that challenge rule of law 
orthodoxies, see Stephen Golub “Beyond the Rule of Law Orthodoxy: The Legal 
Empowerment Alternative”, Rule of Law Series, Democracy and Rule of Law Project 
Number 41 (2003) https://carnegieendowment.org/files/wp41.pdf [accessed 18th February 
2019]. 
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countries; and many people do not prefer the solutions afforded by 
litigation and formal legal process.72 
 
Legal empowerment efforts consequently aim to provide legal aid in a way that is 
practical, flexible, and responsive to socio-legal context. 
As the various settings and contexts above suggest, the field of reference 
for public legal education is vast, contributing to its lack of clear distinction as an 
educational endeavor. This is further complicated by the fact that public legal 
education also includes provision of information embedded in wider legal aid 
services. The blurring of boundaries between information, education and advice 
leads to confusion, in particular when provided by state actors or agencies. In this 
sense it comes close to, but remains distinct from, the promulgatory activities 
associated with lawmaking.73 The need to differentiate between general information 
about laws and regulations and more explicitly educational interventions is tackled 
in some instances by focusing on the outcomes of different interventions. For 
instance, the extent to which knowledge is linked to individual empowerment or 
collective consciousness raising is explored in some studies, in others distinctions 
                                               
72 Vivek Maru, “Allies Unknown: Social Accountability and Legal Empowerment,” 
Health and Human Rights, Volume 12. No 1 (2010). A practice in Malawi, which has been 
adopted in numerous other jurisdictions, is paralegal training for non-lawyers. The 
paralegal aid clinics (PLCs) form the core work of the paralegals in prisons, prepared by an 
experienced practitioner in forum theatre. The introduction of participatory learning 
techniques and forum theatre empowered prisoners to argue for bail, enter a plea in 
mitigation, conduct their own defense and cross-examine witnesses. Attendance levels at 
the clinics rose dramatically, not so much because they were thought to be entertaining as 
because prisoners noticed that their friends were not coming back from court. They were 
being sent home, whether on bail or having already served their sentence on remand.” See 
Adam Stapleton, “Empowering the poor to access criminal justice: A grass-roots 
perspective, (2010) 11-12. Legal Empowerment Working Papers, International 
Development Law Organization. 
https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/138112/LEWP_Stapleton.pdf [Accessed 19th February 2019] 
73 For a discussion of the proximity of public legal education and promulgation see Lisa 
Wintersteiger and Tara Mulqueen, “Decentering Law Through Public Legal Education,” 
Oñati Socio-Legal Series 7, No. 7 (2017): 1557-1880. 
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are drawn by virtue of the role of information and education directed towards 
group or class interests.74  
 
Legal information is important because many people are powerless in 
particular situations primarily through lack of knowledge – knowledge 
is power. This is [community legal education] at its most basic level. 
Information without education, however, may not achieve the 
objectives of [community legal education]. Legal education 
encourages a critical understanding of the law and the legal system and 
allows an assessment of its impact or usefulness. It is contended that 
education must be a mechanism for consciousness raising, not simply 
an unquestioning acceptance of the status quo.75 
 
The orientation toward class interests appears more cognizant of the wider 
structures within which rights function, while emphasising that education and 
information should not be conflated.  
Reflecting on the range of motivations behind public legal education 
reveals some definitional challenges, which merit being construed in light of their 
particular and often contingent political, historical and geographical contexts. This 
preliminary exploration already foregrounds the competing visions of the 
normative and socially adaptive purposes of public legal education, in contrast to 
practices that aim to defy, subvert or challenge legal orthodoxies. Garth’s 
important comparative analysis of neighbourhood law firms provides us with a 
useful illustration of these divergent definitions and their potential consequences. 
                                               
74 “Guidelines for the management of community legal education”, Australian National 
Community Legal Education Advisory Group, National Association of Community Legal 
Clinics, 1995:1. 
http://www.naclc.org.au/cb_pages/files/13%20National%20CLE%20Guidelines%20%28O
ct%202009%29%282%29.pdf [Accessed 6th February 2019]. The recognition of class or 
group interest makes for a more sophisticated approach to legal need and the mechanisms 
through which access barriers can be addressed. Infra Mauro Cappelletti and Bryant Garth 
eds. Access to Justice: A World Survey, Volume 1 Book 1 (Milan: Sijthoff and Noordhoff, 
1978). 
75  National Community Legal Education Committee, 1995. In contrast, recent research 
from Australia contends that the self-help aspect of community legal education requires a 
sustained focus on procedural and practical issues (often identified with legal materials 
produced by for-profit CLE providers), and loses efficacy when including the contextual 
aspects of legal systems.  
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Public legal education serves to build “awareness of legal procedures and 
approaches to problems”; “counteracts relations of dependency between lawyers 
and clients”; helps to “mobilize individuals and groups to pursue their rights”; 
“fosters self-help activities”76; demystifies law and counteracts the “myth of rights”; 
and supports the autonomy of groups to pursue other forms of political and social 
action.77   
Balancing collective demands for social and political action with 
individualized liberal rights frames produces varying and sometimes antithetical 
objectives. The sheer breadth of goals, methods and of the motivations of the actors 
involved in public legal education has, as we will further explore, created 
discernible tensions affecting the development of public legal education in a 








The previous section introduced the wide genre of public legal education 
as it has appeared around the world in recent years. The narrower focus of the 
following discussion will examine the public legal education movement that 
manifested as an aspect of the counter-culture of the 1960s. Emerging in North 
America from grass-roots activism and agitation for social reform, radical 
educational practices were able to flourish outside of institutional frameworks and 
                                               
76 The divergent notions of self-help are also instructive. For example, the Adamstown 
Law Centre in Wales, who were devising strategies to support self-help report: “Handing 
out leaflets should not be confused with working with the client in a way that can increase 
the client’s awareness and abilities. The promotion of self-help requires at least as much 
professional input as a conveyance or a court appearance. The professional skills needed 
are rather different, but they should not be disparaged or under-resourced merely for that.” 
Adamstown Community Trust 1978 cited in Bryant Garth, Neighborhood Law Firms for 
the Poor: , A Comparative Study of Recent Developments in Legal Aid and in the Legal 
Profession (Alphen aan den Rijn, Netherlands: Sijthoff and Noordhof International 
Publishers, 1980), 170.  
77 Garth, Neighborhood Law Firms, 193-198. 
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were a feature of a wider progressive movement for change. Education practices 
were used as a strategic tool in liberation battles - getting legal information to those 
who refused to fight in the Vietnam war, vagrants, women’s liberation movements, 
and people fighting police oppression - in short, “bringing law to the people.”78 
Poverty law, out of which public legal education grew, was itself an outgrowth of 
the civil rights movement.79 It was conceived as a direct challenge to the systemic 
inequalities of the law in the conservative tendencies of mainstream liberalism, and 
that also served to entrench poverty and oppression within the legal order.80  
In the U.S., important conceptual precursors emerged under the auspices of 
‘preventive law’, long before the War on Poverty of the Johnson administration. 
The growth of preventive law dates to the turn of the twentieth century and a shift 
to case law methods of teaching in law schools. Changes in academic legal 
education were accompanied by evolutions in the practice of law. Advice and 
consultation were becoming a feature of legal practice, in contrast to practices 
centred solely on litigation and advocacy. These changes were a far cry from the 
political activism aimed at poverty alleviation, since preventive law was closely 
associated with commercial and criminal law.81 But they would in due course 
become integral to the general practice of law. According to Willard Hurst, the 
incoming Professor of Harvard Law School in 1870, Christopher Columbus 
Langdell, marked a key moment, both in the orientation of law schools toward the 
case method and of a change in the orientation of legal culture. It is this change that 
interests us: “[B]oth in their own eyes and in the common opinion of laymen, 
                                               
78 Lois Gander, “The Radical promise of Public Legal Education in Canada,” (MA diss., 
University of Alberta, 1999): 13, and “The changing face of Public Legal Education in 
Canada”, News & Views on Civil Justice Reform, no. 6 (summer 2003): 4. 
79 Martha Davies, “The Pendulum Swings Back: Poverty Law in the Old and New 
Curriculum,” Fordham Urban Law Journal, Volume 34, Issue 4 (2006): 1391-1415.  
80 For a concise overview of the various programmes that emerged in the U.S in the 
context of the ‘War on Poverty’ in the era of civil rights, see Frank Munger, “Rights in the 
shadow of class: Poverty, welfare, and the law,” in Austin Sarat ed., The Blackwell 
Companion to Law and Society (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004): 330-353. The effect 
of the collapse of the war on poverty on research efforts is discussed further below. 
81 Bruce J Winick, “The Expanding Scope of Preventive Law,” Florida Coastal Law 
Journal Volume 3, Issue (2001): 189-204. For the development of the idea of preventive 
justice and the security state see Andrew Ashworth and Lucia Zedner, Preventive Justice, 
(Oxford: University of Oxford, 2014).  
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lawyers’ distinctive business was contest in court…The years after 1870 
showed…increasing effort to use law and lawyers preventively.”82 What was 
critical to this preventive approach was the realisation that clients had to know 
when a fact has legal salience:  
 
Every person in our society must be able to determine (a) whether his 
activities do or do not involve law, and (b) if they do, whether the 
activities are sufficiently significant to engage professional 
guidance…the practice of preventive law by actors-at-law presupposes 
that there are guideposts and warning signals to enable a person, based 
on his own experiences and knowledge, to determine when he is an 
actor-at-law, and that there are rules of hygiene which he may safely 
follow.83  
 
This basic conceptual premise was readily adaptable to the early emergence of 
legal aid societies working with poorer communities. Information and awareness 
raising work by the New York Legal Aid Society began as early as 1904, 
distributing pamphlets for domestic servants. Kansas City Legal Aid Bureau 
produced multilingual information on legal questions in 1912, and materials for 
soldiers and sailors were widely distributed by the Red Cross after the First World 
War.84 Some of the most strident legal aid advocates construed their activities not 
only as preventive but as a crucial process of social integration in rapidly 
expanding urban populations.85 A leading light of Boston Legal Aid Society, 
                                               
82 Willard Hurst, The Growth of American Law: The Law Makers (Boston: Little, 
Brown and Company1950), 302, cited in Brown, Louis M. "The law office. A preventive 
law laboratory," University of Pennsylvania Law Review 104, no. 7 (1956): 940. On the 
links with later student radicalism and the continuities and contestations with legal realism 
see also Laura Kalman, The Yale Law School and the Sixties: Revolt and Reverberations 
(North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 2005). 
83 Brown, Louis M. "The law office. A preventive law laboratory," University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 104, no. 7 (1956): 940-953.   
84 Munger, “Rights in the shadow of class” (2004: 4). John Whitler, “Public Legal 
Education,” Journal of Family Law, Volume 12 (1972): 269. 
85 See Reginald Herber Smith, Justice and the Poor: A Study of the present denial of 
justice to the poor and of the agencies making more equal their position before the law with 
particular reference to legal aid work in the United Sates (Carnegie Foundation for the 
Advancement of Teaching, 1919), 7. 
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Reginald Smith, whose seminal study Justice and the Poor became widely 
influential, considered work to make law available to poor immigrants as vital to 
assimilation and to avoid the danger of political radicalisation. The rule of law was 
“an important element in the Americanization of immigrants…access to the legal 
system not only ’taught’ new Americans about democratic values but also 
dampened the prospects of radicalization.”86 
The early movement was also bolstered by a growth in poverty law 
literature and a rapid expansion of poverty law curricula in law schools.87 A notable 
feature of poverty law scholarship is its preoccupation with power, which, 
alongside the critical legal studies movement emerged in the higher legal education 
milieu of the same period. A rich undercurrent of critical thought combined social 
and political theory with the concerns of concrete legal realities. The nature of 
legal advocacy and the prospect of empowerment in legal relations became the 
subject of critical legal scholarship since its traditional methods were accused of 
“reproducing indefensible status hierarchies inimical to professed ideals of equality 
in their own institutions and in the profession.”88 The structural forms of inequality, 
the constitutive function of law and society,89 and problems of agency and the 
personal capacities of individuals were included in this potent mix.90 Finally, the 
idea that the poor require ‘treatment’ came under attack by critical scholars in the 
1960s. Their critiques specifically countered the notions of ‘legal hygiene’ that 
                                               
86 Jon M.A. Di Pippa, “Reginald Heber Smith and Justice and the Poor in the 21st 
Century,” Campbell Law Review, Volume 40, Issue 1 (2018): 73-110. Indeed, the fear of 
communism was one of the radical scourges that Smith sought to guard against. 
87 Martha Davies, “The Pendulum Swings Back,” 1392. 
88 See Anthony V. Alfieri, “The Antinomies of Poverty Law and a Theory of Dialogic 
Empowerment,”. New York University Review of Law and Social Change, Volume 16 Issue 
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Kairys, ed. The Politics of Law (New York: Pantheon, 1990). 
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Speculation on the Limits of Legal Change,” Law and Society Review Vol. 9:95, (1975). 
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grew out of the preventive law frames.91 The idea of treatment, they argued, “entails 
a conception of the poor as having problems rather than grievances and of needing 
treatment not justice. More fundamentally, however, it reflects an image of the 
poor as essentially incompetent, as incapable of knowing their interests or asserting 
them.”92  
The links between the legal and social consciousness of the 1960s 
placed legal aid at the top of the law reform agenda, culminating in the 
announcement of the War on Poverty by  President Lyndon B. Johnson in his State 
of the Union address on January 8, 1964. The Legal Services Programme of the 
Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) was created in 1965. Reform continued 
throughout the world during the 1970's.93  As the War on Poverty took hold, an 
array of neighbourhood legal services were established, centred on community 
action programmes delivered by Community Action Agencies.94  Community 
education and organising functions for the neighbourhood legal services flourished, 
helping to make the new legal services viable.  “From humble beginnings these 
educative initiatives spread to encompass community legal education; professional 
education for intermediaries; law related education in schools; and widespread 
public education about the law.”95 The concern to improve access to justice had - in 
its early days at least - engendered a form of radical education that could break the 
monopoly of legal knowledge, bring legal knowledge to those fighting liberation 
battles, and serve as a tool for holding power to account.96 
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A feature of the early movement was to attempt to conjoin education and 
information with strategic litigation and class actions. Victories in the U.S. 
Supreme Court for enforcing racial equality were accompanied by materials 
disseminating information about newly won civil rights.97 However, quite early on 
the limitations of educational endeavours also became apparent. Lack of 
coordination in provision, suitable levels of detail, and the impasse created by 
inadequate routes to legal redress compounded the difficulties98 Basic 
misunderstandings of what motivated low income groups to attend preventive 
sessions, poor preparation of sessions and teaching methods all served to hinder 
practices. Despite the initial radicalism, early examples of neighbourhood law 
services also pursued models that provided an easy fit with existing political 
structures – education in these forms followed a black letter approach that 
precluded any real attempt to consider the political structures in which legal 
inequality and injustice were embedded.  
Legal education could readily be conceived in more conservative terms; its 
preventive focus need not be construed as an expansion of minority rights and its 
aim could be to show the poor how to avoid the legal system rather than seek to 
change it to better serve their collective interest: 
 
[I]t appears that the [Office of Economic Opportunity] program may 
be losing sight of its primary goal, that of providing the poor with an 
education in preventive law. The increasing caseloads in the local 
offices have required expending the program's resources to meet the 
pressing needs of litigation. Additionally, the tendency of the legal aid 
offices to see themselves as the vehicle for expanding minority rights 
has further depleted the resources otherwise available for the 
educational effort. The unfortunate aspect of this situation is that it 
tends to be retrogressive rather than progressive when the overall 
long-term goals of the war on poverty are considered. The legal system 
is simply not adapted to solving the legal problems of the poor. 
Increasing the poor's dependency on the legal system by providing 
greater access to it sacrifices the benefits which could be gained by 
teaching the poor to avoid the legal process.99 
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Growing recognition that median income groups also struggled to access the legal 
system, and had little knowledge of its workings led to a shift in focus from the 
poorest and most marginalized (that had also involved a community organizing 
element).  Practices less concerned with educative interventions emerged, with 
more emphasis on casework. This turn away from the most disenfranchised also 
became increasingly associated with less activist and more orthodox and legalistic 
responses. According to Gander, “the case-oriented, legalistic perspective and 
work of [neighbourhood law centres] better supported teaching 'black letter law’, 
providing tips on preventing common legal problems, and generating support for 
the virtues of the rule of law.”100 The shift in strategies and ensuing compromises 
also meant that, “the approach implied that neither massive funds nor basic 
political changes were necessary.”101 
The problems these political compromises involved were visible in one 
famous experimental service in New Haven, Connecticut. New Haven is the seat of 
Yale University, had a progressive mayor and was engaged in ambitious urban 
renewal efforts, and so offered a perfect experimental mix.102 Edgar Cahn and his 
wife Jean – both Yale students - sought to try a more progressive approach to 
community and public interest lawyering. Yet the conflicting interests of the multi-
agency settings and funders (in this case, the Ford Foundation) meant lawyers were 
at times restricted from taking forward controversial litigation.103 Jean Cahn, herself 
a young black lawyer, took on the defence of a young black man in the case of the 
rape of a white woman.104 The public outcry that followed forced the resignation of 
Cahn and the closure of the neighbourhood law centre, highlighting the deeply 
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ingrained racial and political divides undermining attempts at legal activism in 
poor communities. The Cahns went on to lead a highly influential campaign setting 
out the model for radically independent and citizen led legal and social reform 
activities.105  
The Cahns acknowledged a crisis in the rule of law, the features of which 
are all too familiar today. The explosion of litigation without sufficient lawyers for 
the poor, sufficient court time to hear cases, and with an ever-growing number of 
grievances that did not attract suitable remedies were already pressing in the 1960s. 
And increasing discretion for officials and government agencies was the stuff of 
entrenched injustice that the legal system was impotent to address: 
 
The law provides no immunity from the contumely and arrogance of 
officials…the continuous insult of being stopped, searched, and 
humiliatingly interrogated. Nor does the legal system purport to offer 
remedy for poor garbage collection in slum areas. Lawyers cannot 
stand by to institute an action every time a child or parent is humiliated 
by a teacher, every time a taxi refuses to pick up a passenger in the 
ghetto, every time a chain store offers shoddy merchandise in its slum 
branches. Yet, it is just such petty grievances which cumulatively have 
made tinderboxes of every major urban center.106  
 
What was needed, according to the Cahns, was a very different approach to legal 
activism, including new institutions that could better contend with the grievances 
of the poor, an enlarged legal profession with the requisite skills to work alongside 
communities, and new methods and forums to enable debate about the permissible 
and impermissible behaviours that those in power displayed: 
 
[A] largely unexplored area for the creation of new "legal" institutions 
is the potential provided by the mass media for informing people of 
their rights, bringing community disapproval to bear upon particular 
actions of particular officials, and generating support for norms 
delimiting the range of permissible behavior in a society where the 
"legal norms" may have little reality or authority in the community. 
Cable TV and community owned and operated radio stations in 
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particular have substantial potential for creating new, legitimated 
forums for community debate, norm promulgation and sanctioning 
- from praise to condemnation.107  
 
As the political mood shifted in the 1970s and 80s, the realisation that legal literacy 
was a tool that had not been adequately deployed came a little too late.108 For 
example, critical race and feminist theorists took legal literacy to the centre stage. 
“Legal literacy was crucial in an age when civil rights discourse was shifting and 
newer paradigms were developing. They perceived the legal and political orders 
were in upheaval.”109 Certainly there had been a rights explosion, but this was not 
evenly distributed and the most able benefited the most from the rise in litigation. 
The vast increase in claims, in lawyers and in litigation costs were not evenly 
distributed. Invariably the expansion of claims and access to the courts meant 
commercial litigants fared better in the new era of rights.110  
The closure of the New Haven project precipitated a growing demand for 
law and poverty work. The demand was construed as fundamental to democratic 
accountability not simply as the struggle for social and economic justice. Edgar 
Cahn subsequently became speechwriter for Robert Kennedy in Kennedy’s role as 
Attorney General. Cahn’s influence is vividly illustrated in Kennedy’s speech to 
the Chicago Student law society on May 1st, 1964: “There is a great need for 
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America to live up to its political promise of civil rights for all its citizens. But 
there is a parallel need for America to live up to the economic promise of social 
rights, of social - and thus equal - justice under law.”111 The experience of New 
Haven led the Cahns to feel the involvement of the Bar was critical, as non-lawyer 
led organisations were incapable of defending lawyers that took on controversial 
cases. With the assassination of Robert Kennedy and under mounting economic, 
social and political pressures, the legal radicalism of the era was relatively short-
lived. By 1969 the civil rights movement was in crisis.112  
Despite the rhetoric of participatory democracy and community 
involvement, the lack of genuine participation by members of the community was a 
persistent critique of the Community Action Agencies, and the legal services that 
were attached to them. Nevertheless, the early lack of independence of legal 
services (which later would be achieved but did not in itself resolve tensions 
around different actors’ interests)113 did not completely overshadow the advances 
that were made – nor did it preclude some early preventive and educational efforts. 
As Jean Cahn pointed out after her resignation in New Haven: “the potential for 
extended legal services including representation, education and preventive 
counselling for the poor is only now coming to be appreciated.”114  
These developments also had significant impact in Canada. The 1960s saw 
the spread of agencies and legal aid clinics, often student led, incorporating public 
education activities. These programs, “had as their goal eliminating the root causes 
of social problems, like poverty and fundamentally altering the way power is 
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exercised.”115 Here too, a sense of the potential of education in the law for shaping 
democracy was discernible; participatory democracy was conceived as a means of 
returning governance to the people, involving legal education at its very core.116 One 
influential Canadian development that helped to embed the role of public legal 
education into the wider legal services landscape can be found in British Columbia. 
The amalgamation of the Legal Services Commission and the Legal Aid Society in 
1979 into the Legal Services Society brought together two distinct strands of work. 
The Commission was a government led body mandated to develop legal services 
with a particular focus on the provision of education and information. Its vision 
included work with schools, libraries, community groups and Aboriginal groups.117 
After an early focus on clinical legal education models,118 funding from the Federal 
Department of Health and Welfare proved a catalyst for change, albeit federation 
meant that some areas were more proactive than others. The model they adopted 
included law reform, community participation and organizing, paralegals and 
education initiatives.119 Yet in Canada too, the shift away from a political mission 
occurred just as programs expanded and grew to become an embedded aspect of 
the justice landscape. According to Gander, this is because public legal education 
failed to adopt a theory of law that does not reproduce the systemic problems that 
law itself creates: “law has become trapped by the very concept of law it sought to 
transform” and thereby “suffers a fundamental impediment to accomplishing its 
goal of democratizing the legal system in the pursuit of justice.” 120 
The growth and partial success of North American legal service models 
were influential elsewhere. In 1968, the U.S. model was described by the English 
Law Society of Labour Lawyers in their pamphlet ‘Justice for All.’121 By 1970, the 
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first law centre mirroring the model was opened in North Kensington. Although 
early initiatives for law centres were local, by the end of the 1970s the Law Society 
concluded that the model offered a complement, rather a threat to private practice.122 
They were not without detractors; the Law Society had initially argued the model 
would prove divisive and would mean a “loss of independence of the profession 
and could lead to a totally nationalized legal service.”123 In Australia, community 
legal centres were similarly founded in response to government and market failures 
to provide the benefits of the law to the poorest and most marginalized. They can 
also be located within a history of protest, social change, and civil and legal rights 
movements that grew out of the radical 1960s.124 Activists and lawyers came 
together, initially in disparate local activities, to provide free legal help and 
establish legal campaigns – for anti-war, anti-death penalty, and youth rights 
struggles amongst others. They self-identified as ‘anti-establishment’, seeking to 
break with elitist legal culture and remove barriers to access. According to one 
early pioneer of the movement: “[one of the] primary points of distinction of early 
community legal centres was that they were going to produce information and tell 
people about the law.”125 
The developing model of neighbourhood based legal services in the U.S., 
Canada., UK, Australia and New Zealand had in common a preoccupation with 
closing the gap between law and the communities they served. A wider holistic 
style of legal service for the poor encompassed advice, information and public 
legal education practices, in many cases with models of community organizing.126 
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Specific targeted campaigns for information involved creative ways of reaching 
disadvantaged communities with a strong preventive focus, for example, work with 
women in prisons, homelessness and housing conditions, and racial harassment.127 
However, pressure to limit services to individual advice was apparent from the 
beginning of the law centre movement in England. The shift toward legal aid 
casework services consistently appears to have undermined the more proactive 
elements of the movement, overshadowing community organising and PLE 
activities.128 Reflecting on these tensions Byles and Morris comment:  
 
[A]ny extension of community-oriented work such as housing, 
immigration, community relations or the enforcement of rights, was 
interpreted as an area of potential conflict with government, and as 
such, a threat to the ‘nonpolitical’ role which it was felt proper for a 
lawyer to maintain in his professional capacity.129  
 
Local law services, the proponents argued, should be akin to that of “the traditional 
family doctor.’130 This ‘curative’ approach to the social ills of poverty rather than 
critiques of power structures continues to influence public legal education debates 
in the U.K. today.131   
 The agitation of the 1960s influenced the evolution of legal services 
elsewhere. In Western Europe, the student movement played a critical role in the 
development of public legal education activities. Evidence of burgeoning legal 
activism in Belgium, Norway and the Netherlands can be seen throughout the 
1970s. In Tilburg, a group of students created the first ‘law shop’ (Rechtswinkel) 
with the aim of making their legal skills socially useful.132 By 1977 there were 
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approximately 80 law shops with an emphasis on poverty law and decentralised 
reform focused activities, mirroring neigbourhood law services elsewhere during 
the same period. Educational activities included radio work and publicity stunts, 
and in due course their enormous popularity drew attention to the inadequacies of 
traditional judicare services.133 In order to provide a more adequately funded 
system, the Dutch Ministry of Justice ultimately replaced the Rechtswinkel network 
with ‘bureaus voor rechtshulp’ - legal advice centres.  
Recent history of public legal education in comparative contexts highlights the 
tensions that will shape some of the core arguments of this thesis. Firstly, although 
they drew inspiration from international political movements, public legal 
education practices largely grew out of local conditions, often spontaneously 
emerging from specific experiences of repression and as a counter-tactic against 
liberal conservatism. Secondly, the pervasive experience of exclusion from legal 
redress, the unaffordability of legal services, and a culture of elitism surrounding 
legal knowledge engendered a variety of attempts to break the monopoly of legal 
knowledge and the protectionism of the legal elites. However, the more this 
endeavour became led by lawyers themselves, the form of law - its rigidities and 
hierarchies - came to undermine the radical potential that public legal education 
held out. Thirdly, despite the relatively widespread establishment of legal 
education practices, the field remains both under-researched and what research 
does exist lacks critical orientation. For Gander this is understandable: “[public 
legal education] providers have tended to engage their inquiry at a practical rather 
than a theoretical level and to take whatever ground they can gain from time to 
time. [Public legal education] has also had to take on many faces just to ensure its 
own survival.”134 
 Aside from Gander’s fascinating study of the radical promise of public legal 
education, there is a striking lack of critical scholarship considering relations 
between the development or curtailment of public legal knowledge and its 
constitutive role – either in constituting social relations or as an aspect of 
constituent power from which political legitimacy is derived.  Despite the history 
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of political struggle that the early public legal education movement charts, 
scholarship considering the paradigm of legal knowledge beyond the institutions of 
courts, academic and professional legal actors is largely limited to empirical legal 
needs studies.135  It appears, with some exceptions, legal scholarship has neglected 
to tackle the linkages between the monopolization of legal knowledge by 
professional, legal and political elites and the dissemination of legal knowledge to 
the wider population.136 This has resulted in a failure to engage with how power 
relations in and around the juridical field constitute dynamic processes.  We will 
aim to tease out relations of legal knowledge and power that are constitutive of 
political and social relations throughout the remainder of the chapter. 
 
 
Legal need studies and access to justice 
 
 
We have begun to explore the evolution of educational practices that 
crested in the 1970s, partially due to their initial success in elevating the social, 
economic and political exclusion of poor and minority groups into public 
consciousness. In fact, the demand for realisable rights and for meaningful political 
participation was received in some quarters as nothing short of a crisis in 
democracy. The Trilateral Commission, founded in 1973 by David Rockefeller, 
amplified fear of the perceived ‘ungovernability of democracies’ across the 
Trilateral axis of the United Sates, Western Europe and Japan.  Leading voices of 
the Trilateral Commission, Michael Crozier, Samuel Huntington and Joji 
Watanuki, reporting in 1975, lamented the ‘excess of democracy’ that had emerged 
in the 1960s. This excess took the shape of “the rise of egalitarian demands and the 
                                               
135 But see Benjamin Fleury-Steiner & Laura Nielsen eds., The New Civil Rights 
Research: A Constitutive Approach (Aldershot/Burlington: Ashgate, 2006). Some of the 
limitations associated with legal needs scholarship, as Engel points out, fostered the 
branching off into legal consciousness studies within the paradigm of law and society 
scholarship. David Engel How Does Law Matter in the Constitution of Legal 
Consciousness? In, Bryant Garth and Austin Sarat eds. How Does Law Matter? 
Fundamental Issues in Law and Society (Chicago Ill., Northwestern University Press, 
1998), 122. 
136 For a discussion of postmodernism in social theory and law see Roger Cotterrell, 
Law in Social Thought and Social Theory in the Study of Law (2004), 18-21.  
 53 
desire for active political participation by the poorest, most marginalised classes.”137 
What was configured as an excess of democracy was also an excess of government 
– the art of liberal government had over-reached its internal rules and its 
longstanding equation of good government with frugality.138  
Against this ‘excess’ of distributive justice in the North and West, post-
colonial calls for redistribution were also emerging. The founding of the Mont 
Pèlerin Society in 1947 by Austrian economist Friedrich Hayek and others sought: 
“to re-found liberalism in opposition to the threat of socialist planning, which, the 
[Mont Pèlerin Society] argued, had led to the disappearance of ‘the essential 
conditions of human dignity and freedom’ from much of the earth.”139 Post-colonial 
struggles and the demands for restitution, the Society’s proponents argued, were 
conspiracies to keep colonial populations from much needed economic 
development and freedom. Unsurprisingly, the demand for equality, for 
redistribution and democratic participation engendered a backlash. But this was not 
a revival of laissez-fair liberalism; rather, it brought about a new version of 
juridical activism to reassert the independence of the market.140  The precarious 
democratic condition of Europe, North America and Japan in the 70s – the 
Trilateral Commission warned - lay in:  
 
the conjunction of the policy problems arising from the contextual 
challenges, the decay in the social base of democracy manifested in the 
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rise of oppositionist intellectuals and privatistic youth, and the 
imbalances stemming from the actual operations of democracy itself 
which make the governability of democracy a vital and, indeed, an 
urgent issue for the Trilateral societies.141  
 
The conditions of social and moral decay, intellectual vanguardism and 
generational agitation were held responsible for a situation in which the growth and 
coalescence of interest groups were able to make demands on their respective 
governments. After the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the oil crisis of 1973, and the 
student revolts of May 1968, the demands overloaded the ‘decision-making 
burdens’ on government and were seen as fatal to democracy itself:  
 
the effective operation of a democratic political system usually 
requires some measure of apathy and non-involvement on the part of 
some individuals and groups. In the past, every democratic society has 
had a marginal population, of greater or lesser size, which has not 
actively participated in politics. In itself, this marginality on the part of 
some groups is inherently undemocratic, but it has also been one of the 
factors which has enabled democracy to function effectively. Marginal 
social groups, as in the case of the blacks, are now becoming full 
participants in the political system. Yet the danger of overloading the 
political system with demands which extend its functions and 
undermine its authority still remains. Less marginality on the part of 
some groups thus needs to be replaced by more self-restraint on the 
part of all groups.142 
 
This diagnosis led to a number of crucial responses – some of which we will 
explore in greater depth in our analysis of the function of legal education and 
public legal knowledge in the reorientation of the rule of law in modernity. This 
enables us to trace the origins of a new economic-juridical rationality, one that 
illustrates a shift in the terrain of political sovereignty.   
Before we turn to a political-philosophical account, we will first consider 
the body of scholarly literature accompanying the period of civil rights agitation 
and the growth of social and economic rights over the course of the twentieth 
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century. These studies offer important insights into the legal epistemological issues 
that emerge, the different challenges that people encounter in understanding the 
law, and the complex interactions of attitudes and competencies that have inform 
and shaped educative interventions in the last half century. While offering crucial 
insights for public legal education practice and policy, the literature is notable for 
its shift from early strident political accounts toward increasingly neutral social 
scientific analyses.  
Lack of knowledge about laws and legal systems is pervasive.143 Despite 
difficulties in drawing comparisons across jurisdictions, some essential features of 
legal need are apparent. Legal needs tend to be unevenly distributed across 
populations and have significant social, health and economic ramifications, as well 
as being linked to the availability of access to justice.144 Some groups experience 
multiple and severe legal problems which they also frequently fail to attempt to 
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Comparative Study,” Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, Volume 13 issue 1, (2016): 50–
93. The institutional focus of much of the early legal need literature meant that less 
attention was given to the complex interrelationships between subjective knowledge and 
skills, and quotidian encounters in which law, knowledge, and power are played out. See 
Rebecca Sandefur, “Access to Civil Justice and Race, Class and Gender Inequality”, 
Annual Review of Sociology, Volume 34, Issue 1 (2008): 339-358, Christine Coumarelos, 
Deborah Macourt, Julie People, Hugh M McDonald, Zhigang Wei, Reiny Iriana, Stephanie 
Ramsey, “Legal Australia-Wide Survey: Legal Need in Australia”. (Sydney: Law and 
Justice Foundation of New South Wales, 2012). 
144 Pleasence et al, “Paths to Justice,” 2013. Richard Moorehead and Pascoe Pleasance, 
“Access to Justice After Universalism,” Journal of Law and Society, Volume 30, Issue 1 
(2003): 1-10. Deborah L Rhode, “Access to Justice,” Fordham Law Review, Volume 9 
(2000-2001): 1785. Pascoe Pleasence, Nigel N Balmer, Alexy Buck, Aoife O’Grady, A. 
and Hazel Genn, “Civil Law Problems and Morbidity,” Journal of Epidemiology and 
Community Health, Volume 58, Issue 7, (2004): 552-557. 
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resolve.145 Barriers to the resolution of legal problems are interrelated with advice 
seeking behaviour, problem solving strategies, rights knowledge and problem 
characterization.146 The most common legal problems involve consumer issues, 
problems with neighbours, family, employment problems, issues involving tenure, 
eviction and property rights, as well as debt problems and personal injury. A final 
category creating access to justice issues is in relation to government, such as 
conflicts about social security, migration problems or government permits.147  
Strong correlations exist between vulnerability to legal problems and the presence 
of disability, single-parenthood, welfare dependency, unemployment and minority 
ethnic grouping.148    
The definition of legal need has not remained static, but has shifted and 
expanded over the years. As a result, what constitutes legal need in the literature 
has been described as a ’dynamic process’.149 It has moved away from an original 
focus on those actively seeking a resolution to a legal problem to consider the ways 
in which justiciable issues encompass the events that raise legal issues which may 
                                               
145 Coumeralos et al., “Legal Need in Australia,” 15, Pleasance et al, “Causes of Action” 
2004a, b, 2006. Balmer et al “knowledge, Capability and the Experience of Rights 
Problems,2010. Buck et al., “Do Citizens Know How to Deal with Legal Issues?”, 2008. 
Hugh M McDonald, Zhigang Wei, “Concentrating disadvantage: a working paper on 
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146 Pascoe Pleasence, Alexy Buck, Nigel N Balmer, Aoife O’Grady, Hazel Genn and 
Marisol Smith, Causes of Action: Civil Law and Social Justice (Norwich, TSO, 2004). 
147 For a comparative perspective of legal aid strategies see Maurits Barendrecht, Laura 
Kistemaker, Henk Jan Scholten, Ruby Schrader, Marzena Wrzesinska, Legal Aid in 
Europe: Nine Different Ways to Guarantee Justice, (Hiil, Ministerie van Veiligheid en 
Justitie, 2014). 26 https://www.hiil.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Legal-Aid-in-Europe-
Full-Report.pdf . [Accessed March 24th 2019]. Although there is a tendency in the popular 
imagination to equate justiciable issues with crime, the incidence and frequency of civil 
legal issues is considerably greater amongst all groups.  
148 Ibid.  
149 The requirement of meeting legal needs has largely dictated institutional and 
legislative transformations to improve access to justice. Coumerelos et al, “Legal Need in 
Australia”, 3. See also Macdonald, R.A., “Access to justice in Canada today: scope, scale, 
ambitions,” in Julia Bass, W Bogart & Fredrick H Zemans eds, Access to justice for a new 
century: the way forward, Law Society of Upper Canada, Ontario, (2005): 19–112. 
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never reach the formal justice system.150 Finding a lawyer and accessing the courts 
became one pole of a much wider spectrum of issues concerned with ensuring 
people could better understand the law, access alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms and push for law reform.151 Nevertheless, the institutional focus of 
early legal needs studies meant that less attention was given to the complex 
interrelationships between individuals’ knowledge and skills and the quotidian 
encounters in which law, knowledge, and power are played out.152 This has 
contributed to an ongoing law-centric focus in the concept of legal need, even as 
the concept has expanded. 
The earliest empirical research on legal need dates back to the 1930s with a 
visible expansion of the approach and larger scale studies appearing in the socio-
legal scholarship of the 1990s.153 In 1933, the Dean of Yale School of Law 
observed: 
[T]here is a large amount of legal business untapped by the legal 
profession, in the community here studied, there may not be so much 
of a problem of the “unauthorized practice of law” (since other 
agencies are not supplying the gap), as a failure of the lawyer to meet 
the social needs which justify the existence of the profession.154 
 
                                               
150 Hazel Genn, Paths to Justice, 1999. The requirement of meeting legal needs has 
largely dictated institutional and legislative transformations to improve access to justice, 
see Coumarelos et al “Legal Needs in Australia”, 3.  
151 Macdonald, R.A., ‘Access to justice in Canada today: scope, scale, ambitions’, in 
Bass et al, Access to justice for a new century: the way forward, Law Society of Upper 
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152 David Engel, “How Does Law Matter in the Constitution of Legal Consciousness?” 
in Bryant Garth and Austin Sarat eds, How Does Law Matter? (1998), 109–144.  
153 Pleasence et al, “Paths to Justice,” 2013. Abel places the origins of legal need 
rhetoric at the door of Reginal Herber Smith’s study in 1919, “The conceptualization of 
legal aid as providing access carries with it the notion of "legal need" and engenders studies 
designed to show that such need is unfulfilled… I want to argue simply that the concern-
indeed, the obsession-with access rests on the value premise that it is desirable that 
everyone be equally entitled to consult a lawyer or to approach a legal institution directly.” 
Abel, “Law without Politics” 489.  
154 Charles E Clark and Emma Corstvet, The Lawyer and the Public, The Yale Law 
Journal vol. 47 (June 1938):172-1293. 
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The survey suggested a lack of trust of lawyers by the public, and amongst 
lawyers, too, there appeared to be anxiety about professional elitism and the 
implications for the Bar.155 While there were only very few such surveys until the 
latter part of the century, and we can note the commercial impetus, the use of 
survey techniques raised important and unexpected questions for the practice of 
law in the early part of the twentieth century.156  
The expansion of social science research in the legal field culminated in 
the formation of the Law and Society Association in 1964, explicitly endorsing the 
value of the empirical study of law in the interests of forming social policies.157 
From the very outset of the law and society movement, the intersection of the 
needs of the poor and the justice system were a primary concern for scholars. The 
study of law and poverty offered an exemplary site for questioning conventional 
assumptions about the conditions and consequences of legal administration.158 How 
courts and lawyers dealt with the poor came under closer scrutiny. Not only was 
the character of law itself partially responsible for the failure to accord the poor 
with the same protections as the rich; one of the many reasons for the failure of the 
civil justice system to meet their needs was linked to ideas about the capacity of 
poor people themselves.159 This included ‘legal competence’, which described the 
ability to further and protect interests through active assertion of legal rights. One 
such example was the exception to conscription laws in place during the Vietnam 
War, Carlin et al observe:  
 
Poor persons are less likely to have jobs that qualify for deferment on 
occupational grounds and they are less likely to be students. Moreover, 
they are less likely to know about the legal status of conscientious 
objector and to be articulate enough to qualify for that status.160 
                                               
155 The survey by Clark and Corstvet was in fact occasioned by a recession at the Bar, 
see Pascoe Pleasence, Alexy Buck, Tamara Goriely, Jenny Taylor, Helen Perkins and 
Hannah Quirk, Local Legal Need, London: Legal Services Commission (2001): 9. 
156 Pleasance et al, (2001), 10. 
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research” in The Blackwell Companion to Law and Society (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 
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The politicisation of the 1960s thereby featured the concomitant growth of public 
awareness of law and legal education intereventions.161 This work was also bolstered 
by renewed efforts by scholars to understand the challenges of access to justice 
reforms.162 
The Florence Access to Justice Project, beginning in 1978 and 
incorporating four volumes of comparative analysis of the modes and limits of 
access to justice in more than 26 countries, is notable for setting out some of the 
challenges with which the public legal education movement today continues to 
grapple with. The three waves of access described by the authors are still relevant 
to our analysis today. The first wave encompassed recognising the need for legal 
aid to be extended to the poor; the second noted the importance of new ‘diffuse 
rights’, including consumer and tenants’ rights – those social and economic 
domains with most impact on the everyday lives of the poor, and that also 
implicated groups or classes of interest. The third, dubbed the ‘access to justice 
approach’, sought to partially adopt the first two waves while recognising their 
limitations.  These three waves, the authors argue, need to be addressed 
interdependently and as part of a continuum if headway is to be made. The lack of 
effectiveness of what was then called judicare concerned the problem of small 
claims (as the amounts at stake often amounted to less than the cost of 
proceedings), as well as the failure of recognising the class interest of the poor 
beyond individual claims (and in fact having the effect of individualising what 
were much more systemic problems). Vitally, judicare did not account for the 
significant disadvantages faced by poor communities which undermined their 
capacity to even recognise a legal issue, or, when they did, the psychological 
barriers that prevented them from going to law or persevering with their case.163 
The extent to which legal services are accessed for those issues that are not 
ordinarily construed as being ’legal’ mean people tend to use legal aid for familiar 
                                               
161 Throughout the 1960s, the expansion of civil rights and attempts to redistribute 
wealth fostered links between legal and social reform efforts. They encompassed the ideal 
of the rule of law as a vehicle for formal equality and injected socio-legal scholarship with 
optimism for equating legal with social justice. Sarat, “History of Law and Society 
Research”, 3-4. 
162 Mauro Cappelletti and Bryant Garth eds.  Access to Justice: A World Survey, Volume 
1 Book 1. (Milan:  Sijthoff and Noordhoff, 1978). 
163 Seton Pollock, Legal Aid the First 25 years, (London: Oyez Pub 1975), 25. 
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legal problems such as criminal and divorce matters.164 Willingness to get a lawyer 
to buy a house, or obtain a divorce far outstripped preparedness to seek legal 
advice on areas characterised by power imbalances.165 Access to the courts as the 
primary mode of equalising power relations, particularly in the adversarial context, 
offered limited results. Wider social-theoretical approaches needed to be drawn 
upon in order to avoid the limitations of law’s method of detail and social sciences’ 
narrow empiricism.166 Knowledge as a barrier to effectively achieving redress came 
to be considered alongside alienation, and negative perceptions of the justice 
system. This interplay of subjective consciousness and the structural institutional 
functions of law were to become the early precursors of theoretically inspired 
studies into legal consciousness.167  
Legal need studies and access to justice scholarship also began to register 
the processes of rapid juridification, identified by Habermas as “the tendency 
towards an increase in formal (or positive, written) law that can be observed in a 
modern society.”168 The extensive growth of legal rights and obligations in a number 
of new fields suggests an economy of legal need and legal expansion that has led to 
growing gaps in legal knowledge in the public sphere. A broad range of legal 
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relatively serious problems such as child protection, homelessness, and children’s 
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rights, responsibilities and protections have come to apply to areas which have 
fallen out of the scope of public legal assistance, including housing, employment 
and welfare benefits.169 Consequently, for individuals who rely on the state for the 
provision of basic income and shelter, the law appears as a naturalised fact, while 
masking its contingent and political nature:  
 
The growth of legal need alongside the process of juridification 
suggests that there is an economy between them: the more law there is, 
the greater legal need will be. However, the concept of legal need 
obscures this economy: the very idea of ‘need’ suggests that law is 
natural or necessary. This inadvertently and subtly reinforces the 
process of juridification, which is characterised by both the 
proliferation of laws and a greater penetration of law into everyday 
life, such that law becomes a ’reified social fact’170 
 
The failure to identify the law as contingent and subject to a labour of construction 
of social reality largely determined by elites is a critical problem with which this 
thesis argues any progressive education beyond the legal academy must address.171 
Fundamentally, many of the approaches to access to justice explored above fail to 
address the very terms upon which they rely. This is not only to suggest the need to 
consider structural effects and relations of law and power on subjects themselves, 
on the dynamic relations of class, race and gender formed with and by institutional 
mechanisms, but at root, poses the persistent problem of the relationship between 
law and its claim to justice. 
The proclivity to divorce law from politics in much of the literature on 
legal aid, legal need and access to justice is, as Abel observes not altogether 
surprising since advanced capitalism is predicated on the condition of the 
separation (of liberal legalism) for its expansion. Moreover, “the institution of legal 
aid itself attempts to fulfil the promises of liberal legalism without first effecting 
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any change in fundamental political relationships.172  The predominant concern is 
for access to justice, conceived as a problem of epistemological - juridical salience. 
In this idiom, the studies diagnose the concrete effects of social and economic 
disadvantage, while largely remaining silent on political diagnoses of legal 
exclusion. These accounts still offer insights into societal needs, and help us to 
understand the sorts of interventions that might more effectively meet those needs 
as we come to consider public legal education strategies in their light. But there is 
much that escapes this approach.  We will need to turn elsewhere to understand 
more about the relations with which we started – the new rationalities of 
governance which have as their aim socially adaptive strategies in the context of 









This final part of the chapter begins to contend with some of the 
shortcomings we have identified in the preceding discussions. This and the 
following chapter will turn to a critical reading of the association of legal 
knowledge in the population with rule of law theories. In contemporary 
conceptions, legal knowledge is a concrete feature of the way in which the rule of 
law is brought to life insofar as it concerns the intelligibility and accessibility of 
citizens’ rights and duties.174 The liberal construction of the rule of law, 
aspirationally at least, presupposes a constitutive role for public knowledge of law 
as an aspect of democratic governance and popular sovereignty. This encapsulates 
the legitimation of limits of authority of the government by virtue of citizens’ 
understanding and participation in the constitution of the legal and political order. 
These two poles of the constitutive and constituted aspects of legal knowledge 
                                               
172 Richard Abel, “Law Without Politics: Legal Aid under Advanced Capitalism” 32 
UCLA L. Rev. 474 (1984-1985), 476. 
173 See the discussion on the concerns of theTrilateral Commission at page 49 above. 
174 Tom Bingham, The Rule of Law, (London: Penguin. 2011). 
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incorporate the practices involved in promulgating legal rules and shaping 
administrative practices, as well as the implicit engagement of citizens in shaping 
the body politic. The central question that is posed of law and education when seen 
through this juridical political lens is: What is the nature of the polity that is being 
produced and reproduced? As the participative and therefore democratic elements 
are increasingly eclipsed in public policy discourse, we will keep in view what this 
means for the construction of progressive pedagogical practices that go beyond a 
mere instrumental redeployment of normative orthodoxies. 175 
 Public policy initiatives in the United Kingdom have begun to sharpen the 
specific links between public legal education discourses and the rule of law. The 
issues emerging from the United Kingdom have wider implications for rule of law 
developments in other jurisdictions and bring to the fore some of the contradictions 
that trouble practices in the field.176 A recent parliamentary debate on public legal 
education, led by Conservative Member of Parliament, Ranil Jayawardena, was 
opened by emphasising the implicit importance of public knowledge of the law for 
cementing the contract between citizen and state:  
 
I believe we should start from first principles, for Her Majesty’s 
Government’s first duty, above all else, is to keep its citizens and our 
country safe from harm—safe from those who wish to do us harm, 
                                               
175 Giorgio Agamben points to the problem as follows, “Democracy designates both the 
form through which power is legitimated and the manner in which it is exercised…it is 
perfectly plain to everyone that the latter meaning prevails in contemporary political 
discourse, that the word democracy is used in most cases to refer to a technique of 
governing.” Giorgio Agamben, “Introductory Note on the Concept of Democracy,” in 
Democracy in What State, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 2-3. On 
influential approaches to promulgation see Jeremy Bentham, “Of the Promulgation of the 
Laws,” in The Works of Jeremy Bentham (1838); John Austin, Lectures in Jurisprudence, 
Or the Philosophy of Positive Law (London: Law Books Exchange, 2004), Lecture XXV. 
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the United Kingdom leaving significant imprints elsewhere in the world. See Zolo, “The 
Rule of Law: A Critical Appraisal,”3-71. But this claim is also based on the expansion of 
the role of technology both in the digitization of courts and legal services that are swiftly 
reshaping thinking about justice systems around the world.    
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both within and outwith. To that end, just as in Burke’s unwritten 
social contract between the living, those who have been and those who 
are yet to come, the Government form an unwritten contract with the 
population as a whole. In that contract, in exchange for their security 
and safety, the public agree to follow the rule of law.177 
 
Public legal education is posited as the mechanism that binds the citizen to the state 
and that underpins the functioning of parliamentary democracy by improving 
participation in popular sovereignty. Jayawardena goes further, “PLE increases 
citizens’ knowledge of this mother of all Parliaments, the birthplace of 
parliamentary democracy, where we make the laws that others implement. It 
increases political engagement and, I hope, will increase representation.”178 In 
parliamentary questions, the Solicitor General also underlined the importance of 
education for the rule of law, “Public Legal Education is a statutory feature of the 
justice system and part of the Rule of Law.”179 A tentative statutory footing was 
provided for improving citizens’ understanding of their rights and duties under the 
auspice of the Legal Services Act in 2007. Under the Act, the Legal Services Board 
(LSB) was created as the new independent body charged with overseeing the 
regulation of the legal profession, as well as reforming and modernising the legal 
service market by ‘putting the interests of consumers at the heart of the system’.180 
The LSB thereby shoulders the duty to promote the regulatory objectives of the 
Act. The objectives range from supporting the constitutional principles of the rule 
of law, improving access to justice, protecting and promoting the interests of 
consumers and increasing public understanding of citizens’ legal rights and duties.  
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The Act makes no further mention of how public legal education 
objectives will be given effect beyond the reserved activities traditionally 
undertaken by lawyers.181 In practice, this means that legal education for the public 
is excluded from the scope of reserved activities, and knowledge acquisition is 
limited to the advice a client can receive individually from their lawyer. For the 
Act to attain its objectives in supporting the rule of law and enhancing access to 
justice, the availability and accessibility of legal services to the public is a 
prerequisite. Yet shortly after the changes to the regulatory frameworks that aimed 
to liberalise the legal market, the Government introduced the Legal Aid Sentencing 
and Punishment of Offenders Act in 2012. Bolstered by the rhetoric of austerity 
measures, heavy cuts to public legal assistance in family and civil law reduced 
legal aid expenditure from £2.6bn in 2005-06 to £1.5bn in 2016.182 The cuts 
immediately undermined the objectives of improving accessibility of legal 
services, affecting precisely those who were least likely to have an understanding 
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of their rights and duties.183 While the Legal Services Act was successful in 
cementing a consumerist and competition oriented paradigm for a liberalised legal 
market, it failed to lead to improvements in access to justice.184 What the regulatory 
change served to do however is to re-orientate the rule of law and public 
understanding of the law as an expected outcome of market-driven competition.  
The statutory footing provided by the regulation of legal services casts 
public knowledge of the law as both a liberalising economic force and as an 
outcome of that same thrust. Positing enhanced knowledge of legal rights and 
duties thereby enables the withdrawal of public finance, which market forces will 
then provide for once public investment has been withdrawn. The changes are 
promoted as reinvigorating the rule of law and thereby the relation of state and 
citizen along economic lines. Rather than abandonment to entirely unfettered legal 
markets, this suggests a dual movement of liberalisation and reshaping of controls 
toward a political and social formation. Public understanding of the law is 
presented as a feature of market success or market failure while being cast as a 
matter of accountability or legitimacy of governance under the democratic rule of 
law.  To illustrate, an investigation into the operation of the legal services market 
by the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) underlines the primary 
objective of balancing consumer protection and the public interest with a 
competitive legal market. Other objectives: “currently set out in the Legal Services 
Act 2007, such as ensuring public legal education or improving access to justice, 
remain extremely relevant but might be considered to be part of the primary 
objective.”185 Where rule of law protections fail, or unmet legal need persists, this 
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is attributable to informational asymmetries between consumer and provider, or 
alternatively on a failure to achieve adequate price competition.186   
Another related dynamic influencing the changing role of public legal 
knowledge is the rise in litigants in person in the United Kingdom court system.187 
The increasing presence of unrepresented parties to litigation has attracted greater 
attention, and is linked to the impact of the loss of legal aid.  This in turn has 
reshaped how the rule of law will be given effect in the courts.188 A major court 
reform programme aims to digitalise the court system, with over one billion 
investment garnered in part from the sale of significant parts of the courts estate, 
and by a substantial reduction in court staff employed by HMCTS.189  In his final 
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“Transforming Courts and Tribunals”, July 2018. The principles of reform are stated as 
“just, proportionate and accessible with the aim of serving “swift and certain justice.” 
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report on the civil court restructure review preceding the reforms, Michael Briggs 
L.J., contends that an Online Court for the UK requires an associated strategy for 
educating court users to ensure its success:  
 
The provision of the Online Court as a means of increasing access to 
justice for ordinary people needs to be viewed in the context of the 
provision made nationally for public legal education, that is, educating 
would-be court users about the essentials of the service provided by 
the courts for the vindication of their civil rights, including the basics 
of navigating court process, alternatives to court proceedings and some 
of the essentials of both substantive and procedural law.190 
 
More broadly, the reforms aim to alter the reliance on representation by lawyers in 
individual disputes in private and public law arenas, and to refocus the profession 
towards higher value and complex litigation. Litigants with family, civil or tribunal 
related matters will be encouraged to resolve disputes outside of the court system 
through enhanced early settlement stages, and wherever possible to apply or defend 
claims using swifter digital processes. The vision for enhancing the role of United 
Kingdom courts in international commercial arbitration situates the justice system 
as a major contributor to the UK economy.191 Once again, public knowledge is cast 
as the strategy to ensure that the rule of law continues to function in an orderly and 
expedient fashion, while simultaneously influencing and reshaping the roles of the 
actors in the system toward economic imperatives. 
                                               
https://consult.justice.gov.uk/digital-communications/transforming-our-courts-and-
tribunals/supporting_documents/consultationpaper.pdf. 
190 Civil Court Restructure Review: Final Report 2016, https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2016/07/civil-courts-structure-review-final-report-jul-16-final-1.pdf 
.[accessed 10th November 2018]. 
191 “Today our commercial courts are recognised as pre-eminent. International litigators 
come here because they know they will be treated fairly, and overseas they prefer our law 
to be the governing law for commercial contracts. That confidence translated into a £25.7 
billion contribution to the UK economy by legal services in 2015.” Lord Chancellor, Lord 
Chief Justice and Senior President of Tribunals, “Transforming Our Justice System – Joint 
Statement,” (Ministry of Justice & Her Majesty’s Court Services, September 2016), 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_da
ta/file/553261/joint-vision-statement.pdf. [accessed December 2nd 2018]. 
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 This UK case study demonstrates how discourses linking the rule of law 
directly with public legal education have sharpened around specific social and 
economic policies that exhibit inherent tensions from the perspective of the role 
that public legal education can take. Making savings to the public purse and 
preparing for a ‘digital-by-default’ system that is less reliant on lawyers demands a 
more legally educated public. The deregulatory drive to liberalise the market for 
legal services ostensibly could plug gaps in rule of law protection, but only from 
the perspective of market rationality that configures players as winners or losers in 
a globally competitive justice game. Hence, correctives to the problem of failed 
access to justice policies focus on informational disparities hindering competition 
and the smooth functioning of the market.192  
This would, in classical liberal tradition, serve to frame the economic 
sphere as that which is left untouched by the meddling of the state. The ensemble 
of legal and economic rationality directs citizens’ knowledge toward the rights and 
duties intrinsic to economic interactions. The shaping of specifically neoliberal 
interests therefore comprises a complex relationship in which the liberal rule of law 
and liberal rationality provides the medium through which the neoliberal economy 
advances itself and shapes the state itself along economic lines.193  This new 
paradigm has crucial consequences for actors and their motivations in the field of 
public legal education. As legal services invite wider economic players into the 
fold, the question of who will be responsible for delivering public legal education 
potentially moves to new players in the market for legal services.194 And as the 
                                               
192 These tensions are by no means exclusive to the United Kingdom; they are being 
mirrored elsewhere with attempts to adopt digital dispute resolution systems well underway 
in European as well as Anglo – American jurisdictions. “Online Dispute Resolution for 
Low Value Civil Claims,” Report of the Civil Justice Council (2015), 
https://www.judiciary.uk/reviews/online-dispute-resolution/odr-report-february-2015/  
[accessed November 16th 2018]. 
193 Brown, Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth revolution, 151. 
194 Alternative Business Structures brought in via the Legal Services Act 2007 enable 
non-lawyer ownership and investment in legal services. One of the first players to seek 
ABS status was U.S. based LegalZoom, whose model includes integrating online 
information with triage to legal advice, and therefore is a particularly relevant model for the 
shape of future providers. Not every new ABS is primed toward profit motivations; for 
example, charities have also sought the status of ABS to enter into areas of law in which 
legal aid has been removed. Neil Rose, “Legal advice charity becomes first not-for-profit to 
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citizen becomes tethered to the state by altogether new configurations, this also 
fundamentally reshapes education in law insofar as the body politic is concerned. 
In other words, if the rule of law binds the citizen to the state, and the way in which 
this relationship is formed via legal knowledge becomes subject to the rationality 
of the free market, the educational implications for democratic or popular 
sovereignty also undergo a transformation.  
The following chapter takes up the turn toward neo-liberal policies and 
responses through a study of wider links between public legal education and the 
rule of law.  The diffuse mechanisms through which law becomes indistinguishable 
from administration (through bureaucratic institutions that have delegated 
functions), is concealed by classical rule of law theories that still hold rhetorical 
sway.195 Following this discussion of contemporary theories of the rule of law and 
their treatment of public legal knowledge, we will consider how earlier rule of law 
theories addressed this concern, with a focus on Enlightenment approaches. The 
question of how the public were to be included in the body politic contains explicit 
as well as implied elements of legal knowledge in the work of a number of leading 
Enlightenment thinkers. As critiques mount from both right and left of the idea that 
the rule of law in and of itself can provide a bulwark against either populism or 
authoritarianism, the question remains what sort of polity legal education for the 
public ought to be striving toward?  
To answer this, we must also ask to what underlying legal theoretical 
approaches we owe rule of law arguments in the field of public legal education 
today. Originating from around the mid twentieth century in the Occident the 
relationship between the rule of law and the advancement of economic rationales 
                                               
set up an ABS,” (Legal Futures, April 26, 2013): https://www.legalfutures.co.uk/latest-
news/exclusive-legal-advice-charity-becomes-first-not-for-profit-set-abs [accessed 1 
December 2018]. 
195 In his 1977-78 lecture course, Security, Territory, Population, Foucault had already 
demonstrated that Rousseau posed precisely here the problem of reconciling a juridico-
constitutional terminology ("contract," "general will," "sovereignty") with an "art of 
government." Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population Lectures at the College De 
France, 1977 – 78 (Palgrave Macmillan, Ed. Michael Senellart Trans by Graham Birchell. 
See also Giorgio Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory (Stanford California: Meridian, 
2011) Trans Lorenzo Chiesa. 
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inaugurates a juridical-economic relation between the citizen and the state.196  The 
individual citizen-consumer effectively usurps the juridical - political relation that 
forms and binds the constitutive ties between the citizen and the state. The 
epistemological attributes of this new configuration entail a discernible shift from 
liberal to neoliberal underpinnings. The content of legal knowledge entails 
diminishing emphasis on the rights and duties of citizens as aspects of their coming 
together to form political associations and thereby forming the constitutional state. 
 The amplification of market-based rationales also feature in the law and 
society scholarship that we have considered above. From the initial agitation and 
political aspiration of the public legal education movement, accompanied by law 
and poverty scholarship, its replacement by a dominant economic focus 
fundamentally throws into question the strategies that socially inspired legal 
activism have relied upon and continue to rely upon.197  The law and society 
scholarship paradigms explored thus far present a difficulty in addressing the 
extent to which law is used not simply to manage disputes but to establish the 
terrain upon which the disputes are fought.198 Even if we take into account leftist 
arguments pointing to the systemic mechanisms through which law reinforces 
certain interests over others, be they economic or political (or both),199 the 
                                               
196 The most pertinent example arises in the re-creation of post-war Weimar Germany in 
1948. See Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, 75 – 95. 
197 This draws on the work of Michel Foucault identifying the overlapping tendencies 
within liberalism toward a rationality of economic government, alongside an attempt to 
endow existing economic institutions certain functions of governmental infrastructure.  In 
other words, legally mandated power handed over to private institutions. For a useful 
discussion of the various texts see Colin Gordon, “Governmental Rationality: An 
introduction,” in The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality Edited by Graham 
Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 26. 
198 This requires a paradigm beyond that of law as the ‘mirror of society’ with which the 
law and society field has traditionally associated itself. See Brian Tamanaha, “Law and 
Society”, in Dennis Patterson Ed. A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory 
(Oxford: Wiley Blackwell, 2010), 368- 371. 
199 Tamanaha, Brian. ‘Law and Society,’ in A Companion to Philosophy of Law and 
Legal Theory, 2nd ed. Brian Patterson ed. Oxford: Wiley Blackwell, 2010 
377 See also the Weberian argument of the extent to which legal rationality is uniquely 
suited to the demands of capitalism for enhancing certainty and predictability, and the 
concomitant need for specialized bodies of legal knowledge that operate at a distance from 
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traditional foci of law and society scholarship are unable to tackle the most difficult 
questions pertaining to the critique of law: how it forms itself and what 
mythologemes this gives rise to. This is the territory to which we will turn in 





















                                               
lay understanding. Max Weber, Economy and Society An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, 




Public legal education and the rule of law 
“As has been stated by numerous legal scholars, I have the absolute right to 




The question of what people know about the law, and the consequences of 
legal knowledge within a given population, lies at the heart of the Western legal 
and political order.201 This relationship is often treated obliquely, and therefore 
constructions of legal knowledge remain under-theorised for their political and 
constitutional valence. As a consequence, implications for the nature of public 
legal education practices, their objectives, constraints and risks are equally 
occluded.  As we have seen in the previous chapter, recent social policy debates 
engage arguments for public legal education as a means of reinforcing the rule of 
law. In this idiom, the certainty and foreseeability of law emphasises social 
equilibrium and the capacity to secure stable trade.  Public knowledge of the law is 
                                               
200 Donald J Trump, quoted in The Conversation, June 5th 2018, “Trump may believe in 
the rule of law, just not the one understood by most American lawyers,” 
http://theconversation.com/trump-may-believe-in-the-rule-of-law-just-not-the-one-
understood-by-most-american-lawyers-97757, [Accessed on 16th March 2018]. 
201 There is a surprising degree of consensus in rule of law theories with regard to the 
centrality of public understanding of the law, ranging from the basic requirement of 
publishing laws to more substantive mechanisms for disseminating and educating the 
public about the law. For an overview see Andrei Marmor, The Ideal of the Rule of Law, in  
A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory, ed. Patterson, (Oxford: Wiley-
Blackwell: 2010). See also Michael J. Trebilock, Ronald J. Daniels, Rule of Law Reform 
and Development: Charting the Fragile Path of Progress (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2008): 266. For a view that distinguishes between orthodox descriptions of the 
rule of law and a vision of the legal empowerment as a wider political and economic 
phenomena, see Stephen Golub, “Beyond the Rule of Law Orthodoxy: The Legal 
Empowerment Alternative”, Rule of Law Series, Democracy and Rule of Law Project, 
Number 41 (2003) [accessed on 18th February 2019] 
https://carnegieendowment.org/files/wp41.pdf 
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thereby articulated as the basis for stabilizing and sustaining these normative 
relations. What initially appears as a matter of marginal concern to jurisprudence 
and a set of patchy legal services thus emerges in a different historical light.  
The preceding chapter charted the development of a burgeoning public 
legal education movement over the last forty years, wherein the challenge of public 
awareness and knowledge of the law and legal systems became the focus of a 
number of access to justice initiatives. Animated by the clarion call for civil rights 
and by battles to eradicate poverty, the legal education movement emerged in the 
Anglo-American context from the middle of the twentieth century in the turmoil of 
war and social upheaval.202 As the political agitation that galvanised civil rights 
groups receded and the welfare state expanded, then waned, the contours of public 
legal education discourse changed. Socio-legal literature throughout this period 
highlights the persistence and intensification of the epistemological-juridical 
problem of widespread ignorance of the law. Yet the political detachment of much 
of the literature masks the shifting political consensus during this period, in 
particular willingness to invest in legal assistance programmes for the poor, and the 
extent to which programmes either individualised or collectivised struggle. This 
occlusion in much of the literature fails to register the significance of public legal 
education when considered as an aspect of the turn away from classical liberal 
conceptions of economy and law. 
Paying attention to the relationship of what people know about the law in 
manifold rule of law theories reveals some important tendencies. An idea uniting 
contemporary and classical conceptions of the rule of law is that the universal 
binding nature of laws assumes implied or explicit knowledge of law, and that this 
serves as a legitimation of the rule of law and the sovereign state. The principle of 
self-determination in which citizens are both authors and subjects of the laws is 
thus paradigmatic of the legitimacy of the legal order.  However, the political 
philosophies that frame these links and how they themselves relate to the 
constitution of the body politic vary widely. Classical and neoclassical versions 
ranging from Aquinas and Hobbes, to Locke and Rousseau express the urge toward 
political association as a turn toward the constitutive and participative features of 
                                               
202 Influences on the development of the field sprang from the poverty law movement 
originating in Canada and the United States with a focus on civil rights and the alleviation 
of poverty. See Louise G Trubeck, “Poverty Lawyering in the New Millennium,” Yale Law 
and Policy Review, Volume 17, Issue 1 (1998). 
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sovereignty through which power is both legitimated and constrained. Yet 
modernity, as Foucault and others observe, appears to progressively abandon the 
contours of political imaginary, adopting instead a narrow episteme of economy 
and administration. Rather than marking a revival in classical liberal thought, or 
indeed earlier juridical-political constructions of the relation between the ruler and 
the ruled, the new discourse that we will analyse points to the economic-juridical 
nexus that is in the ascendency. Contemporary public legal education debates 
gradually come to light within liberal rule of law doctrines that are in the process of 
being reshaped by the advance of neoliberalism.203 The chapter will explore how 
public understanding of the law is treated through these changing paradigms, and 
how this awareness can aid us in moving on to consider the ways in which critical 
public legal education strategies can be shaped in light of these influences. 
The chapter begins by situating the problem of knowledge of law in formal 
and substantive accounts of the rule of law. This aims to consider why resurging 
rhetoric on the rule of law is manifesting at a time in which scholars and jurists 
from the left and right bemoan its decline.  The diagnoses of its decline range from 
the reaction to the legacies of totalitarianism, to subsequent post-war welfarism and 
the growth of administrative courts.204 Yet the wave of populism engulfing the West 
                                               
203  An account of the broad tenets of neoliberalism are given by Wendy Brown as: 
“enacting an ensemble of economic policies in accord with its root principle of affirming 
free markets. These include deregulation of industries and capital flows, radical reduction 
in welfare state provisions and protections for the vulnerable; privatized and outsourced 
public good, ranging from education, parks, postal services, roads and social welfare to 
prisons and militaries; replacement of progressive with regressive tax and tariff schemes, 
the end of wealth distribution as an economic or social political policy; [and] the 
conversion of every human need or desire into a profitable enterprise. Wendy Brown, 
Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth revolution (New York: Zone Books, 2015), 
28. For an evolution of liberalism to neoliberalism see Michel Foucault, The Birth of 
Biopolitics: Lectures at the College de France 1978-1979 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2008), 101 – 291. 
204 Brian Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), 60-72. As early as 1885, the English liberal 
conservative jurist A.V. Dicey expresses concern about the erosion of the rule of law: “The 
ancient veneration for the rule of law has in England suffered during the last thirty years a 
marked decline. The truth of this assertion is proved by actual legislation, by the existence 
among some classes of a certain distrust of the law and of the judges, and by a marked 
tendency toward the use of lawless methods of the attainment of social and political ends.” 
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continues to engage volubly with rule of law rhetoric. From threats by President 
Trump to use executive orders to pardon himself if indicted in criminal 
proceedings, to a popular referendum contributing to parliamentary paralysis in the 
United Kingdom, followed by declamations of judges as ‘enemies of the people’ 
when parliamentary supremacy is invoked. Elsewhere in Europe, the compromise 
of judicial independence in Hungary and Poland has attracted sharp criticism.205  In 
this febrile populist environment it may be apropos to assume education 
endeavours would focus on public understanding of the rule of law insofar as it 
relates to questions of democracy, constitutionalism or the wider constraint of 
governmental powers. Instead, the role of public legal education in current 
discourse centres on enhancing competitive liberalised and globalised markets and 
boosting consumer confidence.206 In the development setting in particular, a swathe 
of investment-oriented policies aimed at shaping and bolstering the rule of law are 
underway.207 
Both substantive and formalist versions of rule of law theories incorporate 
legal knowledge as an aspect of their construction, and in differing ways lend 
support to the economic and consumerist paradigms that are in the ascendency. 
Couched in the language of efficiencies and competition, the reforms that are 
underway in the West (both technological and ideological) involve a significant 
export industry.208 This globalising thrust is particularly pertinent when considering 
                                               
Albert Venn Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Laws of the Constitutions, ed. Roger E. 
Michener (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1982), 64.  
205 For a recent analysis of the intersections of populism and the rule of law see Nicola 
Lacey, “Populism and the Rule of Law”, Working Paper 28 (London School of Economics, 
2019) http://www.lse.ac.uk/International-Inequalities/Assets/Documents/Working-
Papers/III-Working-Paper-28-Lacey-Populism-and-the-Rule-of-Law.pdf [Accessed 16th 
March 2019]. 
206 A recent exception is the public legal education campaign developed by Lawyers for 
Choice and others in the recent Irish referendum for repeal of the 8th Amendment in regard 
to Irish abortion law, see Kevin Burns, “Lawyers for Choice put forward the legal case for 
Repeal” Irish Legal News, 27th February 2018  https://www.irishlegal.com/article/lawyers-
choice-put-forward-legal-case-repeal [accessed 12th February 2019]. 
207 For example, via the activism of the World Bank in the rule of law arena see Deval 
Desai, “Power Rules, rule of law reform and the world development report 2017,” in 
Handbook on the Rule of Law eds. Christopher May and Adam Winchester. 
208 The UK and US together account for 60% of global legal services revenue, half of 
the Global 100 firms are based in the US and 14% in the UK. Recent years have seen a 
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how post-war human rights instruments have served as a platform for liberal legal 
expansion. These instruments emphasise the importance of promoting public 
awareness of rights as aspects of peace building and democratisation. The 
proliferation of law and the markers of juridification that we began to consider in 
the first chapter can therefore be construed as an element of emerging legal 
rationality seen in its global context. As Bilchner and Molander write: 
 
Today the question of juridification is actualised through the 
emergence of new democracies at an unprecedented scale; the 
proliferation of rights discourses globally, regionally, and nationally; 
and the growth of international law generally and the use of 
international courts and war crimes tribunals more specifically. Simply 
put the twin ideals of the rule of law and legally assured human rights 
have conquered and continue to conquer new ground worldwide.209 
 
This diagnosis of global juridification demands further analysis from the 
perspective of rights knowledge. While the post-war politics of wealth 
redistribution and state planned welfare lost political traction in the latter part of 
the twentieth century, the individual rights frames within which public legal 
education is embedded have provided a continuing backdrop to development 
discourses and the expansion of global markets. We will consider the implications 
of these tensions in which public legal knowledge is given growing prominence as 
an aspect of the rule of law, while the rule of law as such appears simultaneously to 
be in declining in the internal configuration of the polities of the West. 
The study then aims to situate these tensions and their origins in 
Enlightenment rule of law theories emerging in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. We trace the contours of the rise of sovereign states with a consideration 
of the way in which legal knowledge provides the legitimation for the force of law 
as religion begins to wane. The separation of secular and religious worlds ushered 
in a belief in human progress anchored in reason and science. Divine and natural 
                                               
major expansion of US and UK law firms into China, other Asian countries, and sub-
Saharan Africa, along with a number of rule of law cooperation programmes. “UK Legal 
Services in 2015,” The CITYUK http://www.thecityuk.com/research/our-work/reports-
list/legal-services-2015/). [Accessed 26 July 2015].  
209 Lars Blichner and Anders Molander: What is juridification? Working Paper No.14, 
March 2005 http://www.arena.uio.no  
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laws waned as legitimating frameworks of civil governance, to be replaced by the 
supremacy of positive law embodying scientific values of rationality and temporal 
legitimacy.   
We subsequently move to the evolution of representative democracy in 
which citizens knowledge binds, constitutes and limits popular sovereignty via 
ideals of social contract or general will, both of which putatively ascribe general 
knowledge of laws as prerequisite. With the growing belief in human rationality as 
the centre of technological and scientific progress, the evolution of the rule of law 
also charts the expansion of the sovereign state and the rise of capitalism, both of 
which entailed increasingly rapid legislative activity. With the accelerated 
expansion of the state after the medieval period came an increase in the volume 
and scope of legislation.210 These developments provide the trajectory toward a 
modernity in which juridification has become the norm, alongside the exponential 
growth in bureaucratic and administrative arbitration mechanisms, creating 
challenges which public legal education practices grapple with today.  
Despite the vigour and aspirations of Enlightenment rule of law theorists, 
by the middle of the twentieth century checks and balances that democratic rule of 
law ideals promised came under increasing attack from a number of quarters. 
Challenges to rule of law orthodoxy arose from an array of forces, from the rise of 
National Socialism in Germany, to the growth of state capitalism, as well as the 
expansion of the post-war welfare state.  The literature we will discuss points to the 
frailty or rather the impossibility of the ideal of the rule of law that nevertheless 
exhibits a remarkable continuity at the intersection of public knowledge of laws 
with divergent political theories within this shifting terrain. 
 
 
Formal and substantive accounts of the rule of law 
 
 
The essentially contested nature of the rule of law, and its polemical 
evocation by left and right may well have rendered the idea meaningless. As Judith 
Shklar contends, the idea is in danger of being consigned to nothing more than 
                                               
210 Tamanaha, Rule of Law, 27. 
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‘ruling class chatter’.211  Our purpose here is not to offer a critique of the rule of law 
as such, but to consider how public knowledge of law can be re-evaluated in the 
context of wider political and educational theory. Despite the contested nature of 
the rule of law, public knowledge is a component (either explicitly or implicitly) of 
the narrowest formal and the widest substantive constructions. At the very least, in 
its thinnest construction, the requirement that laws should be published or 
promulgated, and be reasonably intelligible remains intrinsic to otherwise 
competing formulations.  
We began where we left off in the previous chapter, with the origins of 
neoliberalism during the twentieth century, and its acceleration at the end of the 
Cold War.212 Substantive theories of the rule of law aim to recognise the limitations 
of the strict application of the formal rule of law and to a greater or lesser extent 
undergird formal requirements with external values. This follows the line of 
argument that without some other extrinsic values, the rule of law is merely 
determined by the separation of judiciary, administration and legislature, features 
that lack any inherently democratic characteristic. As Joseph Raz suggests: “[a] 
nondemocratic legal system may, in principle, conform to the requirements of the 
rule of law better than any of the legal systems in our more enlightened Western 
democracies.”213 Moreover, orthodox liberal accounts of the freedom of the 
individual when formulated in legal terms are at best fluid and at worst result in a 
calamitous loss of freedom:  
 
To say that a citizen is free within the open spaces allowed by the law 
says nothing about how wide (or narrow) those spaces must be. Legal 
liberty is not offended by severe restrictions on individuals, for it 
                                               
211 On the differing and often antagonistic constructions of the rule of law see Judith 
Shklar, “Political theory and the rule of law,” in Allan Hutchinson and Patrick Monahan, 
eds., The Rule of Law: Ideal or Ideology (Toronto: Carswell, 1987), 3. For a discussion of 
contestation and epistemological approaches to the rule of law see Danilo Zolo, “The Rule 
of Law: a Critical Appraisal”, 3-71, in The Rule of Law: History, Theory, Criticism, eds., 
Pietro Costa and Danilo Zolo (2007), 5-7.  
212 Brown, Undoing the Demos, 9. 
213 Joseph Raz, “The Rule of Law and Its Virtue,” in Liberty and The Rule of law, eds., 
Cunningham (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1979).  
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requires only that government actions be consistent with laws declared 
in advance, imposing no strictures on the content of laws.214  
 
Substantive critiques therefore point to the restrictions of individual freedom and 
liberty that are by no means antithetical to the rule of law. They convey wider 
values and social objectives, and public understanding of the law and the capacity 
to exercise rights (even if rather abstractedly stated) is a central tenet of these 
accounts. 
In contrast, formal versions of the rule of law focus on the negative 
liberties that the rule of law can provide, aligning more closely with liberal 
economic orthodoxies. Their approaches tend to be minimalist, with a strong 
positivist thrust. Similarities can be found in how formal accounts treat explicit 
links between foreknowledge of the law and the regulative demands upon private 
individual conduct. Austrian economist Friedrich von Hayek (1899-1992), writing 
in 1944 notes that government is and should be bound: 
[B]y rules fixed and announced beforehand - rules which make it 
possible to foresee with fair certainty how the authority will use its 
coercive powers in given circumstances and to plan one’s individual 
affairs on the basis of this knowledge.215 
 
Foreknowledge of the limits of permissible conduct (primarily concerning 
commerce and criminal conduct) is a key element of freedom ascribed by legal 
liberty. Legal rationality is fundamental to Hayek’s theory of economic rationality. 
Concomitant with the promulgation of general legal rules is the facilitation and 
securitisation of economic exchange, since the market requires the predictability of 
regular exchange market freedom. In Hayek’s view, the general rules afforded by 
the rule of law are necessary to ameliorate human ignorance. Ignorance or, as he 
later qualifies, substantial margins of uncertainty and doubt in human affairs, 
require a minimum of intervention in market affairs so that innovation can flourish. 
Assimilating basic rules enables competitive innovation, which in turn requires a 
minimum of coordinated planning for the future, since our condition of ignorance 
                                               
214 Ibid., 37. 
215 Friedrich Von Hayek, The Collected Works of F.A. Hayek, Volume 15. The Market 
and Other Orders (University of Chicago Press 2014), 181. See also Friedrich Hayek, The 
Constitution of Liberty (Routledge: London, 2006), 306. 
 81 
(at all strata of society) precludes attempts at the state planning level to succeed. 
Since individuals base their plans on the way is which knowledge is 
communicated, “the crucial problem for any theory explaining the economic 
process, and the problem of what is the best way of utilizing knowledge initially 
dispersed among all the people is at least one of the main problems of economic 
policy.”216  
Shklar interprets Hayek’s proposition as follows: “By internalizing these 
minimal rules and social conduct we become more intelligent. Far from being 
anarchical, a rule observing ‘spontaneous order’ can be expected to emerge.”217 The 
problem with Hayek’s account, for Shklar, is an unwarranted belief in the 
emergence of a better ‘spontaneous’ order arising from the smooth function of a 
competitive economy. Disavowing wider political objectives, the rule of law as 
conceived by Hayek reduces contemporary accounts to economy and the demands 
of capital on one end of the political spectrum, and welfarist demands on the other. 
She writes:218  
Is there much point in talking about the Rule of Law? Not if it is 
discussed only as the rules that govern courts or as a football in a game 
between friends and enemies of free-market liberalism. If it is 
recognised as an essential element of constitutional government 
generally and of representative democracy particularly, then it has an 
obvious part to play in political theory.219 
 
Unlike classical rule of law accounts, contemporary interpretations evacuate 
crucial constituent elements of theories of state as the basis of establishing the 
nature of a polity (democratic or otherwise). Thinning notions of democratic 
accountability are limited in order to address asymmetries in consumer power in 
the legal market. An instrumentalisation and internalisation of juridical-economic 
rationality thereby increasingly evacuates any conception of political community. 
This discussion foregrounds an argument that Michel Foucault develops in 
lectures delivered at the College de France between the 24th January and the 21st 
February 1979.  Following his account, the changing paradigm from classic liberal 
                                               
216 Friedrich Von Hayek, ‘The Use of Knowledge in Society” American Economic 
Review, XXXV, No. 4; September, 1945, pp. 519-30.  
217 Shklar, Political Theory and the Rule of Law, 7. 
218 Ibid., 7-11. 
219 Ibid., 16. 
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to neoliberal contours in rule of law theories is heavily indebted to Hayek and his 
move from Freiburg, to the London School of Economics and eventually to 
Chicago. Blending social market economics and legal theory with Milton 
Friedman’s economic theories from the 1940s onwards, 220 Friedman and Hayek 
went on to found the influential Mont Pèlerin Society in 1947.221 In part, their 
theories were formulated as a reaction to totalitarianism; their idea of generally 
applicable formal rules aimed at the avoidance of unwarranted state intervention in 
the market and  individual liberties (the rule of law so conceived is “quite the 
opposite of a plan”).222 Yet the corollary of market freedom is an increase in legal 
activism. This is reflected in the need to arbitrate social conflicts that inhibit (and 
necessarily arise from) a competitive enterprise economy. 223 
 
One of the problems of liberalism in the eighteenth century was the 
maximum reinforcement of a juridical framework in the form of a 
general system of laws imposed on everyone in the same way. But the 
idea of the primacy of the law that was so important in eighteenth 
century thought entailed as a result a reduction of the judicial or 
jurisprudential, in as much as the judicial institution was in principle 
confined to the pure and simple application of the law. Now…the 
judicial, instead of being reduced to the simple function of applying 
the law, acquires a new autonomy and importance.224 
 
What is now required is a judicial interventionism that overlays the role of 
enterprise by reducing the friction and conflict that competitive enterprises 
produce. Foucault argues that while competition produces the conditions for 
economic deregulation: “the social regulation of conflicts, irregularities of 
behaviour, nuisance caused by some to others, and so forth, requires judicial 
interventionism which has to operate as arbitration within the framework of the 
                                               
220 Foucault explores the links between the German Ordo-Liberals who reconvened in 
Freiberg University after the war and the American anarcho-liberals related to the Chicago 
School in The Birth of Biopolitics, 51-184.  
221 The links between Mont Pèlerin and the Trilateral Commission are explored in 
Chapter One. 
222 Dardot and Laval, The New Way of the World, 151. 
223 Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, 172. 
224 Ibid., 177. 
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rules of the game.”225 With regard to Hayek’s notion of the internalisation of legal 
and social rules as a basis for reconstruction of liberal orthodoxies, we can see how 
Foucault arrives at the emphasis on the forms of reason and knowledge that could 
be deployed and internalised to shape the modern neoliberal subject. Wendy 
Brown also marks this internalised shift as a significant factor in the process of 
establishing the hegemony of homo economicus at the expense of homo politicus 
that was, at least until the nineteenth century still predominant.226  
The role of legal knowledge thus becomes a potent medium for an 
alternative rationality of government and of the shaping of citizen-subjects. 
Foucault identifies new subjects and subjectivities emerging in the latter part of the 
twentieth century that are: “only governable insofar as a new ensemble can be 
defined which will envelop them both as subjects of right and as economic 
actors…[I]t is this new ensemble that is characteristic of the liberal art of 
governing.”227 This excursus on the deployment of legal knowledge in the public 
realm as an aspect of narrow and wide rule of law theories suggests a convergence 
of economic-juridical rationalities shaping citizens more determinedly as economic 
actors. The reorientation of the rule of law here marks a turn toward a new relation 
between citizen and state, and a legal rationality that suffuses or overtakes 
juridical-political rationales for tempering or legitimising government intervention 
tout court. In the following sections we will consider how this influence is borne 





Public legal education in global rule of law developments 
 
 
 Before moving to consider the ways in which knowledge of law is treated 
in the writing of a number of key Enlightenment thinkers, will first take a moment 
to consider the rubric of post-war peace building and the advance of human rights 
legislation insofar as they consider legal education for the public. From the 
                                               
225 Ibid., 175. 
226 Brown, Undoing the Demos, 107-111. 
227 Foucault, Birth of Biopolitics, 295. 
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Universal Declaration of Human Rights to the UN Charter, treaty provisions 
underline the importance of public understanding of law as a necessary aspect of 
securing human rights protections and preventing the scourge of war.  In 
September 2012, to reaffirm their commitment to the rule of law originating from 
the founding Charter of 1948, the UN General Assembly underlined the 
importance of ‘awareness raising concerning legal rights’ in order to secure equal 
access to justice.228 The Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
(2000) likewise aims at its inception to promote the visibility of the rights it 
enshrines: “[I]t is necessary to strengthen the protection of fundamental rights in 
the light of changes in society, social progress and scientific and technological 
developments by making those rights more visible in a Charter.”229 In the preamble 
to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights we can likewise find the education 
of citizens is an explicitly stated goal of the Declaration:  
 
Now, Therefore The General Assembly proclaims This Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights as a common standard of achievement 
for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and 
every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, 
shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these 
rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and 
international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and 
                                               
228 Declaration of the High-level Meeting of the General Assembly on the Rule of Law 
at the National and International Levels A/Res/671/1. In order to achieve the goals set out, 
the General Assembly calls for: “international cooperation and invites donors, regional, 
sub-regional and other intergovernmental organizations, as well as relevant civil society 
actors, including non-governmental organizations, to provide, at the request of States, 
technical assistance and capacity-building, including education and training on rule of law-
related issues. https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/A-RES-67-1.pdf [Accessed December 
12th 2018]. 
229 The preamble continues as follows: “The Union is founded on the indivisible, 
universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity; it is based on the 
principles of democracy and the rule of law. It places the individual at the heart of its 
activities, by establishing the citizenship of the Union and by creating an area of freedom, 
security and justice.” Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union 2012/C 
326/02. https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:12012P/TXT&from=EN 
[Accessed on 28.9.2018]. 
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observance, both among the peoples of Member States themselves and 
among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction.230  
 
While formal rule of law requirements were predicated on social and economic 
relief measures in the aftermath of the Second World War, commitments to broader 
welfare and wealth distribution elements substantially waned.231 Human rights and 
development programmes with a focus on property, security and contractual 
autonomy have proved more durable.232 Agendas that pave conditions for the 
                                               
230 Further, the Secretary General of the United Nation defines the rule of law as: “[A] 
principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, 
including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally 
enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human 
rights norms and standards.” Secretary General of the United Nations, General Assembly of 
the United Nations, http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/. 
231 See Samuel Moyn, Human Rights in an Unequal World, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
The Belknap Press of the Harvard University Press, 2018), 41-68. The shift away from 
wealth equalising measures and welfare is evidenced by broader welfare state retrenchment 
and declining legal aid budgets in the West, since the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights came into force in 1976, particularly in the wake of the global 
financial crisis. A recent report assessing the global position of social and economic rights 
concludes: “The dogma of fiscal austerity imposed worldwide in the wake of the global 
financial and economic crises has represented a renewed assault on economic and social 
rights. As [Centre for Social and Economic Rights] has shown, austerity policies in both 
developing and industrialized countries have contributed to escalating levels of inequality 
and wealth concentration, affecting the rights of marginalized communities 
disproportionately.” Ignacio Saiz, “Twenty Years of Economic and Social Rights 
Advocacy Marking the twin anniversaries of CESR and the Vienna Declaration and 
Program of Action,” Centre for Social and Economic Rights (2015), 7. 
http://www.cesr.org/sites/default/files/downloads/cesr_20years_escr.pdf [accessed 
December 15th 2018]. For an overview of changes in legal aid eligibility in Europe see 
Maurits Barendrecht et al., “Legal aid in Europe: Nine different ways to guarantee access to 
justice?” Hague Institute for the Internationalisation of Law (HIIL) (2014), and for a US 
perspective see Alan W Houseman, “Civil legal aid in the United States, an update for 
2017”, March 2018. 
https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/handle/10822/761858/Houseman_Civil
_Legal_Aid_US_2017.pdf?sequence=5&isAllowed=y. [accessed November 12th 2018]. 
232  Zolo, “The Rule of Law: A Critical Appraisal,” 4 
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smooth functioning of the global market have also fared substantially better than 
reparative post-colonial demands. In the context of legal empowerment initiatives 
in which community legal education efforts are prominent, land rights and land 
registration have been at the heart of development efforts.233 The World Bank’s 
default position has been in favour of land titling where customary and neo-
customary land rights have previously prevailed:  
 
For the Bank and other advocates market-promoting titling and 
privatisation, land commodification and enhanced transfer-ability are 
the goal. Private property in land is envisioned as both a driver and the 
end-point in an inexorable process of economic and institutional 
modernisation.234 
 
Two critiques arise from these observations. First, the capacity to reorient 
individual liberties and human rights within rule of law frameworks to the 
paradigm of economic and consumerist transactions comes at the expense of wider 
public policies aimed at general social and economic welfare. Danilo Zolo makes 
the argument as follows: 
 
                                               
233 The Report of the Commission on the Legal Empowerment of the Poor references the 
Public Legal Education and Support Task Force in the United Kingdom, which was 
convened at the same time as the United Nations Commission, with a view to considering 
the importance of self-help strategies and legal rights information provision (2008, 22-24). 
The Commission, chaired by Peruvian Economist Hernando De Soto was heavily shaped 
by the thesis presented in his book The Mystery of Capital, which sought to bring ‘dead 
capital’ into the market. The book was warmly received by Margaret Thatcher who 
reviewed the book on its publication as follows: “[T]he single greatest source of failure in 
the Third World and Ex-Communist countries [is the] lack of rule of law that upholds 
private property and provides a framework for enterprise.” Hernando De Soto, The Mystery 
of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails everywhere else, (London: 
Black Swan, 2001).  
234 Catherine Boone, “Legal Empowerment of the Poor through Property Rights Reform: 
Tensions and Trade-offs of Land Registration and Titling in Sub-Saharan Africa.” The 
Journal of Development Studies, 55:3, 384-400 (2019), 385, 
https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fjds20 [Accessed March 17th 2019]. Boone also notes 
countervailing tactics employed in user rights initiatives that seek to stave off agribusiness 
and limit the mortgageability of land, 387. 
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[T]o support the rule of law means to advocate the protection of 
individual rights as the primary aim of political institutions and legal 
bodies…[N]ot only does such a philosophy relinquish social organism, 
collective utilitarianism and statism, but it also subordinates the public 
dimension and the general interest.235 
 
Second, economic restructuring facilitated by human rights discourses has served 
to avoid and undermine attempts to establish postcolonial reparative and wealth 
distribution demands.236 As human rights instruments move away from distributive 
accounts of equality to humanitarian interventions and discourses that actively 
counter state-led distribution endeavours, these shifts exhibit the influence of the 
same economists behind restructuring in the global North and West. Jessica 
Whyte’s research traces the confluence of influential British-Hungarian 
development economist Peter Bauer, friend and associate of Hayek (and 
subsequently adviser to Margaret Thatcher) in the reframing of human rights 
toward free-enterprise from the 1970s:  
 
Humanitarians lent their moral prestige to ‘free enterprise ideological 
counter-attack’ on Third Worldism and the [New International 
Economic Order]. Their impact was on the terrain of political idealism, 
as they helped long-cherished right-wing themes cross over to the 
political left and re-signified state distribution as a totalitarian threat to 
liberty and human rights.237  
                                               
235 Zolo, “The Rule of Law: A Critical Appraisal,” 4.  
236 Attempts to fight for wealth redistribution arose particularly in 1970s development 
arguments. For example, the aim of the New International Economic Order [NIEO] soon 
became the bête noir of neoliberal economic development theorists including Hayek and 
more recently Peter Bauer. Writing in 1979 Algerian Jurist and Ambassador to the United 
Nations, Mohammed Bedjaoui, emphasizes the role of law in securing wealth distribution 
in post-colonial contexts as follows: “The aim must be to reduce inequality in every area 
where it is found. To do this therefore we must re-fashion, or ‘revolutionize’, the laws 
which lead to the reproduction of the relations of domination and exploitation.” Towards a 
New International Economic Order (New York and London: Holmes and Meier, 1969), 
255. 
237 Jessica Whyte, “Powerless companions or fellow travellers? Human rights and the 
neoliberal assault on post-colonial economic justice,” Radical Philosophy, 2.02 (June 
2018). Peter Bauer argued that foreign aid and government intervention in development 
was tantamount to a reduction in individual freedom by ‘politicizing’ economic life. This 
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Within these critiques, our central concern is that the articulations of the rule of law 
within which public legal education endeavours are embedded provide the 
backdrop, or at least mediate new configurations, altering the relationship between 
the public and private, and between citizen and state in ways that subsequently 
enable new supervening economic rationalities to take hold in global rule of law 
developments.238  
As we move toward ‘thicker’ or more teleological accounts in contemporary 
juristic and legal scholarship on the rule of law, we can note a growing emphasis 
on the legitimating function of public understanding of the law, with objectives 
ranging from the legitimacy of criminal sanctions to the safety net provided by 
social welfare entitlements.239 According to Tom Bingham in his definition of the 
rule of law along eight principles, the first guiding principle is that the law must be 
“accessible and so far as possible, intelligible, clear and predictable.”240 The reasons 
he provides are threefold. In the criminal law context, since it is not always plain 
what constitutes criminal conduct, the role of criminal law in discouraging criminal 
behaviour can only function properly if it is reasonably clear to everyone what such 
behaviour consists of. Foreknowledge therefore takes on both a preventative and 
                                               
premise would eventually become mainstream development policy: “I see myself and the 
small group that I brought together as a kind of symptom of the rise of neoliberalism…we 
thought we were the intellectual vanguard but no…we were just following the rising 
tendency.” Ibid., Whyte, Interview with Rony Brauman at footnote 115. 
238 A large number of legal awareness raising programmes have emerged since the 2008 
establishment of the Legal Empowerment Commission. The Commission defined legal 
empowerment as: “a process of systemic change through which the poor and excluded 
become able to use the law, the legal system, and legal services to protect and advance their 
rights as citizens and economic actors.” The priorities emphasised property rights, labour 
rights, and business rights in addition to the foundation of access to justice and the rule of 
law. See Laura Goodwin and Vivek Maru, “What do we know about legal empowerment, 
mapping the evidence,” Hague Journal on the Rule of Law (2017) 9:157–194: 159. 
239 For a taxonomy of rule of law approaches that includes teleological accounts aimed 
at constraining or rendering power accountable see Lacey, “Populism and the Rule of 
Law,” 2019. On the links between neoliberalism and populism see Michael Sandel, 
“Populism, Trump and the Future of Democracy,” Open Democracy, May 9, 2018, 
https://www.opendemocracy.net/michael-j-sandel/populism-trump-and-future-of-
democracy [retrieved 2nd December 2018]. 
240  Bingham, The Rule of Law, 1998, 39. 
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disciplining function.241 In the civil law context, if there are to be rights and 
obligations that the civil law confers, the citizen must know what they are. Giving 
the example of claiming winter fuel allowance, Bingham underlines the need for 
foreknowledge of the allowance as well as accessible means of claiming it.242 
Finally, his grounds for the need to ensure accessibility and intelligibility of the 
law centres on growth; the ability to invest and trade relies on reasonably clear 
expectations of how resulting agreements will be treated.243  
This wide construction of the purposes of rendering the law intelligible and 
accessible to the public as a mechanism for sustaining social equilibrium is echoed 
by a number of other scholars. Maravall and Przeworski maintain that guarantees 
of intelligible, promulgated rules relate to the wider stabilising effect that the rule 
of law is ostensibly able to provide, so that people are able to predict the actions of 
others: 
In sum, laws inform people what to expect of others. Even if it were to 
deviate from the announced course of action, the state announces what 
it plans to do, including what it intends to punish. Such announcements 
provide safety for individuals. At the same time, they facilitate 
coordination of sanctions against a government that deviates from its 
own announcements. In this sense, publicly promulgated rules provide 
an equilibrium manual.244 
 
American legal scholar Lon Fuller takes a similarly wide view by organising the 
principles of the rule of law around eight kinds of ‘legal excellence’. Fuller’s 
analysis of promulgation is relatively attentive. He argues general rules must be 
publicised, prospective, intelligible, consistent, not impossible to obey, relatively 
permanent, and congruence between their actual implementation and the rules as 
                                               
241 As the boundary between civil and criminal law becomes ever less apparent in 
complex contemporary forms of control and sanctions, this presumption, as Ashworth 
argues, is increasingly untenable. See Andrew Ashworth, “Ignorance of the Criminal Law 
and Duties to avoid it,” Modern Law review, 74 (1): 1-26. 
242 This kind of equalizing, welfarist intervention is precisely what both Hayek and 
Dicey feared would undermine the certainty and formality that the rule of law offers.  
243 Tom Bingham, The Rule of Law, (London: Penguin, 2011), 39-42. 
244 Jose Maria Maravall and Adam Przeworski eds., Democracy and the rule of law 
(Cambridge University Press: 2003), 5. 
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promulgated must be guaranteed.245 He ultimately rejects the possibility of 
educating people about the laws since: “it would in fact be foolish to try to educate 
every citizen of the full meaning of every law that might be conceivably applied to 
him.” 246 The need would only arise if the law diverged significantly from the 
generally held views of right and wrong. Nonetheless merely being cognisant of 
the law is insufficient; the public ought to be able to scrutinise the values behind 
the laws to ensure that those tasked with applying them do so within the bounds of 
the law. Resting his argument problematically on the internal morality of the law, 
his account then also concerns the stabilizing certainty of the application of the rule 
of law in its constituted functions.  
 The contours of the rule of law that we have analysed so far, shaped 
around either wider liberal models of inalienable rights as well as narrower, 
formalistic accounts in the preceding discussions suggest that in different ways 
both create the conditions for the reordering of subjectivities toward a new 
configuration of state and the administration of society.247 Even wider substantive 
accounts of the rule of law demonstrate how political-juridical epistemes give way 
to a juridical-economic episteme. Wealth production and the effective 
governability of enterprising subjects appears a new order of global rule. However, 
the liberal frames that we will encounter below do not necessarily lead to the 
conditions of our contemporary situation in which market orientated principles 
shape the priorities for rule of law objectives. These preliminary conclusions 
provide conceptual tools to analyse classical liberal approaches to the rule of law in 
the remainder of the chapter with specific attention to how legal knowledge and 
legal education is anchored by political theorist as the source of legitimation for the 
structures of sovereignty that they entail.  
 
 
                                               
245 Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law (Yale University Press, Revised edition,1977), 
Chap. 2.  
246 Ibid., 49. 
247 For Hayek the rule of law is not intended to produce a set of abstract rules in order to 
protect rights; while narrowly focused on general rules, this peculiar rationality is however 
wide in its purview: “it does far more than make the citizen feel secure from the agents of 
coercive government. It sustains the free-market economy and that ‘spontaneous order’ is 
itself the foundation that all other aspects of the society as a whole rest on.” Shklar, 
Political Theory and the Rule of Law, 9. 
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The Enlightenment ideal of the rule of law  
 
 
So how does our contemporary ensemble of legal and economic rationality 
relate to its classical liberal antecedents, and can we discern where certain 
continuities and discontinuities emerge from the perspective of how legal 
knowledge and rights education is theorized by leading thinkers of the 
Enlightenment? This final part of the chapter explores this crucial movement of 
cultural, philosophical and political change that emerged out of late seventeenth- 
and eighteenth-century Europe.248 An era marked by revolutions and social 
upheaval, from this period the supremacy of law as an idea or ideal took on new 
contours.249 Under the prevailing influence of earlier conceptions of natural law, the 
doctrine of human rights and civil rights came to find their most powerful 
expressions in the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen and the 
American Bill of Rights in 1789.250 Today, notwithstanding the critiques and diffuse 
orientations of the rule law we have already encountered, it is taken for granted that 
the rule of law occupies a pre-eminent position as a constitutional principle.251 But 
this was not an inevitable outcome, and the evolution of rule of law concepts 
reflects the conditions and contingencies that arose in different territories and in 
response to different philosophical-political outlooks.252 This final section of the 
chapter will tackle the wide body of literature emerging from this period where 
                                               
248 We will adopt a broad periodicity that Paul Hazard uses to circumscribe the period 
between the late 1600s to the late 1800s. Paul Hazard, The Crisis of the European Mind, 
J.F. The Enlightenment in Problems and Perspectives in History (Longmans Green and Co 
Ltd.: London, 1967). 
249 A number of writers have explored the Enlightenment from the perspective of crisis 
and transformation - see more generally Hazard, The Crisis of the European Mind, 1967 
and Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment, trans. Fritz Koelln and James 
Pettigrove, (Princeton University Press: Princeton, New Jersey, 2009).  
250 Cassirer, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment, 248.  
251 A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 70-79. 
252 For example, what came to be known as the rule of law (Rechstaat) in Germany 
arose as a reaction to the limitations of the police state and raison d’état. Foucault reminds 
us that the reason of state is not an art of government based on divine, natural or even 
human law. It relies on the capacity or rather the relative strength of the state. Foucault, 
Birth of Biopolitics, 246. 
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sources provide critical purchase on the problem of legal knowledge. In tracing the 
roots of rule of law theories in Enlightenment thought, the object is to ask under 
what conditions these theories emerge and what transformations they augur.  In 
particular, we will turn our attention to how rule of law theories shaped relations 
between citizen and state as they bring forth new forms of rationality. With the 
Enlightenment comes an era of reason, progress and increasing secularization of 
political life, adding impetus to the promulgation of laws to the citizenry. And yet 
the theological undercurrents of the formation of the body politic, and the 
epistemological evolution binding human reason to God’s providential plan remain 
potent if obscured aspects of modernity.  The domination of juridical-economic 
rationality today is in no small part indebted to these political theological 
precursors.253 Keeping in view the educational questions that are central to this 
study, the following section will consider how the ensemble of legal, economic and 
political rationalities evolve during the Enlightenment period to produce novel 
ideas of the legal subject. From the autonomous, reasoning Kantian individual to 
the consenting contractarianism of Locke and subsequently the abstract legal 
subject on which Rousseau bases political right, all rely to greater or lesser degree 
as we shall see the constitutive bind of legal understanding by the populace. 
The influence of natural law arguments on the development of 
Enlightenment thought emphasises the mediating role of reason and law between 
the divine and the secular realms. To grasp what is at stake in the genealogy of 
Enlightenment rule of law concepts, we must first briefly take a step back to the 
influence of Christian theology in the evolution from natural to positive law. The 
synthesis of Aristotelian philosophy with Christianity owes much to St. Thomas 
Aquinas (1225-1274). Aquinas applied the precepts of Canon Law to neutralise the 
opposition between force or violence and law with the mediation of knowledge. 
The force of law, he contends, is justified or legitimated by the function of 
knowledge. If the law is to have the binding force proper to it as law (Aquinas 
reminds us of the semantic link between lex and ligandum: to bind), it must be 
applied to those who are subject to it by some promulgation that brings it to their 
notice.254 Promulgation, then, is required if law is to have force.255 Promulgation, 
                                               
253 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans. Talcott Parsons 
(New York: Vigeo Press, 2017). 
254 Thomas Aquinas, Selected Philosophical Writings, trans. Timothy McDermott 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 413. 
255 Aquinas, Selected Philosophical Writings, 416.  
 93 
according to Aquinas, links the spheres of eternal law, natural law and human law. 
In the order of God’s Providence, eternal law is promulgated through God’s Word 
and the eternal book of life. Since creatures hearing and reading it are not eternal, 
natural law functions as the reasoning creature’s share in the eternal law. As a 
result, human reason also shares in the Providential plan but in an imperfect way. 
The goal of law, Aquinas argues, following Aristotle, is to attain the happiness of 
the community to which each individual is a part: “for he [Aristotle] says we call 
those acts just in law that promote and conserve happiness and its components in 
the city, for it is the city that is the complete self-contained community.”256  Human 
law lays down particular laws to order human actions according to natural law 
through the will of the ruler, with the proviso that the ruler’s will is in accord with 
reason and directed toward the common good. This providential aspect of reason 
appears to carry within it the subsequent presumption of the duty to know with 
regard to laws in general.257 Moreover, this duty concerns the express requirement 
for a law to exist so as to legitimise punishment per se.258 The principle and ancient 
legal maxim that ignorance of the law is no defence also finds its source in 
classical understandings of the links between legal knowledge and culpability for 
crimes, Aristotle thus writes: “We punish those who are ignorant of anything in the 
laws that they ought to know and that is not too difficult.”259  
                                               
256 Aquinas, Selected Philosophical Writings, 413. 
257 According to the Jurist Gratian, “A law is not really law until it has been made 
known." Gratian, Decretum Gratiani, c. 3, dist. VII cf. Gilbert Bailey, “The Promulgation 
of Law”, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 35, No. 6 (Dec., 1941), 1059-1084. 
258 The ancient principal that no punishment will be applied without law (nulla poena sin 
lege) simply requires that relevant laws exist, and that they are not applied retrospectively. 
The rule was historically linked to establishing limits on the conduct of officials rather than 
as a mechanism for determining culpability Hall. J. General Principles of Criminal Law 
(1947), 373-4.   
259 Aristotle, “Nicomathean Ethics” in Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised 
Oxford Translation, Jonathan Barnes Ed, Volume One (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, Bollingen Series 1984), 1758. The continuing application of the maxim in modern 
doctrinal accounts raises important concerns about how legitimate it is for a presumption of 
knowledge to be ascribed in the complex contemporary forms of control and regulation of 
conduct and when the line between legal and moral wrongdoing is often far from clear. The 
ramifications of ignorance of law, rather than fact, offered up as a defence or mitigation of 
liability from punishment or other forms of legal liability has come under increasing 
scrutiny. Particular acts of transgression are related to knowledge of law insofar as the act 
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With this schematic introduction we will move on to consider how natural 
law arguments were resituated in Enlightenment thinkers’ development of the rule 
of law, beginning with French jurist and liberal political philosopher, Charles-
Louis Montesquieu (1689-1785). Montesquieu regarded the spirit of the law to be 
what animates the world. While some laws come to be made, some exist without 
needing to be posited, but since man is: “ignorant and subject to error…[and] he 
could forget his fellows; legislators have returned him to his duties by political and 
civil laws.”260 For Montesquieu, where civil laws aim at the general welfare, religion 
comes to be relegated to the perfection of the individual. The spirit of the laws, 
according to Montesquieu, can be derived from the nature of things, expressing a 
form of justice, or relations of justice that exist even before enacted laws come to 
be asserted. The idea of unalterable, universal norms that precede positive laws’ 
command is exemplary of natural law theories.261 But what distinguished the 
eighteenth century from earlier natural law theories is the unshakeable belief that 
human reason can better shape natural laws into a perfected and unified theory of 
state. As religious ethics and transcendental justice receded, the state had to 
become the sole source of moral and social order. For Montesquieu, the rule of law 
was exemplified by the rule of the criminal law as a means of restricting, through 
certain institutional limitations, the oppressive interventions of the state. Shklar 
describes how his ideas on the separation of powers evolved:  
 
Power was checked by power in such a way that neither the violent 
urges of kings, nor the arbitrariness of legislatures could impinge 
directly on the individual in such a way as to frighten her and make her 
insecure in her daily life…the only task of the judiciary is to condemn 
the guilty of legally known crimes defined as acts threatening the 
security of others, and protect the innocent accused of such acts..262 
                                               
is voluntary. Voluntary acts become unlawful only if they are brought about by the power 
of the individual to act (insofar as they are not compelled by another) and in the absence of 
ignorance that can be reasonably mitigated. Ashworth considers whether ignorance of the 
law is itself to be construed as generally wrong, and the problems of autonomy that are 
implied in the maxim. Andrew Ashworth, The Principles of Criminal Law, 7th Edition 
(2013) 220.  
260 Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press:1989), 3. 
261 Ibid., 5. 
262 Shklar, Political Theory and the Rule of Law, 5.  
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Knowledge of law was still largely imputed through the link between natural and 
human reason, though the sovereign nevertheless provides the tie to human law via 
the act of promulgation. While these earlier thinkers were attentive to the role of 
legal knowledge, via reason and promulgation, they delimited this with the 
fundamental unknowability of Gods providential plan. Hidden within the secular 
arrangements for the developing political community remained an impasse in 
which the ground of authority rested on transcendental truths, to which human 
reason could not attain. This impasse, or aporetic relation of legal knowledge in 
constituting the sovereign state, as we shall see in the next chapter is a crucial 
argument that we will follow with Walter Benjamin that points to the falsifications 
and mystifications surrounding modern arrangement of state legitimacy. For 
present purposes what marked a crucial turning point for early Enlightenment 
thinkers that held to the apriority of laws, was a new attitude of thought and 
rationality that sought to bring the forces of reason and nature together in the 
interests of reforming the relations between the individual and society, not simply 




The rule of law and the sovereign state 
 
 
A distinctive framework for early modern writers is the corollary of rule-
based government with the sovereign state.263 We find a critical juncture for the 
problem of knowledge and the binding force of law materialising in the person of 
the sovereign in the political theory of Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679). While his 
political theories are regarded as antithetical to rule of law as it is understood in 
modern conceptions, we can nevertheless trace crucial links between natural law 
theories and later social contract theorists in Hobbes insofar as the problem of legal 
knowledge is concerned.  In Hobbes’ sovereign theory of state, law is conceived as 
                                               
263 William E Scheuerman, “Review: The Rule of Law at Century’s End”, Political 
Theory, Vol. 25, No. 5 (Oct. 1997) 743. 
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the command of the sovereign.264 Sovereign law expresses the sovereign will backed 
with the power to punish or reward. This entails political authority unrestrained by 
law (potestas legibus soluta).  Law cannot bind the sovereign as such (unless by 
virtue of willingly submitting himself to any law). 265 For Hobbes, the sovereign is 
conceived as the embodiment of the commonwealth to which every man consents 
as the best means of avoiding the state of war and violence with which nature is 
associated: “law was brought into the world for nothing else but to limit the natural 
liberty of particular men, in such manner as they might not hurt, but assist one 
another.”266 Hobbes’ absolutist schema pits the violence of nature against the peace 
and rationality of the commonwealth and thereby justifies the absolute right of the 
sovereign to use force to secure the obedience of his subjects. The irrational state 
of nature legitimates the coercive demands of secular laws.267   
Hobbes’ construction is remarkably attentive to the juridical-
epistemological role of legal knowledge for the subjects who are so bound. 
Command entails the legislative function as well as the promulgation of law. In 
keeping with natural law theories, he suggests that knowledge of ordinary moral 
                                               
264 On the conception of law as command rather than counsel, Hobbes relies on 
Aquinas: The “law is an ordinance of reason for the common good, made by him who cares 
for the community and promulgated.” And Suarez: “the requirement that law be made by 
one who cares of the community implies that it is not counsel, but a command.” “On laws 
and on God the Lawgiver,” Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan: With Selected Variants from the 
Latin Edition of 1668, (Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company Inc., 1994), footnote 2, 
173. He also refers to command as the terminus ultimus of the forces of all citizens 
together. De Cive, cited in Jean Hampton, “Democracy and the Rule of Law” in The Rule of 
Law Nomos XXXVI, ed. Ian Shapiro (New York: New York University Press, 1994). 
265 Hobbes argues: “A fourth opinion repugnant to the nature of the commonwealth is 
this: That he that hath the sovereign power is subject to the civil laws…which error that 
setteth the laws above the sovereign, setteth also a judge above him, and a power to punish 
him, which is to make a new sovereign.” Hobbes, Leviathan, 213. 
266 Hobbes, Leviathan, 175. 
267 As Giorgio Agamben, observes we will encounter repeatedly the idea that it is the 
state of nature which in the modern era is the being-in-potentiality of the law and the basis 
of the laws’ self-proposition. Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare 
Life, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford California: Stanford University Press, 1998) 35 
- 36. A transcendental logic ascribes the only authority to which the sovereign is bound to 
the natural law and thus to the ultimate authority of God. Hobbes, Leviathan, 213. 
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rules and of virtues is promulgated by the natural law and is accessible to all men.268 
However civil law, since it is not made by nature, is linked to consent.269  The 
relationship between the covenant of society and the social contract requires total 
submission of all its members as a logical necessity.  It is through this and only 
through this mechanism that a social or community life is constituted. Consent 
implies a degree of substantive knowledge of the laws to which subject are bound, 
and which constitute the political arrangement that Hobbes envisages.270 
Promulgation of the law provides the nexus of the express sovereign will 
that binds those who also then benefit from the civil laws: “for the knowledge of 
particular laws belongeth to them that profess the study of the laws of their several 
countries; but the knowledge of the civil law in general to any man.”271 The way in 
which the laws must be brought to the attention of subjects is differentiated. 
Already in the Hobbesian requirement for the promulgation of laws, we see 
emerging aspects of what extends later notions of legal supremacy in an 
administrative-governmental state: “For every man seeth that some laws are 
addressed to all the subjects in general; some to particular provinces; some to 
particular vocations; and some to particular men; and are therefore laws to every of 
those to whom the command is directed, and to none else.”272 The absolute state still 
demands an administrative state apparatus that can disseminate legal knowledge 
pertaining to particular groups and professions.  
For Hobbes, it is in the very nature of law to be made known: “The law of 
nature excepted, it belongeth to the essence of all other laws to be made known to 
everyman that shall be obliged to obey them either by word, or writing or some 
                                               
268 “Civil law is part of the dictates of nature…civil law and natural law are not different 
kinds, but different parts of law, whereof one part (being written) is called civil, the other 
(unwritten), natural. But the right of nature, that is the natural liberty of man, may by the 
civil law be abridged and restrained.” Hobbes, Leviathan, 175. 
269 “But every subject in a Commonwealth hath covenanted to obey the civil law.” 
Hobbes, Leviathan, 175. 
270 Since it is only the authority of the ruler that ultimately founds political society, the 
move from natural to civil state means consent is framed by Hobbes as surrender, as a 
covenant of submission (pactum subjectionis). See Cassirer, The Philosophy of the 
Enlightenment, 256. 
271 Hobbes, Leviathan, 172 and 178. 
272 Ibid., 173. 
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other act.”273 The objective requirement to promulgate is combined with the 
subjective requirement of each individual to be sufficiently informed: “for every 
man is obliged to do his best to endeavour to inform himself of all written laws that 
may concern his future actions.”274  The means to take notice of law is not within the 
grasp of “natural fools, children or madmen”275 in keeping with the maxim, the: 
“law made, if not made known, is no law.”276 However, laws’ inherent lack of 
clarity also requires that someone decides in the event of uncertainty, and this fact 
undergirds the necessity of ensuring the sovereign remains uninhibited by legal 
constraints.277 
The rationality that underpins Hobbes’ theory of state is also characteristic 
of Enlightenment belief that the sciences offered a new generative mode of 
reasoning. This meant an object of enquiry could be best ascertained by genetic 
and causal reasoning. The object of study, of understanding, was to produce rather 
than simply abstract, and the task of philosophy was to ascertain the whole through 
subtraction and addition.278 This was to be hugely influential in the embodied 
leviathan of Hobbes’ political thought. Ernst Cassirer elucidates:  
 
For the state too is a “body” (corpus), and therefore it can only be 
understood by analysis of its ultimate components and reconstruction 
from these…Thus at first Hobbes proceeds by analytically isolating the 
                                               
273 Ibid., 178.  
274 Ibid., 179-80. 
275 Ibid., 177. 
276 He goes on to note the modes of promulgation that were used “in ancient time, before 
letters were in common use, the laws were many times put into verse, that the rude people 
taking pleasure in singing or reciting them might the more easily retain them in memory” 
and citing biblical authority from Deuteronomy 11:19, 31:12 and Solomon Proverbs 7.3 
teaching to children the ten commandments “by discourse both at home and upon the way, 
at going to bed and rising from bed and to write it upon the posts and doors of their houses 
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277 Hampton provides three rationales elaborated by Hobbes for the insufficiency of laws 
alone in providing a unified coherent political foundation: that laws can never be rendered 
completely clear; that they cannot be written so that their application is always obvious; 
and even if they could self-interest would ensure individuals would seek to interpret them 
in more advantageous ways for themselves. Hampton, “Democracy and the Rule of 
law,”17. 
278 Cassirer, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment, 254-255. 
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elements of his problem; in order to use individual wills as counters in 
the calculation, he treats them as abstract units without any particular 
quality. Each will wants the same as every other, and each wants it 
only for itself.279 
 
What Hobbes directs our attention to is how the social covenant can resolve the 
political problem presented by this divergence of will in nature, and the necessary 
transition from natural law theories (as revealed by our reason) contrasted with the 
role of law and state. For Hobbes, there is no state of freedom that pre-exists the 
state, rather, each individual is pitted against the other and no bonds of community 
serve to avoid conflict. It is submission to the absolute sovereign that creates the 
basis for political organisation which in nature cannot subsist due to the natural 
inclinations of men. While natural rights do exist, they must be abridged, and the 
individual will must consent to be bound together in the body of the sovereign in 
order for civil rights to render the best state of affairs in society.280  
Moral and political philosophy during the Enlightenment would 
increasingly reject absolutism and come to base ideas of freedom and equality at 
the heart of theories of state and law. However, the basic generative logic would 
still find a place in later theories. John Locke is one of the most important 
Enlightenment thinkers regarding rights to private property and individual liberty. 
For Locke, unlike Hobbes, the state of nature is not inherently inimical to 
community, and indeed the ties that bind political associations are contingent on a 
pre-existing sociability. But the uncertainty of unwritten conventions in this state 
renders protection of property arbitrary and unsure. The idea of the social contract 
therefore hinges on the ability of people to know the settled law that was made in 
common to form the only benchmark for restrictions of individual freedoms and 
rights.281  The ruling authority must be guided by promulgated laws since the 
unwritten law can only be found in “the minds of men” and because: “men being 
biased of their interest, as well as ignorant for study of it, are apt not to follow it as 
law binding on them.”282 It is in the state of nature that self-preservation becomes 
                                               
279 Ibid., 255-256. 
280 The idea that civil rights are preceded by original ties as the foundation of all social 
and political organizations is reshaped by later contractarian theorists. 
281 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, 157. 
282 Ibid., 152. 
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the over-arching basis for man’s conduct and his acquisitive nature in turn means 
that the protection of private property becomes the priority for any civic 
Government.283 The social contract rests on a theory of consent in which inheres 
some degree of public knowledge of laws since this serves as a constitutive force in 
undergirding the formation of consent as well limiting legitimate authority.284 In this 
construction citizens are themselves the author of the laws providing the nexus that 
preserves the legitimacy of any coercive effect of law, he writes “every single 
person became subject equally with other the meanest men, to those laws, which he 
himself as part of the legislative, had established.”285 Locke thereby links the ends of 
political society and government with the need for: “an established, settled known 
law, received and allowed by common consent to be the standard of right and 
wrong, and the common measure to decide all controversies between them.”286 Law 
is thus the only guarantor of the liberty and security of men. 
 Unlike Hobbes, Locke maintains the voluntary nature of consent rather 
than submission. Express or tacit consent therefore is an important distinction 
drawn by Locke insofar as the contract between citizen and state ensures willed 
consent to be governed: “the difficulty is, what ought to be looked on as a tacit 
consent, and how far it binds i.e. how far anyone shall be looked on to consent 
where he has made no expressions of it at all.”287 At this point the constitutive role 
of epistemology of law which seems to imply some juridical-political thrust is 
fudged in Locke’s schema. He continues:  
 
And to this I say, that every man that hath any possessions, or 
enjoyment of any part of the dominions of any government, doth 
thereby give his tacit consent and is as far forth obliged to obedience 
of the laws of that government, during such enjoyment, as anyone 
                                               
283 Property for Locke includes property of the person, and although in nature property 
is held in common, as we begin to labour and cultivate, the acquisition of property and its 
enhancement leave it prone to becoming insecure, since the state of nature is unsafe and 
uneasy. Ibid., 53.  
284 Important for Locke’s theory is the idea that man is in nature free and therefore 
according to Locke this means that to consent is to do so willingly. Ibid., 142. 
285 Ibid,. 139. 
286 Ibid., 152. 
287 Ibid., 150. 
 101 
under it… it reaches as far as the very being of any one within the 
territories of that government.288  
 
This position places Locke in a quandary – one of which he is perhaps aware as he 
then attempts to disentangle simply being (in person or possessions) under the 
remit of a government, and existing, perhaps as denizen from another country, 
under that same government. His anxious desire to protect property creates an 
exception in which tacit consent only applies insofar a property ownership is 
concerned. That aside, he concludes that no one can be considered a member of 
society without express consent: “Nothing can make a man [a member of society] 
but his actually entering into it by express consent and positive engagement.”289 As 
we will see in the idea of the general will in Rousseau, there is a continuing 
dilemma of how the problem of epistemological-juridical questions of legal 
knowledge can tie or create the binding force of a juridico-political relationship (at 
least once natural law and natural reason is no longer applied), without which 
social contract theories risk falling into hopeless abstraction. 
 Let us examine how the issue of the will to consent can be conceptualized 
in the writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778). Rousseau is both a seminal 
proponent and shaper of Enlightenment thought, as well as a critic of emerging 
liberal philosophies of the Enlightenment. Unlike Locke, he situates the institution 
of private property as a source of inequality and the cause of much of the misery 
that he rails against. The Social Contract seeks remedies for the lack of freedom 
caused by society’s structures and its baleful inequalities.290  Enslavement exists not 
as a consequence of the natural state of men but of society; he reminds us in the 
famous opening sentence of the Contract: “Man is born free and everywhere he is 
in chains.”291 His approach emphasises the importance of the constitutive function of 
law and the deliberative public processes that give force to the general will. He 
combines natural law ideas from Grotius with a Hobbesian schema in a radical 
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way.292 Like Hobbes, he employs the metaphor of the body politic as: “an organized 
body, alive, and similar to man’s. The sovereign power represents the head; the 
laws and customs are the brain.”293 The body is made up of its citizens or members 
who animate the body. Unlike Grotius, he denies any doctrine of original social 
instinct, and contrary to natural law thinkers he considers the state of nature to be a 
situation in which men are isolated from one another and have as their primary 
focus their own self-preservation.294 Despite the seduction of private self-interest, 
Rousseau’s theory does not resort to the necessity of subjection. He does return to 
Grotius, and counters Hobbes in conceding that a people is only a people that 
constitutes itself through a free act of will: “that very gift is a civil act, it 
presupposes a public deliberation…For this act, being necessarily prior [to the 
election of a King] is the true foundation of society.”295 
This presupposed deliberative freedom sits somewhere between the state of 
nature and the final act of the constitution of a state. For Rousseau (unlike Hobbes) 
it is not force that gives rise to right but rather civil liberty is conjoined to moral 
liberty, which means that the passage from nature to the civil state substitutes 
desires with reason and moral judgment.296 Man alienates his freedom and gives it 
over to the whole community so as: “to find an association that will defend and 
protect the person and goods of each associate.”297 In Rousseau we see that the 
social contract is the answer to the problem of imperfect natural freedom.  The 
general will is the basis for all justice and social order since nature cannot provide 
us with a guideline for the rules that a good society requires:  
 
Hence for the social compact not to be an empty formula, it tacitly 
includes the following engagement which alone can give force to the 
rest, that whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be constrained 
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to do so by the entire body: which means nothing other than he shall 
be forced to be free.298 
 
Moreover, this contract requires the total alienation of all rights of the individual to 
be given over to the community. What is distinct in Rousseau’s formulation of the 
social contract is the negation of individual rights, which would “destroy its real 
meaning and content.”299 Rousseau does not jettison the idea of inalienable rights 
but does not evoke them against the state since inalienable rights that once 
belonged imperfectly to nature do not inhere in the constitutional state.300 This 
absolute alienation is the only way in which genuine equality and freedom can be 
achieved. From the perspective of knowledge of laws, we can see why the 
requirement of knowledge for all citizens is an important feature of the deliberative 
social foundation of the general will, and the equal dissemination of and adherence 
to the rights and duties that the civil order can provide for.  
For political society to come about, the individual effectively gives over 
their individual right in order to be recognised as a member of a political collective 
capable of forming a polity ruled by laws. Giorgio Agamben offers an important 
insight into the dilemma that Rousseau presents us with:  
 
[T]he important thing is the distinction - basic to Rousseau’s political 
thought – between sovereignty and government and their modes of 
interaction…[I]n the Social Contract the distinction between the 
general will and legislative capacity, on one hand, and government and 
executive power, on the other, is restated, but Rousseau now faces the 
challenge of portraying these two elements as distinct – and yet 
articulated, knit together, interwoven.301 
 
It is in the discussion of political economy that this distinction between executive 
power and government emerges: public economy (government) and sovereignty 
must remain distinct, general will is the first principle of public economy and 
fundamental rule of government.302 In this conception, the law is the divinely 
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inspired arbiter and medium that prevents oppression as opposed to freely given 
consent:  
 
this salutary organ of the will of all restores [in the realm of] right the 
natural equality among men. It is this celestial voice that dictates the 
precepts of public reason to every citizen, and teaches him to act in 
conformity with the maxims of his own judgement and not to be in 
contradiction with himself. It alone is also what the chiefs should 
cause to speak when they command.303  
 
Here an altogether theological paradigm is resituated within the profane political 
organs of the administrative state. The emanation of government as a distinct but 
interwoven element of sovereign power is a crucial fulcrum for the tensions and 
contradictions that we have begun to explore with regard to the binding function of 
the law epistemology and political sovereignty, and as we will go on to consider 
via conceptual assemblages developed by Critical Theorists some of the challenges 
that include much older proto-religious thought. We can observe at this stage how 
the origins of the turn from classical liberal to neoliberal juridical-economic 
rationality has a longer and more complex pedigree. Agamben writes: 
 
In Rousseau, the government or executive power claims to coincide 
with the sovereignty of law from which it nevertheless distinguishes 
itself…through these distinctions the entire economic-providential 
apparatus (with its polarities ordinatio/execution, providence/fate, 
Kingdom/Government) is passed on as an unquestioned inheritance to 
modern politics…the most nefarious consequence of this theological 
apparatus dressed up as a political legitimation is that it has rendered 
the democratic tradition of thinking government and its economy.304  
 
This idea of the shaping of the particular will into the general will in the interest of 
society governed by laws takes us to a final important construct that owes its 
evolution to Enlightenment thought: the ideas and ideals associated with autonomy, 
individual liberty and the distinction between public and private reason that would 
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come to be profoundly influential in political theory in modernity as well as 
shaping approaches to the promulgation and education of laws in the wider 
population.  
In November 1784, a German periodical Berlinische Monatsschrift 
published a response by Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) to the question: What is 
enlightenment?305 He provides the following formula: “Enlightenment is man’s 
emergence from self-incurred immaturity.”306 Enlightenment in his view releases 
humanity from immaturity such that it will no longer be acceptable to bend to 
someone else’s authority. The immaturity that hinders progress toward 
enlightenment is self-incurred not for want of understanding or reason but rather as 
a consequence of the “lack of resolution and courage to use it without another’s 
guidance.”307 Society is not yet enlightened in Kant’s estimation, but is in the 
process of becoming so. By adopting a certain will to progress it could eventually 
be brought about. What might first appear to the modern mind as a strange idea, the 
motto ‘sapere aude’ ‘dare to know’, dare to use your own reason, was a bold step. 
For thinkers of the Enlightenment, this meant placing the capacity to reason for 
oneself above the authority of church and of absolutist monarchy.308  
In order to use reason in a mature way, Kant made an important distinction 
between the public and the private realm. Taking our place in society means 
exercising our private reason in accordance with what is demanded of us as citizen 
subjects going about our day-to-day labours and duties.309 The examples he provides 
are all professions that nevertheless have a public role – the pastor, the tax collector 
and so forth.310 Individual restrictions on freedom that demand obedience by 
subjects are justified insofar as they do not encroach on the free use of reason in 
the public realm. The use of reason in the public realm - the universal freedom to 
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think and reason and share those ideas - is the condition that will eventually augur 
an enlightened age. According to Kant, Enlightenment is therefore a dynamic 
process of self-emancipation, from which reason can derive a priori rules.311 These 
a priori rules help us to discern the best constitution and the universal laws that 
reason can shape toward civic life and provide a fulcrum for societal improvement 
and peace.  
 Kant was no political revolutionary, and though he was deeply affected by 
the events in America, he was also politically conservative and hoped to shape 
public discourse to avoid the ravages of war. 312 Indeed, the struggle to establish the 
spirit of law pits law against war.313  The realms of education and publicity are 
crucial to the progress of an enlightened, peaceful society. According to Kant: 
“Popular enlightenment is the public instruction of people upon their rights and 
duties toward the state to which they belong.”314 However, the task of instruction 
should not be put in the hands of officials appointed by the state, but into the hands 
of those whose teaching would be free from restraints. By this Kant means 
philosophers and writers. In contrast to the private use of reason the public use of 
reason is a matter of writing and publishing: “by the public use of one’s reason I 
mean that use which anyone may make of it as a man of learning (or scholar) 
addressing the entire reading public.”315 The ‘freedom of the pen’ to influence others 
through teaching and writing is a vital force during the Enlightenment, and as 
Voltaire suggests is the real: “Palladium of the rights of the people...in general, we 
                                               
311 Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, in Kant Political Writings, 174. 
312 He remarks on revolution in the text as follows: “A revolution may well put an end to 
autocratic despotism and to rapacious power-seeking oppression, but it will never produce a 
true reform in ways of thinking.” Kant, What is Enlightenment?, 55. 
313 “For the condition of peace is the only state in which the property of a large number 
of people living together as neighbours under a single constitution can be guaranteed by 
laws.” Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, in Kant Political Writings, ed. H.S Reiss 
(Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1991), 174. To this extent Kant follows along the 
lines of Montesquieu - limited in scope but wide application assertion of the rule of law, 
which Shklar describes as follows: “The ultimate spiritual and political struggle is always 
between law and war. Rome chose war and lost everything. If France were to choose world 
monarchy and war instead of the English path to liberty and law, it too would be doomed to 
a deadly despotism.” Political Theory and The Rule of Law, 5. 
314 Kant, The contest of Faculties, in Kant Political Writings 186.  
315 Kant, What is Enlightenment?, 55. 
 107 
have a natural right to use both our pen and our tongue at our own risk.”316 From the 
perspective of law this freedom of thought ought for Kant not only to include 
freedom of religious thought but also public criticism of laws, even if, as private 
citizens we must do our duty in respect of the laws. Writing about the Frederick the 
Great, Kant suggests: “there is no danger even to his legislation if he allows his 
subjects…to put before the public his thoughts on better ways of drawing up the 
laws even if this entails a forthright criticism of the current legislation.” 317 This was 
a remarkable suggestion at the time and one that was fairly quickly quashed by 
new edicts on censorship that followed the death of Frederick I and the accession 
of Frederick Wilhelm II. 
Kant’s use of ‘the public’ also appears at a time when there was a growing 
concern with freedom of the press. It is worth noting the medium that this 
interjection takes - as a publication in a periodical journal. Just shortly before Kant 
wrote his piece, another commentator, Wekhrlin, was published in the same 
periodical in 1784. He writes: 
 
What must it have been like in the times before printing presses 
existed! Tyrants had no bridles, the people no refuge. Vice could grow 
impudent, without becoming red with shame. Virtue knew no means of 
sharing its suffering, or gaining the sympathy of society. The laws had 
no critics, morals had no supervisor, reason was monopolized. 
Providence spoke: let the human race become free! And publicity 
appeared.318  
 
It is in this milieu that men of letters crafted their ideas and turned them into a 
potent conduit for public discourse and deliberation. This deliberative and critical 
public discourse had enormous import for the way in which relations between 
individual and state, and the organization of constitutional government would be 
conceived. If Enlightenment was to bring about rational autonomy, one of the 
implicit demands it makes is to use reason to create one’s own laws rather than 
simply obeying the authority of others. The notion of autonomy as self-imposed 
law entails a two-fold move: the subjective shaping of the autonomous individual 
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via the will to reason, and the constitutive political status of public reason in 
shaping authority.  Modern man, as Foucault’s critique of Kant’s text opens up, 
must face the task of producing himself, of constituting himself as a subject.319 
We come to summarise the ideas emerging through our excursus that link 
public legal education, and more broadly public knowledge of laws, with the rule 
of law. We began with an exploration of contemporary discourses linking public 
legal education to the rule of law. The use of legal knowledge in both narrow or 
wider readings sustains a shift in the orientation of rule of law doctrines toward 
competitive liberalised and globalised markets. While ostensibly deploying public 
knowledge of the law as a legitimising force, the legitimation becomes less a 
process of constraining the power of government than a veridiction: a means of 
creating and shaping an altogether new rationality of government. The readings 
suggest a convergence of rule of law, public awareness of the law with the 
demands of market-driven values and a certain rationality of economy associated 
with the neoliberalism of the last thirty years.  
Substantive theories agree that there must be more than simply formal 
construct if the ideal of the rule is to have a meaningful role in the lives of citizens. 
The hedging about of the ideal of the rule of law with extrinsic values, such as the 
extent to which the rule of law promotes the worthy goals of dignity or freedom, 
for example, and the extent to which the jurisprudence of human rights provide a 
positive, if imputed, standard of constitutional norm for rule of law positions, is 
one route to solving the problems inherent in liberal constructions.320 However, the 
framing of laws around the liberal individual has also served to erode the validity 
of the collective and public realms. These tendencies, as some critics of 
development orientated approaches have commented, have also usurped aspirations 
for the rule of law as a mechanism for peace-building and protection of human 
rights by providing a medium for global investment capital. Here we noted that 
teaching of human rights and liberal property regimes together formed the 
emphasis of global expansionism in the legal realm. This form of teaching 
                                               
319 Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?” in The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow 
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 39. As we will consider in the final chapter of the 
thesis, Kant’s ideas would be enormously influential in the development of 
citizenship education. 
320 See for Raz, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, in The Authority of Law: Essays on 
Law and Morality (2012). 
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however, despite serving a rubric of democtractisation have substantively moved 
away from a critical understanding of how citizens themselves shape and form the 
body politic. Instead these paradigms focus on the constituted elements fo the 
executive state functions. Promulgated laws need to be understood to foster 
cohesion and order.  
  The inter-war years produced a crisis of capitalism that would have 
enduring consequences for the re-evaluation of classical liberal doctrine. The 
coincidence of liberal political and legal thought with the rise of capitalism 
augured industrialisation and with it all the miseries of long hours, poor conditions 
and endemic poverty.  Even liberalism’s most fervent proponents were moved to 
curb the tendencies of liberal economic policy. According to John Stuart Mill, 
capitalism seemed to give to the least deserving the greatest reward.321 Ensuing 
social welfare initiatives including social security, working hours, pensions and 
universal education came about as means of ameliorating the effects of poverty, 
and classical liberalism consequently gave way to the social welfare state. Early 
constitutional theorists such as Dicey (and later Hayek) warned against these 
developments as inimical to the rule of law. Specifically, the expansion of 
administrative actions resulting from the developing welfare state and the loss of 
overview by the ordinary courts of the bulk of administrative actions threatened the 
orderly rule of law. As theorists increasingly remark the decline of the rule of law 
in the face of social welfare and administrative courts, we nevertheless noted the 
populist rhetoric growing in rule of law debates alongside social policies directed 
toward enhancing public education about the laws for the purpose of liberalising 
markets and underpinning price competition.  
However, classical liberalism does not inevitably lead to the conditions of 
our contemporary situation in which market orientated principles shape the 
priorities for rule of law objectives. Enlightenment thought engaged more directly 
with political theology so that an undercurrent of political theological ideas held in 
close proximity the idea of God’s providential order, natural law and the links to 
natural reason. These facets agree on the importance of publicity or promulgation 
of law as garnering the legitimacy of sovereignty. Classical liberal theories both 
eschewed and internalized political theological accounts of natural reason in their 
constructions of the sovereign state.  John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (in 
different ways) grasp the importance of promulgating law as an aspect of the 
                                               
141 Tamanaha, Rule of Law, 65. 
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general will and the formation or constitution of consent to be governed above and 
beyond what natural law can offer. The reading traces the classical liberal 
foundations for the rule of law with its adherence to doctrines of liberty and the 
social contract that provides the basis for the constitution of government by 
consent. In order to constitute the self as an autonomous subject there are two 
further movements to consider during this period. One the one hand, the idea or 
ideal of the creation of laws moves away from a theologically determined one, 
from the rule of the church and scripture. On the other, we see the disavowal of law 
which is dictated by an absolutist state, by the will of the ruler alone. What we can 
discern are some of the continuities and discontinuities from classical versions of 
liberalism vis-a-vis contemporary rule of law ideas.  
An element to keep in view when considering these new drivers for public 
legal education is the distinction between the juridico-political function of legal 
knowledge vis a vis the constitutive form of the state, and the epistemological-
juridical function of foreknowledge of laws in relation to the ascription of 
culpability for crimes or breach of duties. Insofar as the rule of law is applied via 
the medium of the courts, this emphasises the epistemological-juridical (and 
broadly administrative) function of public legal education. As the market 
increasingly informs a rationality of state, we can see how early rule of law 
theories contained the seed of the tendency to shape the rationality of the subject 
and of the citizen subject in differing ways in Locke, Rousseau and Kant. Legal 
knowledge is intrinsic to this shaping of private and public reason toward the 
constitution of government. But the form of economic rationality that is distinctive 
of neoliberalism was not fully-fledged in classical thought. This question did not 
contour the ambition of liberalism either as an economic or political doctrine; the 
former sought only to free the economic subject, the latter to free the political and 
civil subject. Neither raised the market itself as a principle of all life or of 
government.322 The new paradigms for the rule of law and the way in which public 
knowledge and discourse on the law is deployed serves rather to instrumentalise 
them toward entirely new configurations of the arrangements between citizens and 
the government. In contemporary frames it appears citizens are to be taught about 
the law to ensure they are effectively able to take up their role as competitive 
consumers. Under the conditions of rapid juridification, and as distinctions 
between public and private, criminal and civil spheres collapse, the problem of 
                                               
322 Brown, Undoing the Demos, 61. 
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public knowledge has stubbornly persisted.  Moreover laws become a potent force 
in shaping the desires and aspirations of the citizens to whom they are directed. We 
will move in later chapters to consider how the School of Critical Theory 
challenged the liberal ideal of the rule of law and served as an inspiration for 
critical pedagogical philosophies. We will also analyse the fundamental problem of 
the differentiation between the exercise of power from its legitimation raised by 
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The chapter begins by introducing the interdisciplinary strands of Critical 
Theory that emerged from the Institut, home to a group of predominantly German 
Jewish thinkers including Max Horkheimer (1895-1973), Theodor Adorno (1903-
1969) and more distantly, Walter Benjamin (1892-1940). The analysis traces the 
birth of Critical Theory in the Germany of the inter-war years and the vision of 
interdisciplinary social theory that the Institut fostered. It is worth noting the 
contiguity of the Frankfurt School and the German Ordo Liberals that we 
encountered in the previous chapter. Each group of thinkers, in their own ways, 
was attending to what they construed as the irrationalities of capitalist society. As 
Foucault noted, both schools took up the challenge posed by Max Weber wherein 
law is implicated in the transformation of capital, “the movement from capital to 
capitalism, from the logic of contradiction to the division between the rational and 
the irrational.”325 Moreover, as the century unfolded and Nazism saw many of the 
members of both schools forced into exile, the contingencies and social and 
political urgency with which both sought to theorise anew the inheritance of liberal 
Enlightenment are important to keep in mind.  
Critical Theory and the writings emerging from the Institut would 
subsequently come to have a significant impact on educational theory both in 
Europe and America, a subject that will be explored in the final chapter of the 
thesis.326 The publications of the Institut were substantial, heterogeneous and 
                                               
324 “Goethe’s Elective Affinities,” Selected Writings, Volume 1, 1913-26, eds. Marcus 
Bullock and Michael W Jenning (Belknap Press: Harvard University Press, 1996), 309. 
325  Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, 105-6. 
326 For an introduction to the links between Critical Theory and critical pedagogy see 
Nigel Blake and Jan Masschelein, “Critical Theory and Critical Pedagogy” in The 
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diffusely received. The chapter will therefore limit the scope of the literature by 
offering an overview of Critical Theory and its methods as described by its key 
contributors, followed by a focus on these thinkers’ reception of liberal legal theory 
during the fall of the Weimar Republic. This two-stage circumscription of the 
literature from the Institut aims to offer the most relevance to the legal theoretical 
considerations of the thesis and helps to elucidate the legal educational concerns 
that we will subsequently move on to consider. 
In preceding chapters, we considered the contested space wherein legal 
knowledge in the public domain is linked to constituent power, to the constitutive 
role of the citizen vis a vis the law and the modern state.327 Two primary rationales 
underpin the contemporary debates on public legal education. The first is the basic 
constitutional premise that obedience to laws implies that knowledge of laws to 
which citizens are bound should be accessible to all of the citizens attached to a 
particular legal order (the constitutive function of public knowledge).328 The 
second and related rationale addresses the capacity of individuals to have sufficient 
specific knowledge of their rights and duties in order to secure legal protection and 
to assess individual culpability insofar as a lack of knowledge of a legal rule 
procures a defence or mitigation in a particular case (the constituted function of 
public knowledge).329   
                                               
Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Education, eds., Nigel Blake, Paul Smeyers, Richard 
Smith and Paul Tandish, (London, Blackwell, 2009), 38-56. 
327 The socio-legal literature in the legal needs tradition is explored in detail in Chapter 
One; however, to recap, this growing body of evidence links the nature and impact of low 
levels of legal knowledge with the failure to gain legal redress. This in turn has 
implications for the rule of law, as developed in Chapters Two and Three.  
328 As a general premise of the rule of law, this proposition simply states that people are 
entitled to know in advance what, as a matter of law, they are (or are not) empowered to do. 
See Ian Mcleod, Legal Method (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 62.  
329 For a comparative perspective on the doctrinal consideration, see Douglas N Husak, 
Ignorance of Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016). The historical origins of the 
association of ignorance with law can be found in medieval Aristotelianism as well as in 
Aristotle, and on the other hand, in Augustine. In Roman and Civil law ignorantia iuris is 
defined as ignorance (lack of knowledge) or error (false knowledge) concerning the 
existence or meaning of a legal norm. The broad rule establishes that ignorance of fact is 
excusable, whereas ignorance of law is not. See Samuel Parson Scott, The Civil Law, 
including the Twelve Tables, the Institutes of Gaius, the Rules of Ulpian, the Opinions of 
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The following study takes up considerations of the rule of law and the 
associated problem of public understanding of the law developed in the previous 
two chapters through an alternative theoretical framework, for which we will enlist 
primarily the work of Walter Benjamin (1892-1940). Benjamin is perhaps one of 
the most enigmatic cultural critics associated with what became known as the 
Frankfurt School: the Institute for Social Research (die Institut für 
Sozialforschung) established in Frankfurt am Main in 1923.330 As the foremost 
thinker attached to the Institut whose theories have been developed with an 
antinomian and anarchist orientation, the use of Benjamin’s critical exploration of 
law may appear an odd choice.331 However, Benjamin’s oeuvre offers a number of 
                                               
Paulus, the Enactments of Justinian, and the Constitutions of Leo. Translated from the 
original Latin, edited, and compared with all accessible systems of jurisprudence ancient 
and modern, (Cincinnati: Central Trust Co.,1932), Volume 3, 239. For the contemporary 
canon law of the Catholic Church see more generally Girard M Sherba, Canon 1096: 
Ignorance as a Ground for Nullity, (Doctoral Dissertation, Saint Paul University, 2001), 
http://www.bookpump.com/dps/pdf-b/1121342b.pdf. 
330 For a critical overview of the work of the Frankfurt School see the collection of 
essays in Jay Bernstein ed. The Frankfurt School: Critical Assessments, Volumes I-V 
(London: Routledge, 1994). For a history of the Institut see Martin Jay, The Dialectical 
Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institut of Social Research 1923-
1950 (University of California Press, Berkley, 1973) and Rolf Wiggershaus, The Frankfurt 
School: Its History, Theories, and Political Significance, trans. Michael Robertson 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998). For a focus on Theodor Adorno and Walter Benjamin 
and their association with the Institute see Susan Buck Morss, The Origin of Negative 
Dialectics: Theodore W Adorno, Walter Benjamin, and the Frankfurt Institut (New York: 
The Free Press, 1979). Hereafter the abbreviated term Institut will be used in the text. 
331 On Benjamin’s association with antinomianism, see David Kaufmann “Beyond Use, 
Within Reason: Adorno, Benjamin and the Question of Theology”, New German Critique, 
No 83 Special Issue on Walter Benjamin (Spring - Summer 2001): 151-173.  In his 
fragmentary exposition on the right to use force written just before the Critique in 1920, 
Benjamin describes the denial of the right of the state and the individual to use force as 
‘ethical anarchism’ which he considers to be fraught with contradictions as a political 
programme, but retains significance as moral action. Walter Benjamin, “The Right to Use 
Force”, in Selected Writings, Volume 1, 231-234. See also James R Martel, “Anarchist All 
the Way Down: Walter Benjamin’s Subversion of Authority in Text, Thought and Action”, 
Parrhesia Journal, Number 21 (2014): 3-12 
https://www.parrhesiajournal.org/parrhesia21/parrhesia21_martel.pdf [Accessed 9th March 
2018]. On the wider group of Jewish writers with whom Benjamin was associated tending 
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crucial insights into some of the most troubling and sustained tensions that arise in 
the context of public legal education, both in its theoretical and practical forms.  
A review of Critical Theory associated with the Institut is followed by a 
close reading of Walter Benjamin’s 1921 essay, Critique of Violence.332  The essay 
has received substantial attention for its provocative and often obscure reading of 
law and violence. Of particular interest for the purposes of a critical evaluation of 
public legal education is Benjamin’s suggestion that ignorance of laws (Unkenntnis 
in the German) and guilt are operative preconditions or requirements of legal 
ordering.333 The Critique of Violence brings myth and guilt to the fore, asserting 
how law’s foundations are secured.334The alignment of law with fate serves to 
show how mythic violence and legal violence coincide in establishing uncontrolled 
rule over life.335 This uncontrolled rule is mediated by a juridified world in which 
law has come to colonise all aspects of life.336 Benjamin emphasises the ambiguity 
of laws and the maxim that ignorance offers no defence in both ancient and modern 
                                               
toward anarchism see Michael Loewy, Redemption and Utopia, Jewish Libertarian 
Thought in Central Europe: A Study in Elective Affinity (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1992). 
332 Benjamin, “Critique of Violence”, 236-252. 
333 Ibid., 249. 
334 Myth is a core motif in Benjamin’s philosophy that he uses to expose quotidian 
reality through archaic forms of thought that have been marginalized from philosophical-
historical enquiry. On the concept of myth in Walter Benjamin’s work see Winfried 
Menninghaus, “Walter Benjamin’s Theory of Myth”, in On Walter Benjamin, Critical 
Essays, and Recollections, ed., Gary Smith, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 
1988). 
335 Insofar as it is impossible to locate a precise time at which juridification becomes the 
norm, as Zartaloudis points out, this is a feature of late modernity, and can be compared to 
an earlier posited law in which human actions were separable from legal actions – or as 
events that could provide the basis for a legal evaluation within a specific jurisdiction as 
‘actiones’. See Zartaloudis, ‘Violence without law’, 170-1. 
336 As Teubner suggests, this condition of law is not simply a matter of the proliferation 
of laws but of the “bureaucratization of the world”. See “Juridification, Concepts, Aspects, 
Limits, Solutions” in Juridification of Social Spheres: A Comparative Analysis in the Area 
of Labor, Corporate, Antitrust and Social Welfare, ed. Gunter Teubner (New York: Walter 
de Gruyter, 1987), 3-48. Teubner traces the first use of the term juridification 
(Verrechtlichung) to Otto Kirchheimer, a member of the Institut; the term was used to 
criticise the use of labour law to quell political class conflict. Ibid., 9.  
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legal systems. This illuminates how law in modernity has its origins in the 
construction of boundaries between the secular and profane, between life and 
death, and whose deliberate and necessary ambiguity ensures infringement of these 
respective spheres as conditions of their continued operativity. The analysis 
ultimately points to a precondition of law in which guilt is the cipher for the 
capture of life in law.337 Shifting the centre of law’s legitimation away from the 
presumption of the intelligibility of law as required by rule of law doctrine toward 
an extortive force that exists as a consequence of law’s ambiguity and away from 
innocence as a presumptive principle of legal operativity radically alters the 
educational locus we have so far considered. 
In order to grasp what is at stake, we will need to proceed keeping two 
distinct registers in mind. One is of the socio-legal constructions of legal 
knowledge and navigation of the legal system as already explored in empirical 
legal needs studies. These studies point to the absence of public knowledge of the 
law and linked access to justice issues in securing substantive and procedural 
protection. The other register concerns a historico-philosophical development of 
guilt and ignorance, which brings together a constellation of concepts including 
fate and mythic violence. Together these two registers illuminate overlapping or 
interwoven difficulties for theoretical analysis that will serve to underpin the 
educational concerns that follow, and as we will go on to show in the final chapter 
of the thesis, sustain very different educative orientations.  
These readings provide a very different perspective on the problems we 
have encountered of juridification, or proliferation of law and of the possibility for 
a progressive liberal reading of the rule of law.  By unearthing a framework of 
violence, myth and the suffocation of alternatives modes of ethical and social 
relation, Benjamin ask us to reassess our understanding of legal modernity and to 
consider abandoning its application as a means of achieving either the peaceful 
resolution of disputes or of establishing the basis of democratic governance. The 
expectation of orderly, peaceful and equitable modern law is thereby 
fundamentally brought into question. Rather than the promise of freedom, 
                                               
337 Giorgio Agamben describes this as follows: “The cipher of this capture of life in law 
is not sanction (which is not at all an exclusive characteristic of the juridical rule) but 
guilt…in the original sense that indicates a being-in-debt – in culpa esse.” Giorgio 
Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Palo Alto: Stanford University 
Press, 1998), 26. 
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autonomy and progress with which Enlightenment thought and Enlightenment 
legality is associated, what Benjamin and his collaborators at the Institut point to is 
the increasing oppression and loss of freedom that legal modernity augurs for all 




Critical Theory and the Frankfurt School 
 
 
We begin by considering the problems presented by what the Institut’s 
thinkers construed as ‘traditional theory’ as opposed to Critical Theory. The need 
for an alternative theoretical model centres on their accusation that traditional 
theory is not only impotent in the face of social and economic injustice, but is in 
fact complicit in its perpetuation. Their diagnosis profoundly implicates a liberal 
account of law.  Law belongs to a wider shift in which the rationalities it 
constitutes, of equality, rights, freedom and so forth produce antinomies that 
subvert or eviscerate the lived experiences of alienation, marginalisation and 
oppression brought about by the economic-juridical order of law. The stark 
separation of fact and value, description and prescription performed by legal 
reasoning attempts to erase its own self-constituting arrangements and the 
constitutive role that it has in producing the categories and the subjectivities that it 
then deploys.  Yet this operation must at all cost remain hidden if the law is to 
maintain the appearance of deriving its authority from some other (more 
legitimate) source than brute force of superior power. In a secular world, the 
necessity of producing false sovereigns is crucial to the continuation of law’s 
hegemony and involves a process of smoothing over contradictions and 
discontinuities that also radically limit the ability to imagine different ways of 
being, living and relating. This undermines the pursuit of justice insofar as it 
belongs to a rationality that has lost any wider value beyond self-preservation and 
the pursuit of technological and economic progress. Their scathing attack on 
positivism as such and legal positivism as its corollary provides a lens with which 
to reconsider the assumptions we have encountered about the progressive and 
emancipatory potential of public legal education. We will look in greater depth at 
the problem that positivist or instrumental rationality poses for education via the 
 118 
writings emerging from the Institut in the next chapter. The present discussion 
focuses on critiques of liberal legal theories and their implications in the political 
context of the Weimar Republic. For the purposes of the argument at this stage, the 
critique of the positivist and putatively progressive ideas of the liberal rule of law 
offer the opportunity to re-evaluate the stabilising and pacifying force attributed to 
the rule of law in contemporary society. Instead, a technocratic and economist-
centric rendition of law becomes the handmaid of Enlightenment logic. The 
substitution of meaning, substance and suffering with utilitarian value, 
quantification and the primacy of universal rule relegate all unscientific thought to 
the margins of philosophy, and with it the pursuit of social justice.  
For Critical Theory’s proponents, its transformative potential lies in its 
fundamentally negative orientation rather than offering a positive theory of 
improvement for elements of the structure of society. Unlike traditional method, 
critical method fosters a stance that “is suspicious of the very categories of better, 
useful, appropriate, productive, and valuable, as these are understood in the present 
order, and refuses to take them as non-scientific presuppositions about which one 
can do nothing.”338 Negation thus seeks to insist on the non-identity of the actual 
and rational, and therefore to challenge the given social order. As a result of this 
negative orientation, Critical Theory lays no claim to neutrality but situates its only 
evaluative criterion as the overcoming of social injustice with a deep antipathy to 
accepting the rules of conduct with which society furnishes its members. For 
Horkheimer, the inspiration for this negative drive would derive from a tradition of 
philosophical pessimism, following a decisive shift away from Marx.  Moreover, 
for Horkheimer, Adorno, and Benjamin this would also entail an exposition of 
negative theology closely associated with a strand of Jewish messianism in which 
the end of suffering and a redeemed world anticipates a radical break with an 
orthodox understanding of historical progress:  
[Horkheimer’s] messianism, as that of Benjamin is not a positive and 
simplistic one; Horkheimer's historical pessimism ruins the optimistic 
conception of culture, and dissolves the foundation for any positive 
utopian position. If in principle thought and culture are mainly 
interpreted as man's oppression of nature (and of nature within man), 
then there is no room for progress towards the utopian stage. Like 
Benjamin, the later Horkheimer has showed that action in the name of 
and for the sake of progress instead led necessarily to the abolishment 
                                               
338 Max Horkheimer, “Traditional and Critical Theory” in Critical Theory: Selected 
Essays, trans. Matthew J Connel (New York: Continuum, 2002), 206-207. 
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of the free subject and to the oppression of man by the system of 
culture.339 
This orientation is also a crucial fulcrum for the argument pursued in the 
thesis, both in terms of a critique of law and of education. What emerges from a 
critical theoretical perspective is a negative or even destructive process, clearing 
the conceptual ground so that alternative framings of law and education can 
flourish. Negative critical enquiry eschews the presumption that teaching law to 
people who have been excluded or marginalised is a valuable and productive tool 
for inclusion into the social and economic order. Once this presumption is set 
aside, an urgent task for public legal education theorists and practitioners is to 
reflect on the fundamental purpose of public legal education and how these goals 
are instrumentalised in teaching practices. Moreover, this also begins to elucidate 
how the law constitutes and shapes teachers and students that, in turn, come to be 
constitutive subjects of the legal order. This critical awareness is a prerequisite for 
opening a space for transformative legal education.  
The Frankfurt School of Social Research was established as an adjunct to 
the University of Frankfurt in the 1920s. Responding to the limitations of orthodox 
Marxism at a time of political turmoil and the subsequent rise of National 
Socialism, the Institut, led by Max Horkheimer,340 set out to foster a particular 
paradigm of Critical Theory. Their theoretical endeavours had to be adequate to 
what they saw as the most urgent task of social enquiry, which was to break with 
the prevailing conditions of authoritarian closure and domination in social 
                                               
339  Ilan Gur-Ze'ev  “Walter Benjamin and Max Horkheimer: From Utopia to Redemption” 
The Journal of Jewish Thought and Philosophy Volume 8, Issue 1 (1998,  Volume 8: Issue 
1): 6. Ze’ev further describes these influences as follows: “In the second stage of the 
development of their work, both thinkers offer a counter-educational praxis whose 
religiosity is fertilized by the alarming recognition of the impossible realization of the 
imperative of human advance toward God, absolute Spirit, or Reason; toward the 
progressing true knowledge of genuine human interests and realization of their potentials.” 
In Illan Gur Ze’ev, Critical Theory, Critical Pedagogy and the Possibility of Counter-
Education, (Sense Publishers Rotterdam, The Netherlands, 2010), 28. 
340 The first director, Carl Gruenberg, an Austrian Marxist, initially pursued a much 
more orthodox Marxist study programme but was replaced by Max Horkheimer following a 
stroke in 1928. Howard Eiland and Michael W. Jennings, Walter Benjamin: A Critical Life 
(London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2014), 426.  
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relations.341 Scholars from a number of disciplines, including Herbert Marcuse, Max 
Horkheimer, Friedrich Pollock, Theodor Adorno and Walter Benjamin,342 sought to 
contribute to this interdisciplinary social analysis and to a Western European 
Marxist philosophical tradition that could resist the social and economic order of 
capitalism and, more fundamentally, challenge what they considered to be the most 
pernicious elements of Enlightenment rationality. Their critique of Enlightenment 
rationality sought to show how modern technocratic and economic rationality 
subverts rather than serves the Enlightenment’s claim to free the world from 
religious and metaphysical dogma.343 Their pessimism about the cultural and 
societal conditions centred on multiple forms of injustice, and responded to the 
exigencies of their time. This group of writers, predominantly Jewish, developed 
their ideas in the light of failed revolution, the collapse of the Weimar Republic the 
rise of National Socialism, and the spectre of Holocaust.  The task of Critical 
Theory was therefore an urgent one. It aimed to break with the closures both in 
thought and in the related concrete material conditions of oppression that arose in a 
period of extreme political and social upheaval.  
Horkheimer describes a form of theory that can provide a critical analysis 
of the prevailing social, economic and psychological conditions in his 1937 essay 
“Traditional and Critical Theory,” published in the Zeitschrift für 
Sozialforschung.344 In answer to the question ‘what is theory?’ Horkheimer contrasts 
‘traditional’ with Critical Theory.  He contends that traditional theory is “stored-up 
knowledge, put in a form that makes it useful for the closest possible description of 
facts” and aims at embracing all objects within a universal systematic science.345 
                                               
341 Max Horkheimer, “Traditional and Critical Theory” in Critical Theory. For the 
development and correction of Marxist thought by Frankfurt Institut theorists, see Jay, The 
Dialectical Imagination, 41-85.  
342 It should be noted that Benjamin, while immensely influential to the research 
programme established by Horkheimer, contributed more loosely to the work of the 
Institut, nevertheless becoming a primary contributor to the journal zeitschrift fur 
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343 Theodor W Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. 
Edmund Jephcott (New York: Verso, 1979) 3-9.    
344 Horkheimer, “Traditional and Critical Theory,” 188-9. 
345 Critical theory insists on the continuing importance and validity of empirical 
research. However empirical research requires the theoretical framework which only a 
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The requirements of a traditional theoretical system, according to Horkheimer, 
serve a functional unity that subsumes rather than extricates the universal and 
particular so that “all parts should intermesh thoroughly and without friction. 
Harmony, which includes lack of contradictions, and the absence of the 
superfluous,” are its conditions.346 The subsumption of verifiable facts or 
perceptions within conceptual structures of knowledge give traditional theory its 
validity, but in doing so erases the contradictions within which concrete conditions 
of oppression are experienced.347 In contrast to traditional theory, the task of a truly 
critical theory is the negation of rationalist instrumentalism’s tendencies.  Those 
tendencies arise out of the historical development of societies dominated by 
industrial production techniques that in turn produce theoretical formulations that 
are intractably caught up in the self-same modes of production and economic 
rationality. Moreover, these forms of rationality render the urgent task of the 
critique of social problems impotent. Social critique should offer an alternative 
paradigm to scientism by analysing the tensions and contradictions it encounters. 
In the face of the total process of production, social critique, according to 
Horkheimer, had failed in its critical task.348  
Horkheimer maintains that science need not necessarily serve progressive 
ends and can just as readily be placed at the service of the most regressive 
tendencies. Indeed, science “can be used to serve the most diabolical social forces, 
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346 Ibid., 212. 
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and scientism is no less narrow-minded than militant religion.”349 Science and its 
positivistic logic frame the social, historical and economic horizons within 
traditional theory, creating reified ideological categories in which rational cause 
and effect, action and reaction, become entirely unreflexive of their own 
constitutive role in the creation of the present social reality. Rather than a 
construction of history and reality through contingency and antagonism, traditional 
theory posits necessity and mechanistic progress as the historical conditions of the 
present. Horkheimer and Adorno would go even further to suggest that this 
predicament not only forecloses any attempt to bring about change, but quite 
contrary to Enlightenment theorists’ belief in rational human ingenuity as the 
inevitable source of progress, Enlightenment rationality had instead taken on an 
increasingly irrational character.350  
Critical Theory applies a mode of immanent critique that places theory and 
practice, subject and object, past and present into active and dynamic relation in 
creating meaning and producing reason. Christodoulidis provides a succinct 
account of what Critical Theory seeks to achieve: 
 
On the one hand, theory equips practice with its coordinates; on the 
other, practice situates and re-situates theory within new coordinates 
that will inform its possibilities anew. A dialectic develops between 
theory and practice in a dynamic process, that is caught up in history 
and in the making of history. The distinction theory/practice installs a 
border between the two terms, across which the dialectic operates. The 
boundary is, so to say, that which gives traction. Theory measures 
itself against its ability to rationalise practice, and practice emerges as 
meaningful with the help of theory. The dialectic keeps them 
combined and in tension. Any asymmetry that installs itself between 
theory and practice can work both ways. A deficit on the pole of 
practice leaves theory as mere contemplation of, and apology for, the 
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status quo; a deficit on the side of theory leaves practice under-
determined.351 
 
One of the most striking examples of Critical Theoretical method is employed by 
the Institut’s two leading theorists in their co-authored Dialectic of Enlightenment 
in 1944, just after their flight into exile.352 As Gillian Rose notes, the book 
exemplifies Critical Theoretical method by employing a dialectical strategy 
through exaggerated conceptual pairings that are then analysed by the authors, with 
the aim of drawing out the problems they present and to release the potential for 
both reflection and action.353 The Dialectic offers a radical diagnosis of the 
conditions and origins of social and economic oppression. The authors claim that 
the increasing irrationality of modern capitalism exhibits the influence of forms of 
thought that stem from much earlier societies, in which myths created and framed 
normative principles. Their analysis of the origins of law and the intensification of 
oppression provide alternative ways to conceive of law’s evolution and its ties to 
the positive construction of humanity’s progress through history. “Domination, in 
becoming reified as law and organization, first when humans formed settlements 
and later in the commodity economy, has had to limit itself. The instrument is 
becoming autonomous: independently of the will of the rulers, the mediating 
agency of mind moderates the immediacy of economic injustice.”354 This critique of 
the function of legal reasoning both in archaic and modern contexts points to its 
capacity to be shaped by and in turn to shape the world at a remove from wider 
objective values or collectively determined goals. Governance begins to emerge 
from this analysis as a mere afterthought of rationality, aimed at economic 
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dominance.  These critiques bear on the way in which it becomes apparent that 
increasing understanding of law alone is ultimately an insufficient basis for 
transformative action. This places a renewed emphasis on developing strategies for 
legal education in which theory and practice are dynamically engaged and in which 
the capacity to act differently in the world undergirds the intervention. The urgent 
demands of critique point to the challenge of transformative reason that shapes 
alternative imaginaries, as well as active interventions in the past and future, in the 
legal and political and in the secular and theological construction of the present 
social order.  
This awareness weighs in the dialectic of myth and enlightenment that 
Adorno and Horkheimer deploy. Ancient myths narrate the ways in which earlier 
societies understood themselves and the world around them, as well as revealing 
the bonds and relations between the profane and the sacred.355 Crucially, as Levi-
Strauss maintains, the world of myth served societies in which the need to form a 
total understanding of the world enabled individual phenomena to become 
intelligible, and this drive to universalism begins from the earliest human cultures.356 
For Adorno and Horkheimer, this much earlier tendency toward universalism 
suggests that, while Enlightenment rationality had aimed at releasing humanity 
from a world ruled by both religion and myths, it remained inexorably identified 
and intertwined with mythology. The dialectic reveals both the primeval history of 
the modern subject and the subject’s relation to the world. The effect of this 
entanglement, they contend, is critical and ethical impotence, as well the 
legitimisation of an intolerable status quo. 
The continuing symbolic power of myth in modern forms of thought 
illuminates the process through which man seeks to release himself from the bonds 
of nature and the arbitrary rule of fate, and in so doing objectifies the world. All 
things are treated as objects and the world is thereby presented as a positivist, 
empirically calculable reality (that which simply is). In Excursus I of the Dialectic, 
the dialectical rise and fall of myth and Enlightenment is analysed through a 
reading of Homer’s Odyssey. The authors argue the ancient myths narrated by 
Homer sought to make man’s position vis a vis nature intelligible, and indeed to 
                                               
355 On the connection between myths and the symbolism of defilement, sin and guilt see 
Paul Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967). 
356 Claude Levi-Strauss, Myth and Meaning: Cracking the Code of Culture (New York: 
Schocken Books, 1995), 17. 
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overcome it. Their reading suggests that Odysseus provides an archetype of 
modern man. The story is a composite of epic poetry and myths retrieved from 
different historical epochs. Odysseus is the intrepid and heroic seafarer who 
nevertheless marks the shift from nomadic existence to a new social order in which 
property is central. As a landowner and employer in this early depiction of societal 
organisation, mastery and labour are divided:  
 
the hero of the adventures shows himself to be a prototype of the 
bourgeois individual…the epic is the historico-philosophic counterpart 
to a novel, and eventually displays features approximating those 
characteristics of the novel. The venerable cosmos of the meaningful 
Homeric world is shown to be the achievement of regulative reason, 
which destroys myth by virtue of the same rational order which 
reflects it.357  
 
Their dialectical exposition of the Homeric world illuminates Enlightenment in its 
older order. Both epic and myth show that they have domination and exploitation 
in common. Odysseus already displays all the traits of liberalism, bourgeois spirit 
and reason. He must, above all, survive the dangers of the natural world, barter for 
his life and sacrifice his nature in return for exercising his cunning. In other words, 
he must attain self-mastery simultaneously with world-mastery. The myth shows 
how knowledge of the world equates to power over the world, and in the 
metamorphosis of the world into manipulable things - objects to be utilised - 
human beings reproduce themselves as objects that can either be dominated or 
utilised, or both. While Enlightenment rationality sought to juxtapose reason 
against myth and religion, these supressed or partially erased forms of mythical 
thought nevertheless reveal themselves as the formative undercurrents of 
modernity. What emerges from their critique is an Enlightenment that simply isn’t 
enlightened enough to avoid falling back into oppression and domination: “Myth 
turns into Enlightenment, and nature into mere objectivity. Men pay for the 
increase of their power with alienation from that over which they exercise their 
power.”358 In their diagnosis, man and nature repeatedly succumb to necessary 
                                               
357 Adorno and Horkheimer, The Dialectic of Enlightenment, 14 and 42 
358 Adorno and Horkheimer, The Dialectic of Enlightenment, 9. While acknowledging 
the humanistic tendencies and faith in human reason that marks out Enlightenment thought 
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relations of power and command (and thereby domination), a relation that was 
already established in earlier Classical civilization, exemplified in the myths of the 
Greek gods.  
Rather than liberating man and disenchanting the world from all that would 
prevent the establishment of a truly human sovereignty, the fully enlightened world 
that is presented through their reading instead “radiates disaster triumphant.”359 Just 
as man objectified nature, in the inheritance of Enlightenment thought, man 
becomes object, but this time objectified in relation to others. Therein, Adorno and 
Horkheimer argue, lie the conditions for the domination inscribed in social and 
economic relations. Progress and growth require unswerving and tenacious 
domination of both man and nature. To learn from nature and ultimately to use it 
for wealth generation through the application of technology and labour, means that 
neither the enslavement of men nor the destruction of nature can serve as obstacles 
to economic growth. Reaching a new force in the shift from monopoly to state 
capitalism, the “authoritarian state of the present,” is described as the total 
integration or totally administered society in the latter stages of state managed 
capitalism.360  Contemporary social problems reveal the tendency toward social and 
cultural forms of oppression that are not the creations of a self-conscious unified 
will, but rather the world of capital extending beyond the control of man insofar as 
he is himself dominated by it.  
The subjective and manipulative function of reason, instrumentalised 
through technological domination, had also led reason itself to be vacated of any 
critical content.361 As myth becomes secularised, man becomes the focus and source 
of his own self-preservation and reason becomes the new foundation and telos in a 
world evacuated of its gods. The shift toward instrumental subjective reason comes 
at a price. As Martin Jay observes, for Horkheimer and Adorno, instrumental 
subjective reason marks a loss of objective reason and values: “all interaction was 
eventually reduced to power relationships. In their view, the disenchantment of the 
                                               
which is, for them, inseparable from social freedom, it is precisely in this unreflexive belief 
that the seeds of destruction are planted. Dialectic of Enlightenment, xiii. 
359 Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic, 3. 
360 Max Horkheimer, “The Authoritarian State” in The Essential Frankfurt School 
Reader, eds. Andrew Arato and Eike Gebhardt (New York: Continuum, 1985), 97. 
361 On the distinction between objective and subjective reason and the relation of means 
and ends see Horkheimer, The Eclipse of Reason, 3-40. 
 127 
world had gone too far, and reason itself had been gutted of its original content.”362 
As the critique of the Enlightenment demonstrates, Critical Theoretical method 
aimed at exposing the contradictions that appear in the analysis of political, 
juridical and historical events. In risking the loss of their own normative grounds 
for exposing these contradictions (since Critical Theory could itself be implicated 
by the same social, economic and psychological conditions), the aim was 
nevertheless to develop a method of critical thought that is cognisant of the dangers 
of instrumental reasoning but that also makes no claim to absolute objectivity since 
no theory, according to Adorno, truly escapes the marketplace.363  
 
Critical Theory and the liberal rule of law 
 
With this initial discussion of Critical Theorists’ concern about the 
complicity of the liberal rule of law with social and economic injustice, we can 
begin to reflect on how this critique might be fruitfully adopted in the context of 
popular teaching practices. Teaching students who experience disadvantage to 
focus on the tensions and contradictions in liberal legal theories can help to reveal 
the histories and subjectivities that have been supressed in order for legal 
progression to appear as a smooth and pacifying force, and to understand how law 
works to perpetuate social and economic disadvantage. A fundamental aspect of 
counter-hegemonic education seeks to unmask some of law’s core suppositions. In 
their analysis of law, the inner circle of the Frankfurt School questioned whether 
positive law could extract itself from the totalising effects of ideology and 
technological rationality. Not only is law constructed on a model of rationality that 
serves to mask its ideological attributes and power relations. Its modern liberal 
secular form also masks how these relations are implicated in the distribution of 
legal knowledge and the regulation of actions by the individual or the collective. 
As we have noted in the contemporary context, this awareness brings urgent 
attention to the reorientation of legal knowledge to economic-juridical governance 
that is now decisively underway.   
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Perhaps one of the most penetrating critiques of law posited by the 
Frankfurt School is that modern reason and modern law emerged together, and 
therefore law is a primal phenomenon of irrational rationality. The thinking that at 
once aimed to break with myth is also breaks with meaning and supplants formula, 
rule and probability for concepts, cause and motive.364 In the stark view of Adorno, 
“in law the formal principle of equivalence becomes the norm; everyone is treated 
alike. An equality in which differences perish secretly serves to promote 
inequality.”365 In other words, the liberal ideal of equality before the law masks the 
fact that law is a direct attribute of power (and violence) and under the guise of 
equality it thereby also obscures the powerlessness of those who would have 
recourse to it. Unsettling or decentring the premise of rationality, universality and 
equivalence are therefore aspects of educational focus meriting further 
consideration.  
The principle of equivalence, according to Critical Theorists, also serves 
the deceptions fostered by modern liberal legal rationality that are directly tied to 
the process of secularisation and rationalisation. In this view, human subjectivity 
(and ostensibly freedom) emerges simultaneously with the acquiescence to the 
regulatory demands of the state. Law appears less as the system concerned with the 
freedom of the rational autonomous legal subject, but rather as a subjection to the 
heteronomous demands of secular powers to achieve an order based on 
predictability and regularity. Thornhill provides a lucid summary of what is at 
stake:  
Underlying the broad critique of modern rationality in early Critical 
Theory is a quite specific claim about modern law and about the 
relation between law and reason. This claim is, namely, that the 
emergence of modern reason is inextricable from the emergence of 
modern law; that rationality acts as a means of maintaining temporally 
and locally overarching sequences of predictability, calculability and 
organisation – that is of securing conditions of legal regularity through 
society.366  
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The rationalist inheritance of the Enlightenment in the development of modern law 
based on a principle of equivalence also illuminates what Adorno and Horkheimer 
argue is an inherited form of mythic thought. They contend that this mythic quality 
of thought serves to solidify an ontology of debt (or guilt) and retribution that 
replicates the already existent order.  
The principle of fatal necessity is received and embedded in Enlightenment 
logic as the principle of indebtedness and equivalence. This circular logic renders 
all actions as reactions rather than capable of breaking with that which already 
exists. What concerned Adorno and Horkheimer is the loss of a basis for human 
action originating in freedom when retribution and indebtedness underscore the 
ordering principles of a society.367 They perceive modernity organised according to 
the demands of much older societal structures, in which a closed circle of fate and 
retribution requires that all things must atone for simply having happened: “Greek 
myths know no exits, and are eternally the same, every birth is paid for with death, 
every fortune with misfortune…Hence for mythic and enlightened justice, guilt and 
atonement, happiness and unhappiness, were sides of equations.”368 It is within this 
closed circle that law is designated as the arch principle of equivalence and ratio 
that in contemporary societies reappears as a secularised version of older proto-
religious societies wherein justice is subsumed in law:   
 
The step from chaos to civilization, in which natural conditions exert 
their power no longer directly but through the medium of the human 
consciousness, has not changed the principle of equivalence. Indeed, 
men paid for this very step by worshipping what they were once in a 
thrall to only in the same way as all other creatures. Now equivalence 
itself has become a fetish. The blindfold over Justitia’s eyes does not 
                                               
367 The distinction in fact of what is necessary and what contingent lies at the heart of 
the task that critical theory sees itself as addressing, sometimes described as ‘anti-
necessitarian’ thinking. The idea is to resist the temptation to describe the realm of freedom 
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human nature, such are the options available for the exercise of freedom. see 
Christodoulidis, Research Handbook of Critical Theory, page 37 and 13. 
368 Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 16-17. 
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only mean that there should be no assault upon justice, but that justice 
does not originate in freedom.369 
 
Kant’s attempt to ground mutual respect in the form of law, once religion wanes, 
and once morality and rationality cannot be equated, renders a basis for society 
devoid of meaning:  “the citizen who would forgo profit only on the Kantian 
motive of respect for the mere form of law would not be enlightened, but 
superstitious – a fool.”370 Their philosophical-historical analysis traces a process 
through which the emergence of rational consciousness from ancient to modern 
societies has the result of subsuming every claim to human freedom or justice to 
the calculus of an economically rationalised society. This calculus of justice as 
equivalence not only results in irrationality, but is also far removed from any 
ethical or moral basis for action and responsibility.   
In keeping with the negative orientation of Critical Theory, a secular 
theory of justice for Horkheimer makes an entirely different demand than that 
suggested by the economic rationality inherent to law. Justice “epitomises the 
demands of the suppressed at any given moment and is therefore as changeable as 
those demands themselves.”371 The transience and changeability of concrete 
experiences of oppression militate against the rational science of law that seeks to 
contain the particular in the universal. The Enlightenment claim that the yoke of 
religious heteronomy has been removed in the pursuit of human progress has 
merely served to subsume the individual and their experience of suffering in a 
concept of history and of human subjectivity that is a secularised form of salvation 
history.372 In other words, law serves to erase individual suffering with a universal 
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deferral of justice to come, without grounds for evaluating the historically 
contingent and singular ethical moment in which suffering occurs. The singularity 
of justice as an immanent demand in the face of suffering is a theme that is also 
pursued by Benjamin, as we shall see in due course. The conclusion that the 
theorists arrive at with regard to law and justice therefore presents a radical 
challenge to any attempt to construct any alternative normative paradigm, leaving 
many more questions than answers in the wake of their critique of law.  
It is this difficulty that attracts much subsequent criticism of the Frankfurt 
School’s intellectual stance. Their analysis has been criticised for their overly 
determined ascription of ideology and law and the utterly pessimistic outlook on 
any possibility for transformation it appears to entail. Habermas, for example, 
suggests that Adorno and Horkheimer’s extension of Lukács’ and Weber’s thesis 
of rationalisation and reification in instrumental reason to a category of world 
historical process (to the very primeval beginnings of ‘hominization’), and the 
identification of knowledge with power in their theory results in the loss of any 
normative foundation for Critical Theory. He argues:  
 
From the beginning, critical theory labored over the problem of giving 
an account of its own normative foundations; since Horkheimer and 
Adorno made their turn to the critique of instrumental reason early in 
the 1940s, this problem has become drastically apparent […] they 
submitted subjective reason to an unrelenting critique from the 
ironically distanced perspective of an objective reason that had fallen 
irreparably into ruin.373 
 
Nevertheless, Adorno and Horkheimer’s assertions fundamentally centred on 
the unstable and oppressive ground of law and sovereignty, and the propensity of 
instrumental and ideological capture of the rule of law by powerful actors 
alongside the oppressive expansion of bureaucracy in modernity. The re-
emergence of right-wing populism in the West and the ever more ubiquitous use of 
emergency law in Western democracies may have reinvigorated rule of law 
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debates, as we explored in the previous chapter, but they affirm the prognosis and 
urgency of Adorno and Horkheimer’s fundamental mistrust of rule of law 
arguments that aim to serve as a bulwark against authoritarianism and to stave off 
excesses of power.374 More importantly, the argument that public legal education in 
itself can serve to underpin and legitimise a more stable and inclusive rule of law 
requires fundamental reassessment.  
The readings in the previous chapters, both empirical and theoretical, attest 
to an increasingly juridified world and a divestment of public funding as part of a 
wider project of global neoliberal economic-juridical rationality.  As we saw, this 
has had significantly deleterious effects on the ability to secure the rights and 
entitlements that provide equal protection under the law.375 These conditions not 
only substantially reduce routes to access to justice, but also militate against a 
predictable ordering of quotidian life from the perspective of citizens. Legal 
knowledge acquisition, or legal education, as a means of either including the 
legally excluded subject to make more effective claims to the justice system or as 
binding citizen and state in a relation of accountability and legitimacy, appear 
equally illusory. As ever greater resort to claims of identity and belonging coalesce 
around courts and legal processes - which are at the same time ever further from 
reach for those without significant resources - we encounter a need for alternative 
strategies in the contemporary predicaments of public legal education.376 As we 
move on to explore the paradigm of unpredictability, ambiguity and power that the 
members of the Institut argued exhibits law in its most archaic light, what at first 
blush appears to be an impossible impasse, is one of the most potent contributions 
and insights that early Critical Theory can offer for the present condition of law, 
and particularly so from a perspective of education.  
                                               
374 On the increasing use of emergency laws see Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception, 
trans. Kevin Attell (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2015). 
375 Gillian Hadfield and Jamie Heine, “Life in the Law-Thick World: The Legal 
Resource Landscape for Ordinary Americans” in Beyond Elite Law: Access to Civil Justice 
in America eds. S Estreicher and J Radice (Cambridge University Press, 2016). See also 
Gunther Teubner, Juridification of Social Spheres: A Comparative Analysis in the Area of 
Labor, Corporate, Antitrust and Social Welfare, (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1987). 
376 Ronald Niezen, Public Justice and the Anthropology of Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), 217-30. 
 133 
The preceding discussion about the method of Critical Theory offers a 
point of departure for a different conception of law and legal education. Rather 
than pursuing a positive utopian spirit or programme, as we have argued above, for 
Adorno and Horkheimer all positive constructions of progress in fact carry with 
them the seed of oppression. What results is a profound mistrust of an 
emancipatory utopian vision – either of a revolutionary political project or indeed 
as a task for educative resolve.377 The nature of the utopian impulse that emerges in 
this milieu is best understood as a negative dialectical engagement between the 
present and the past, in which hope is a remnant rather than an object or goal to be 
pursued. For Adorno, this means that history “promises no salvation and offers the 
possibility of hope only to the concept whose movements follow history’s path to 
the very extreme.”378 Emancipation as utopian impetus is clouded in illusion since it 
is hidden under the signs of autonomy and law. The problem of historical 
transformation that this view leads to is also one of Walter Benjamin’s most 
important contributions to the thinkers around him. The ideals of social democracy 
are bound up for Benjamin with fundamental problems that exist for him under the 
sign of historical progress and thus demand a critical examination of the concept of 
progress itself:  
Social democratic theory, and still more the praxis, was determined by 
a concept of progress which did not hold to reality, but had a dogmatic 
claim. Progress, as it was painted in the minds of the social democrats, 
was once upon a time the progress of humanity itself (not only that of 
its abilities and knowledges). It was, secondly, something unending 
(something corresponding to an endless perfectibility of humanity). It 
counted, thirdly, as something essentially unstoppable (as something 
self-activating, pursuing a straight or spiral path). Each of these 
predicates is controversial, and critique could be applied to each of 
them. This latter must, however, when push comes to shove, go behind 
all these predicates and direct itself at what they all have in common. 
The concept of the progress of the human race in history is not to be 
separated from the concept of its progression through a homogenous 
and empty time.379  
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This challenge to the concept of progress fundamentally unsettles the claims of 
legal positivism and the evolution of law. Under the sign of progress, suffering and 
historical domination is subsumed and erased. Education and law are both 
implicated in this catastrophe.  
The central influence of Benjamin’s ideas is apparent despite the fact that 
his work with the Institut was sporadic and ultimately disappointing at a time of 
significant personal crisis in his life.380 In order to subvert modernity’s (and 
specifically legal modernity’s) claim to advances, the political and religious motifs 
within his writings serve to highlight a perpetual disenchantment with the world as 
it appears in its immediacy. The present in its entire immediate phantasmagoria 
only obfuscates and obscures.381 The next section of this chapter moves to consider 
some core elements of Benjamin’s historico-philosophical writings through his 
acclaimed critical essay on violence, which provides us with preliminary access to 
his reading of law. The problem of historical transformation is a subject around 
which he circles again and again with his work on the relation between violence 
and law, and in his analysis of classical and German baroque drama.382 For the 
purposes of a reconsideration of rule of law through his reading, and the 
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382 Benjamin, “Critique of Violence,” 238. On a wider exploration of the problem of 
history in Benjamin’s work see also Stephane Moses, The Angel of History: Rosenzweig, 
Benjamin, Scholem, trans. Barbara Harshav (Stanford: Stanford University Press). For his 
readings on classical and Baroque tragic drama see “Trauerspiel and Tragedy”, Selected 
Writings, Volume I, 1913-1926, 55-57, On the Origins of German Tragic Drama. 
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implications for a more critical approach to public legal education theory and 
practice, the suggestion that guilt or indebtedness exists in order for law to come 
about will be the focus of the next stage of the chapter. The central claims that we 
will analyse concern the role of knowledge of law in the designation of culpability 
and more broadly in the constitutive ambiguities that arise through Benjamin’s 
reading. The challenge posed for education demands a critical understanding of the 
structural function of knowledge of law in legitimation, and the specific strategies 
of sovereignty that undermine rather than foster the intelligibility of law.  
 
 
Mythic violence and the origins of law 
 
 
In the preceding section we encountered the critique of instrumental 
rationalisation and of the liberal legal order that, according to Critical Theorists, 
have shared origins in Enlightenment rationality that are also interwoven with 
archaic forms of thought.  For the exponents of Critical Theory this instrumental 
reason is a medium through which historical oppression repeats and intensifies. 
Their analysis was to some extent an elaboration inspired by the earlier writing of 
their friend and contributor to the Institut, Walter Benjamin.383 We will explore the 
consequences for legal epistemology and legal pedagogy in light of  the 1921 essay 
Critique of Violence in which Benjamin’s schema of law-making violence 
(violence that historically institutes a given order) and law-preserving violence (the 
systems, including police and courts, that preserve the existing order) also aligns 
the concepts of fate and guilt (guilt in German carries the dual meaning of guilt and 
debt) with the legal order.384 Rather than describing a notion of fault or moral 
                                               
383 Adorno and Horkheimer, The Dialectic of Enlightenment, 16-17.  
384 Benjamin, “Critique of Violence,” 242 – 252. Judith Butler offers the following 
explanation of the distinction between law-preserving and law-making violence: “Law-
preserving violence is exercised by the courts and, indeed by the police and represents the 
repeated and institutionalized efforts to make sure law continues to be binding on the 
population it governs…Law-instating violence is different. Law is posited as something 
that is done when a polity comes into being and law is made.” “Critique, Coercion and 
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failure, this framework of indebtedness or guilt reflects a condition of human life 
that produces the normative force of law – both modern and archaic. It is a 
condition that for him is abject and distorted.385 The world Benjamin presents in the 
readings (very similar to that which we will encounter in our subsequent reading of 
Kafka) is a world which is simultaneously suffocated by law and shamefully 
lawless. In holding a constellation of an archaic world of myth in close analogy to 
capitalist modernity, he dismantles a series of putative ‘truths’ that law and 
sovereign states erect for themselves. Rather than producing Enlightenment rule 
and distributing power according to the demands of constitutionalism, law masks 
the operation of dominant historical forces. As we traverse these contentions, we 
will remain attentive to the concerns of legal knowledge as operative aspects of 
both modern and archaic constructions.   
Written in the context of the crisis of parliamentary politics in the Weimar 
Republic which was formed following the first world war and internally riven by 
violent revolutions, his essay exposes the problem of both political and ethical 
action.386 The essay tackled one aspect of what was to form part of a larger project 
                                               
Sacred Life in Benjamin’s ‘Critique of Violence’” in Parting Ways: Jewishness and the 
Critique of Zionism, (Columbia University Press: 2013), 71.  
385 Law is already myth in Benjamin’s view and adopts the ordering of life’s potency or 
power toward an oppressive and coercive formula, one that is fundamentally corrupted. As 
David Kaufmann perceives, it is in the very assumption of progress as redemptive, or that 
the law originates in freedom and autonomy that the need to depose law as myth is located: 
“between primeval guilt and future expiation…the greatest form of distortion inheres in the 
fact that, for the fallen, the emancipatory by nature disguises itself as atonement – freedom 
appears under the sign of law, autonomy under the aegis of heteronomy.” David Kaufmann, 
“Beyond Use, Within Reason”, 159. 
386 Beatrice Hanssen notes the frequent contact with Ernst Bloch and Hugo Ball in 1919 
during Benjamin’s studies in Bern, and the urgency of the question of political activity in 
the wake of the Bolshevik revolution and the short-lived Munich Soviet Republic. Beatrice 
Hanssen, Critique of Violence: Between Post-structuralism and Critical Theory, (New 
York: Routledge, 2000), 16. For a treatment of political theology reflecting on the influence 
of Max Weber see Howard Caygill “Non-Messianic Political Theology in Benjamin’s ‘On 
the Concept of History’” in Andrew Benjamin Ed. Walter Benjamin and History (London: 
Continuum, 2004) 215-226. On the influence of Benjamin’s close friend and 
correspondent, Gershom Scholem, See Eric Jacobson, A Metaphysics of the Profane: The 
political theology of Walter Benjamin and Gershom Scholem, (Columbia: Columbia 
University Press, 2003).  
 137 
that he generally described as his ‘politics.’387 The other texts, written around 1920, 
were lost, but the fragments that remain illustrate Benjamin’s concern with the 
deeply antagonistic relation between life and law. Rather than protecting the life 
and liberty of those living within the constitutional state, the constitutional state in 
his view is inimical to peaceable existence and freedom. For Benjamin, the 
struggle for existence thus becomes a struggle against law and a “striving toward” 
justice.388 The first critical thrust of the essay of interest here is the fundamental 
instability he attributes to the rule of law in modern liberal orders. From his 
perspective, parliaments display their inherent instability precisely when the 
spectre of legal violence is no longer visible: “when the consciousness of the latent 
presence of violence in a legal institution disappears, the institution falls into 
decay.”389 Contrary to our reading of stable, foreseeable relations under the 
democratic rule of law, Benjamin paints a picture of instability and perpetual 
violence (whether as punitive enforcement of contract or in the spectre of the 
police and armed forces). 
The second and associated critical contribution that Benjamin offers is a 
striking conclusion about the temporal order of guilt and retribution in the working 
of law, a conclusion that establishes very different grounds for the hyper-
juridification we have encountered via our previous readings of Foucault, Adorno 
and Horkheimer. He reverses the temporal assumption of the claim that law makes 
for itself - that it seeks out guilt for a transgressive act and offers up punishment 
once this has been determined.  Law, he suggests, can only become operative if 
guilt is already in existence. In order to decide conclusively whether punishment 
should be meted out, law must first be able to bring all of life within its purview 
                                               
387 Essays entitled “Life and Violence” and “The True Politician”, were planned, with 
the second to contain chapters on “Dismantling Violence” and “Teleology Without End”. 
Peter Fenves, The Messianic Reduction, Walter Benjamin and the Shape of Time, (Palo 
Alto: Stanford University Press, 2011), 208. 
388 In a short fragment written in 1920 he remarks, “It is quite wrong to assert that, in a 
constitutional state, the struggle for existence becomes the struggle for law. On the 
contrary, experience shows conclusively that the opposite is the case. And this is 
necessarily so since the law’s concern with justice is only apparent, whereas in truth, the 
law is concerned with self-preservation.” Walter Benjamin, ‘The Right to Use Force’, 
Selected Writings I, (1920), 232. 
389 Benjamin, “Critique of Violence,” 244. This problem is also developed in his theory 
of Baroque sovereignty.  
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and scrutiny. This means that guilt is co-extensive with law, or rather it constitutes 
the law and this inaugural moment of the rule of law reveals its fateful and mythic 
origins. As we shall see, Benjamin goes a step further. It is not as a consequence of 
transgression that the force of law is felt, but when viewed in the light of archaic 
mythical construction which haunts modern legal orders, it is because mortals are 
fated to the laws of nature and to creaturely life whose centre of gravity is death.390  
The modern juridical order, he argues, mirrors this formulation by placing life as 
the foundation of the legal and political order. In this view, life itself is juridified 
and condemned to be decided upon by law.391 Benjamin’s critique of juridified life 
means that nothing remains outside of the colonisation of the life-world, which is a 
feature of law that also deeply impoverishes the ethical plane of existence since all 
assessment of value is subsumed within law’s purview. 
                                               
390 Fate, as Benjamin writes in “Trauerspiel and Tragedy”, “leads to death. Death is not 
punishment but atonement, an expression of the subjection of guilty life to the law of 
natural life. That guilt which has often been the focal point of the theory of the tragic has its 
home in fate and the drama of fate.” The Origin of German Tragic Drama, 131.  The 
proximity of Benjamin’s work on drama to understanding his philosophico-historical 
critique is vital to understanding his attempt to overturn scientism as it is deployed in 
historiography as well as grasping his analysis of political theology. See for example 
Calderon’s El Mayor Monstruo, Los Celos and Hebbel’s Herodes und Mariamne: 
Comments on the Problem of Historical Drama, in Selected Writings, Volume I, 363. 
Equally, the importance of the theoretical frame for his ambitions in constructing the 
concept of character and the prospect of freedom of action appear already in the earlier 
essay “Fate and Character” in Selected Writings, Volume 1, 202-205. 
391 For an elaboration of Benjamin’s biopolitical reading see Giorgio Agamben, Homo 
Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, 5-29. The analysis of life’s indebtedness to the 
juridical sphere was derived in part from the historical investigations of Swiss jurist and 
anthropologist Johann Bachofen into matriarchy, myth and law. “Death is the supreme 
natural law, the fatum of material life…The law of material life becomes a juridical 
concept, death is seen as a debitum naturae (our debt to nature).” Johann Bachofen, Myth, 
Religion, and Mother Right, trans. Ralph Manheim (New York: Princeton University Press, 
1967), 188. Benjamin in fact intended to write an essay on Bachofen, commending him on 
his ability to present the ‘Tableaux of Prehistory’ in which the “ancient necropolis attested 
to the silent force of the prelinguistic image (eidos).” His influence appears with great force 
in the subsequent essay on Kafka. See Beatrice Hanssen, Walter Benjamin’s Other History: 
Of Stones, Animals, Human Beings and Angels, (California: University of California Press, 
2000), 93. 
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The third and final conclusion concerns an educative undercurrent which 
informs a logic of misapprehension about the law.  Following his schema, guilt is 
necessarily accompanied by lack of knowledge (Unkenntniss) of the law. Unknown 
or incomprehensible laws render the unfortunate and unsuspecting victim prone to 
the full force of the law, and thus offer no relief from punishment.392 We have 
considered in previous chapters the putative role of public knowledge of laws as 
both legitimating and binding the rule of law to the citizen of a given state. If, as 
Benjamin contends, incomprehension and guilt are necessary preconditions for 
law, then the legal educative consequences for his formulation require an entirely 
different orientation than we have heretofore assumed.  Rather than describing a 
reinvigorated sovereign form that evolves from juridico-theological and juridico-
political theories binding the citizen to the sovereign state, Benjamin’s claim 
produces an aporia in the modern liberal construction insofar as its core principles 
of foreseeability, predictability and calculability are concerned. Theological 
references serve to illuminate the secular implications of laws attempt to emulate 
transcendental justice and thus to decouple law from its claim to justice. Law and 
justice fundamentally belong to different orders, but in order to conceal its 
groundlessness in a Godless world. For this reason law is always already myth for 
Benjamin. Dismantling the array of false projections of state sovereignty and its 
attendant violence does not preclude Benjamin from imagining the possibility of 
secular justice. Justice is a threshold that, we shall see, permits of profane action 
even if, in the last analysis, it cannot be sought in judgement (since this is the 
domain of God).393 The secular threshold of revolutionary action, and of educative 
force, as we will see, delineates the urgent task of reanimating political and ethical 
modes of human interaction that could fundamentally break with false sovereigns 
(and false idols), along with their heteronomy and oppression.394 In other words, 
                                               
392 “Von diesem Geiste des Rechts legt noch der moderne Grundsatz, dass Unkenntnis 
des Gesetzes nicht vor Strafe schützt.” Benjamin, “Critique of Violence”, 249. Benjamin’s 
concern is not epistemological, but rather is internal to the sphere, to the rule, of the Gesetz. 
I am grateful to Anton Schutz for clarifying this important point. 
393 One such rupture of the link between life and law is the proletarian general strike in 
which the demand for limited concessions of legal rights to workers by the state is 
substituted by a “root and branch” attack on the legal system and the state itself. 
394 Martel reads this as a subversion rather than a break with sovereignty, the “cleansing 
of mythological superimpositions…has both a human and non-human aspect to it...by 
displacing sovereignty in the face of a divine competitor, Benjamin de-centers it from its 
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the practice of critique of the cultural reproductive and constitutive forces 
unleashed in law and education at each moment repose the problem of injustice and 
oppression as the basis of the continual work of dismantling sovereignty and the 
repetition of historical violence. 
Benjamin’s essay begins by showing how legal theories elide the self-
positing of law by establishing a transcendent foundation or metaphysical criterion 
for law. He points to the impossibility of a categorical imperative or a universal 
principle that circumscribes the use of violence in the pursuit of justice.395 Natural 
law posits justice as the natural end of law (via natural reason), and positive law 
identifies justice with its means (as founded on the norms sponsored by the State). 
Whereas natural law sanctions violence as means to just ends (but provides no 
basis for a criterion for justice), positive law resorts to distinguishing the 
historically acknowledged conditions of the application of violence: “positive law 
demands of all violence a proof of its historical origin.”396  
The function of law-making in violence is twofold, in the sense that 
law-making pursues as its end, with violence as its means, what is to 
be established as law, but at that moment of instatement does not 
dismiss violence; rather, at this very moment of law-making, it 
specifically establishes as law not an end unalloyed by violence but 
one necessarily and intimately bound to it under the title of power.397 
                                               
stranglehold on human agency without actually getting rid of it. James Martel, Divine 
Violence: Walter Benjamin and the Eschatology of Sovereignty (New York: Routledge, 
2012), 60-62. 
395 Peter Fenves offers an insightful account of the proximity and divergence of 
Benjamin’s “Critique of Violence” with Kant’s use of potestas and violentia in the 
Doctrine of Right. The attempt to find a postulate through which the sphere of right can 
extend seeks to provide a metaphysical category that “makes might right whenever it is 
minimally rational.” Kant’s attempt fails precisely because there is no universally valid 
principle that can be deduced from the axiom of right without recourse to original force in 
order to “extend the juridical body.” Kant ultimately obviates the problem through his 
writings on history wherein any original injustice will be gradually alleviated by means of 
ever-increasing conformity of enforceable law to the idea of right. See chapter 7. ‘The 
Political Counterpart to Pure Practical Reason: from Kant’s Doctrine of Right to 
Benjamin’s Category of Justice’, in The Messianic Reduction, 187-227.  
20   Benjamin, “Critique of Violence,” 238. 
397 Ibid., 248. 
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Violence, Benjamin concludes, posited as an end or as a means to an end either 
makes law or preserves law. In turn, claims to law and right are ultimately the 
arbitrary assumption of power as the immediate or indirect (i.e. as the threat 
underpinning the law of obligations) manifestation of violence.398  
Benjamin’s suggestion that law perpetuates a mythical order is most 
distinctive in his construction of law-founding violence. Since the basis of any 
state, in his reading is historical violence, the signifier of the arbitrary assumption 
of power effectively precludes law from serving either secular or divine justice. 
Benjamin exploits the tension between the contingency and necessity of historical 
violence by anchoring mythic (and legal) violence to the concept of fate. He 
readily concedes that the concept of fate, which finds its origins in the archaic 
world of myth, is not readily grasped by the contemporary mind as a notion of 
predetermination or destiny.399 While the concept of fate was partially adopted into 
Christian theology, he is at pains to point out that it is not a religious category but 
rather a principle and ground of power corresponding to the emergence of legality 
and of legal subjectivity in pagan cults.400 By establishing boundaries between the 
ineffable rules that regulate the cycles of the world, as predestined or 
predetermined allotments of life and death, fate becomes the basis for the human 
rules that can be adopted into the profane life of the political community.401   
The concept of fate (moira) abounds in Greek lyric and epic poetry, and 
reflects the sense of patterns of order and apportionment of events, of time and 
space, as well as the cycles of nature. 402 The Homeric allusion to destiny and 
                                               
398 Thus law-making (Rechtsetzung) is revealed as pernicious power-making 
(Machtsetzung). Ibid., 248 and 249. 
399 Benjamin, “Fate and character” Selected Writings Vol 1, 201. 
400 The fact that fate is not a religious category is discerned through its lack of 
correspondence to either innocence or indeed happiness i.e. its lack of redemptive 
counterpart. Benjamin, ‘Fate and Character’, 201-2.  
401 An important feature of Benjamin’s understanding of the constellations he offers 
between different historical epochs is that he does not conceive of a chain of linear time. He 
weaves a spatiotemporal tapestry that brings event and meaning into analogical tension 
across epochs.  
402 The idea that a traditional plot coincides with the Will of Zeus and thus accords with 
destiny is discussed by Gregory Nagy, The Best of the Achaeans: Concepts of the Hero in 
Archaic Greek Poetry (John Hopkins University Press, 1999), 40, 82. Fate and destiny in 
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tradition illuminates other, perhaps older, concepts associated with moira, 
concerning customary sacrifice that ensure boundaries between the human and 
divine, the sacred and profane were maintained.403 The word moira meaning 
alternatively portion, fate or destiny is often associated with offerings at the 
sacrificial table, in particular the sacrificial custom at Delphi.404 Later classical 
interpretations of the word are most commonly associated with a fixed allotment of 
life in expectation of death, “one’s share is above all else death; as such moira may 
be either a fact of nature, as special destiny, an outcome of divine anger or of 
divine decree, or of all of these put together.”405Moira both fixes decline and death 
and regulates the order of life and nature – in fixing and regulating this order 
within nascent forms of religious thought, fate takes the character of divine 
predeterminism, emphasising misfortune and destruction rather than the cyclical 
laws of nature from which it originated.406 Henceforth, fate brings down the anger of 
the gods for hubris (acts that transgress the limits of human freedom, as in the myth 
of Niobe whose sacrifice also coincided with her being turned into stone.) 407   
                                               
this sense help to construct a predictable and calculable narrative in which meaning is 
secured; perhaps we see here a cultural strategy for making contingency and the 
vicissitudes of life in the trajectory toward death explicable.  
403 See Zartaloudis, Birth of Nomos, 3-34. For an alternative reading of sacrificial rituals 
as engendering religion, and as precursor to myth see Rene Girard, “The Origins of Myth 
and Ritual” in Violence and the Sacred, trans. Patrick Gregory (London: the Athlone Press, 
1988). 
404 “When someone goes in for the purpose of initiating sacrifice to the god, the 
Delphians stand around the altar carrying concealed makhairai (sacrificial knives). 
And after the priest has slaughtered and flayed the sacrificial victim and after he 
has apportioned the innards, those who have been standing around cut off whatever 
moira of meat each of them is able to cut off and then depart, with the result that 
the one who initiated the sacrifice oftentimes departs without having a moira 
himself.” Gregory Nagy, The Best of The Achaeans, 125. The word dais (feast) is derived 
from the word daimoai (divide, apportion allot). Nagy, The Best of The Achaeans, 128.  
405 Jack Newton Lawson, The concept of Fate in Ancient Mesopotamia, (1994), 7.  
406 Lawson, The concept of Fate in Ancient Mesopotamia, 6.  
407 In myth, pride or arrogance brought the consequence of divine retribution. Benjamin 
deploys the myth of Niobe, in which her pride at being a more fertile mother than Leto led 
to the death of her sons and daughters. See “Critique of Violence”, 248 and on eternal 
recurrence see Susan Buck-Morss, The Dialectics of Seeing: Walter Benjamin and the 
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When mortals provoke the anger of the gods, unwittingly or through 
hubris, the gods’ retribution is not expiatory; guilt appears as a constant force that 
drives the fate of each man, a fate that is already determined and may not be altered 
even by the gods themselves.408 Following Zartaloudis’ analysis of Homeric moira, 
the depiction of the gods as being equally subjected to the necessity of order 
established by the potency of moira is decisive: “order needs to be maintained; 
moira cannot be undone or unbound by divine intervention. Moira is a fact of the 
cosmos.”409 
Mythic violence which polices the boundaries of the profane and divine 
realms, Benjamin argues, “is in its archetypal form a mere manifestation of the 
gods.”410 Law mirrors this operation by seeking to originate the source of its right to 
monopolise force within the logic of sovereignty, but since all sovereigns are false 
insofar as they attempt to usurp God, his account unmasks the fact that laws force 
is wielded without justification or end.411 A preeminent example Benjamin points to 
appears in the Greek myth of Niobe. Niobe is depicted in the Iliad as the mortal 
daughter of Tantalus, who, having borne six sons and six daughters boasts to Leto 
of her fertility. Niobe’s boastful pride (hubris) at her superior fecundity offends the 
gods, leading to the vengeful murder of all of her progeny by Artemis and Apollo. 
The tale depicts her as being turned to stone, forever sorrowing for her slain 
children. The cautionary tale speaks of overstepping the boundary between the 
mortal and divine realms. Rather than having broken any law, it is her arrogance 
                                               
Arcades Project, (Boston: MIT Press, 1991), 103. Niobe was also struck mute in this myth, 
and in the lost play by Aeschylus, she remains silent throughout. Her silent mourning is a 
striking feature of Greek tragedy. See Karl Kerenyi, Goddess of Sun and Moon: Circe, 
Aphrodite, Medea, Niobe, (New York: Spring Publications, 1976). 
408 In the Homeric world, the order of fate, or moira has the sense of a wider plan that 
lies behind the gods as a 'shadowy reality', as a fixed order rather than a power, which 
concerns the apportionment of prerogatives between mortals and immortals. As regards the 
question of the extent to which the gods themselves are subject to fate see Greene, Moira, 
14-17 and Zartaloudis, Birth of Nomos, 50-51. 
409 Zartaloudis, Birth of Nomos, 57. 
410 Benjamin, “Critique of Violence,” 248 
411 Judith Butler, “Critique, Coercion and Sacred Life in Benjamin’s ‘Critique of 
Violence’” 71.  
208 
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that calls fate down upon her because she challenges the mere existence of gods.412 
The myth underscores the economy of fate and debt/guilt that Benjamin suggests is 
also perpetuated in the economy of guilt and law. Mortal life, or human life is 
always already construed as corrupt and damaged for its mortality. The myth 
depicts Niobe as the mute bearer of guilt and the act of mythic violence serves to 
reaffirm her pre-existing guilt:  
 
Violence therefore bursts on Niobe from the uncertain, ambiguous 
sphere of fate […] although it brings death to her children, it stops 
short of claiming the life of their mother, whom it leaves behind, more 
guilty than before through the death of her children, both as an 
eternally mute bearer of guilt and as a boundary stone on the frontier 
between men and gods.413 
This manifestation of mythic violence also reveals the hidden object of power. 
Power is the principle that is guaranteed by law-making so as to circumscribe 
boundaries over life and death, and as the power to exercise violence over life.414  
The idea of fate – or moira in Homeric accounts according to Zartaloudis relates to 
the forces ordering both life and death. “Moira indicates an abyss between the 
mortal and immortal planes…what mortals suffer is down to their own power and 
moira. Moira is not an overpowering force but rather is a life subject to the 
ordering of the cosmos.”415 What is revealed through Homeric drama, a feature 
which Benjamin alludes to, is that fate is not a transcendental power as such, but 
rather relates to the all too human appropriation of divine power, with all its 
attendant dangers. 
To demonstrate mythic violence and its potential interruption, Benjamin 
brings the Greek myth of Niobe in contrast with the story of the Korah rebellion in 
                                               
412 Benjamin, Critique of Violence, 248.  
413 Ibid., 248. 
414 As Ricoeur helps to illuminate through his much later study of mythic themes in 
Greek tragedy, the fault “if it can be described as such”, of some god “laying violent hands 
on a human act” is a seizure that is not a punishment but rather is the origin of the fault, it 
demarcates the threat which the act posed to the operation of power. Ricoeur, The 
Symbolism of Evil, 215. 
415 Thanos Zartaloudis, The Birth of Nomos (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
2019), 63. 
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the Book of Numbers, the fourth book of the Hebrew Bible. In the tale of Korah, 
God’s punishment for transgression is considered an example of divine violence 
that carries educative power (or educative force) wherein violence strikes without 
bloodshed.416 Benjamin recounts the story, in which the rebellious Levites are 
bloodlessly annihilated (they are swallowed up by the earth but they remain 
miraculously alive according to most Jewish commentators).417 God’s judgement 
strikes privileged Levites without warning and without threat, but does not stop 
short of annihilation. Divine violence in this account “is pure power over life for 
the sake of the living.”418 According to Benjamin, in punishing Korah’s 
transgression for failing to follow God’s word, the Biblical account serves as an 
example of divine violence in its educative frame.  A guideline or yardstick 
(Richtschnur) is introduced in this reading, which does not preclude all violence 
but circumscribes violence as a power or “gift” that must not be subject to wider 
authority, and that appears to bind only to itself.419 What this violence against 
violence seems to suggest is that it does not strike at a living subject but rather at 
the legal subject, or the subject petrified by law.420  
In contrast to divine violence, mythic violence teaches by example but 
without expiatory potential. Rather than being construed as a protective force, the 
law according to Benjamin merely threatens (although where it will strike is 
unclear), and since it requires no justification for its coercion, it potentially places 
all human action at the mercy of its determinations.421 Not only does the law 
                                               
416 Benjamin, Critique of Violence, 250. 
417 “If these men die as all men die and the fate of all men will be visited upon them, 
then the Lord has not sent me. But if the Lord creates a creation, and the earth opens its 
mouth and swallows them and all that is theirs, and they descend alive into the grave, you 
will know that these men have provoked the Lord." Book of Numbers 16:28. 
418 The careful distinction from an over-arching moral order is clear. Command 
“consists not as a criterion for judgement but as a guideline for action.” Benjamin, 
“Critique of Violence,” 250. 
419 Agamben, State of Exception, 88. 
420 This is exemplified as Niobe in the myth is turned into stone. Judith Butler’s analysis 
helps to clarify the point: “Divine violence does not strike at the body or the organic life of 
the individual, but at the subject who is formed by law. It purifies the guilty, not of guilt, 
but of its immersion in law and thus it dissolves the bonds of accountability that follow 
from the rule of law itself.” Butler, “Critique, Coercion and Sacred Life,” 211. 
421 Benjamin, “Critique of Violence”, 242 
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threaten rather than protect, but also by its nature in circumscribing the boundaries 
of life, law threatens to juridify the world. The colonisation of life by law and the 
juridification of the world have the effect of arbitrarily interring all human acts. 
Birnbaum elaborates what Benjamin has in mind as follows:  
 
[H]e proposes to show that this violence of the power inherent in law 
ineluctably pursues a colonising expansion, which encloses more and 
more acts and facts within the system of guilt…the monopoly of 
violence proper to the law does suppress natural violence only to the 
extent that it extends legal violence, and this at the expense of all other 
non-violent means of agreement or conflict. The law tends to colonise 
all other possible means of referring to the acts of life, even those that 
appeared at first alien to the order of guilt.422 
 
The expansionist proclivity of law interprets human actions as always already 
corrupted and guilty and thereby required to be determined by law. Law’s concern 
with justice in his reading is interpreted as a foil for its own guilt. As Zartaloudis 
describes, “the juridical description of the world is a life falsification, an 
impoverishment,” to hide or cover this embarrassing lack of ground and yet 
maintain mastery in a world that has lost its gods: “the law must presuppose a 
masterless plane of normativity, in the name of its self-imposed necessity of 
mastering.”423 Law then maintains a relation of guilt “towards the world as such, at 
the same time as it places all events and all human actions as subject to law’s 
suspicion.”424 It is worth emphasising again that the reversed temporality of action 
and responsibility that we might expect in the casuistry of law in Benjamin’s 
reading is crucial. From the perspective of ethics, this means there is no room for 
conceiving of human actions and human responsibility other than as always already 
culpable, and leads to what Thiem describes as an ‘arrested’ form of 
                                               
422 Antonia Birnbaum, “Variations of Fate” in Towards the Critique of Violence, eds. 
Brendan Moran and Carlo Salzani (London: Bloomsbury, 2017), 94-95. 
423 Thanos Zartaloudis, “Violence without law?” in Towards a Critique of Violence, 
171. 
424 Ibid., 171. 
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responsibility.425 Human life that is juridified (according to the temporal 
determination Benjamin sets out to show) also precludes meaningful freedom of 
political and ethical action.  
A further problem is the element of ambiguity that Benjamin ascribes to 
law. As we have discussed, the rationale for education about the law is to ensure 
the predictable ordering of legal events in the lives of citizens. Moreover, public 
legal education in its positivist frame proposes to enable citizens to understand how 
to conduct themselves within the limits of the law and in the event of transgression 
what can be anticipated by legal judgement. Benjamin’s reading points to a radical 
legal ambiguity, most pressingly where it concerns the unfolding of the question of 
guilt with regard to knowledge (or lack of knowledge) of law. Benjamin suggests 
that rather than condemning a transgressive act, law must first condemn life to law 
in order to make or legitimise any particular legal judgment. This reversal in 
temporality leads to an inability to predict the course of events from the position of 
a legal subject, while nevertheless suggesting events are predetermined. Events are 
predetermined (fated in this sense) insofar as the guilt of the subject precedes the 
determination of the law and insofar as the law will make a determination on any 
given action. The ambiguity of legal decisions lies in the fact that the subsequent 
determination or judgement (of legal guilt or innocence over a particular act) is not 
yet certain, since it is possible to be judged as innocent. Benjamin here debunks the 
premise of liberal legal theories basing the legitimacy of the use of legal violence 
on the predictability and certainty that legal ordering promises, and the degree of 
certain knowledge of which acts the law will come to sanction: “a deterrent in the 
exact sense would require a certainty that contradicts the nature of a threat and is 
not attained by any law, since there is always hope of eluding its arm.”426 In other 
words, the threatening or extortive violence of law (or legal violence) can’t be 
deployed as a convincing deterrent due to the inherent uncertainty of when 
sanctions may actually be deployed.427 
                                               
425 Annika Thiem, Fate, Guilt and Messianic Interruptions, Doctoral Thesis (Berkeley: 
University of California 2004), 21. 
426 Benjamin, “Critique of Violence”, 242. 
427 In Cornellia Vismann’s reading the extortive violence of the law “nestles in the zone 
of indeterminacy”… “Benjamin begins with the constitutive paradox of law and violence in 
order to lay bare the constructive ambiguities of law” Cornellia Vismann, “Two Critics of 
Law: Benjamin and Kraus”, Cardozo Law review, 26 (2005), 1165 
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Benjamin reminds us that mythical law-making that has power as its 
principle and takes as its object the determination over life, is circumscribed by 
unwritten laws: “Laws and circumscribed borders remain at least in primeval 
times, unwritten laws.” 428 Bringing this notion to bear on the present emphasises the 
necessary unknowability of boundaries for law to maintain its own being in force. 
For our purposes we can take the central argument that de-coupling knowledge of 
law with the legitimation of modern law alters our understanding of the 
constitutive relationship of sovereign states derived from its citizens. Far from 
being regular, universal and predictable, Benjamin diagnoses the unpredictability 
and instability of the constituting moment as well as illuminating the groundless 
and self-preserving nature of law.   
Law in the archaic worldview to which Benjamin alludes is not only the 
means by which relations amongst people are decided, but the instantiation of legal 
statutes also concerns relations between people and their gods.429 Ancient Greece 
began to record its customary laws in written form following the Bronze Age. A 
feature of the early Greek written law is their central purpose of making knowledge 
of laws available to the wider community, rather than as a technical resolution tool 
for a professional classes of lawyers.430 A feature of the archaic period is an 
explicitly educative perspective, wherein law-making was construed as teaching. 
Dating back to the sixth century BCE, to the emergence of Greek direct democracy 
under the archonship of Solon and subsequently reiterated by Aristotle, we 
encounter a juridico-political order that was contingent on citizens learning the 
laws as the mechanism through which divine retribution for injustice could be 
avoided and order brought to the Athenian city-state.431 The establishment of laws is 
construed as an educative act, which aims to dispel ignorance in the polis. 
                                               
428 Ibid., 249. 
429 For an evolution of the idea of law and the terms and concepts associated with it 
from pre to post Homeric Greece see Zartaloudis, The Birth of Nomos, 2019. 
430 See more generally Michael Gagarin, Writing Greek Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011). Early written law characteristically focused on procedure, such as 
terms of office for magistrates, aspects of ordering in the life of a city that depended on 
knowing and administering the governing customs. See Kevin Robb, Literacy and Paideia 
in Ancient Greece (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 86. 
431 Aristotle emphasised the role of legislators in forming good habits in citizens, and 
this effect distinguished the good constitution from the bad, “Nicomachean Ethics” in The 
Complete Works of Aristotle, Volume Two, ed. J. Barns, (Princeton: Princeton University 
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Interesting to note is the shift in concepts of guilt in this archaic milieu, 
which entailed breaking away from the transcendental order of mythic law, toward 
the beginnings of a written corpus of law. Greek tragedy provides one of the most 
fertile literary resources to consider how fate was juxtaposed with law, and in 
which the problem of knowledge of human law and the laws of fate are played out 
in the emerging Greek city-state. 432 The coincidence of Greek tragic drama and rule 
by law in the West also encompassed a wider notion of cultural education 
described as paideia (the ideal of cultural and educational rearing in the context of 
the members the polis).433 Tragedy was thus an art form as much as it was a social 
institution bringing together aspects of religious cult with features of juridical 
thought.434 
                                               
Press, 1984), 1743.  Pedagogical aspects of law in archaic Greece are developed as a notion 
of paideia, drawn primarily from the three-volume work by Werner Jaeger, Paideia: the 
ideals of Greek culture, (1967: trans., by whom from 2nd Ger. Ed. Gilbert Highet). Paideia 
broadly translates as ‘education’ but means not only the rearing and education of children 
(pais is the simple Greek for child) but, by extension, “mental culture, civilization,” and 
then “objectively, the literature and accomplishments of an age or people.” See Clara 
Claibourne Park, “A Reconsideration: Werner Jaeger’s Paideia”, Modern Age; Vol. 28 
Issue 2/3, (Spring/Summer 1984): 152. For a discussion of the educational role of Greek 
drama see Peter Arnott, “Greek Drama as Education,” Educational Theatre Journal, Vol. 
22, No. 1 (March 1970), 35-42.  
432  Apart from the use of technical legal terminology used by tragic writers, the frequent 
reference to crimes of bloodshed, and form of plays as judgment is a characteristic feature 
of Greek tragic drama. Jean-Pierre Vernant and Pierre Vidal-Naquet, Myth and Tragedy in 
Ancient Greece, (New York: Zone Books, 1990) 31-32 
433 The concept of paideia is drawn primarily from the three-volume work by Werner 
Jaeger, Paideia: the ideals of Greek culture, (pb?1967: trans. from 2nd Ger. Ed. Gilbert 
Highet.) See Clara Claibourne Park, “A Reconsideration: Werner Jaeger’s Paideia”, 
Modern Age; Vol. 28 Issue 2/3 (Spring/Summer1984): 152. 
434  As a general principle the agon was connected with the cult of heroes, for example, 
in Homeric epic only the funeral of a hero was occasion for an athletic contest. See Nagy, 
The Best of the Achaeans, 112. On the concept of agon in relation to early juridical thought 
see Michel Foucault, Lecture on the Will to Know; Lectures at the College de France 1970-
1971, Trans Graham Burchell (Paris: Picador, 2014) 75. On the development of agon in the 
context of Greek tragic drama, see Florens Christian Rang, Historische Psychologie des 
Karnevals (Berlin:  Brinkman and Bose, 1983), 51. 
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Benjamin alludes to the fact that these constellations of ideas maintain 
themselves in the modern law, but these traits remain buried and lead to a false 
understanding of the grounds of law’s force and effect. For him, law’s threatening 
character serves as a lesson, since it educates by example. In order to enfold the 
material world, the constant threat of law looms over the individual whose 
ignorance and potential to overstep the boundaries of legality is a feature of law’s 
continuation. Rather than the certainty and foreseeability of rules, Benjamin 
conceives of the relation between life and law as a problem of ambiguity, guilt and 
indebtedness. In a juridified modernity, nothing is left outside of the law, but when 
and where the law will strike is never quite clear. Unknown laws render the 
unfortunate and unsuspecting victim prone to the full force of the law. Legal 
learning teaches the precarity of life through an adaptive mode of learning by 
employing the culprit: “as a mere occasion to ‘teach a lesson’ and thereby to 
increase [law’s] own credibility, to replenish its own ever-threatened stability.”435 
Modernity thereby perpetuates an ancient economy of guilt and law, yet one that 
has adaptive and educative features. 
In the inaugurating moment of law in a polity, we observe that this 
historical event marks the decision over the circumscription of borders, or the task 
of establishing frontiers. The problem we already encountered with Adorno and 
Horkheimer is that the principle of equivalence instituted with the founding of law 
and the reasoning subject can find no basis in ascriptions of law to justice, nor, for 
that matter, for a basis for justice in freedom. The falsification of the world that 
lends credence to law’s promise of justice thereby becomes apparent, as do the 
contours of the historical catastrophe to which Benjamin points. The frontiers or 
borders that law inaugurates grant to the victor power to guarantee the ‘rights’ of 
the loser. Laws appear in their demonic and mythic force with a pretence of 
equality that merely instantiates in the face of absolute defeat.436 This elucidation of 
law-founding violence challenges the idealisation of history and human progress 
and it brings to light the fundamental ambiguity of the origin of law in instances of 
                                               
435 Anton Schütz, “Thinking the Law With and Against Luhmann, Legendre, 
Agamben,” Law and Critique, Volume 11: 107 (2000), 123.   
436 Benjamin goes on to write: “When frontiers are decided the adversary is not merely 
annihilated; indeed, he is accorded rights even when the victor’s superiority in power is 
complete. And these are, in a demonically ambiguous way, “equal rights”: for both parties 
to the treaty, it is the same line that may not be crossed.” Critique of Violence, 249. 
 151 
historical violence.437 As the final arbiter of the right to life, law holds over life a 
form of arbitrary power that has its corollary in the rule of fate in myth.438 The 
constellation of concepts that Benjamin deploys aims to dispel the myth that law 
(and modern parliamentary democracy) are the consequence of peaceable 
conclusions of historical conflict, and in so doing emphasises their inherent 
instability.  
We also encountered the claim that law-founding and law-preserving 
violence results in the colonisation of all aspects of life by the law, something that 
we are witness to in the contemporary phenomena of hyper-juridification. We have 
previously considered the challenge that juridification presents to the task of legal 
educators and to the legitimacy of the rule of law in providing regularity of legal 
relations and the opportunity for all citizens to access the protection that the law 
putatively affords. This awareness can serve as a critical resource for producing 
alternative strategies in encounters with law. Educative interventions require these 
tools of analysis in order to begin to reconceive the object and value of legal 
knowledge. This necessarily disavows pedagogy that merely replicates 
assumptions about the necessity of order or progress as defined within a capitalist 
horizon. The reproduction of the dominant cultural and societal forces brought 
about by orthodox legal education belongs to the armoury of law’s coercive 
function, even as it aims to offer routes to emancipation and social justice.  
 
 
The preceding chapter deployed some of the insights and methods of Critical 
Theory in order to reassess the claims of the liberal rule of law to provide a 
stabilising and pacifying force, within which the intelligibility of law bridges the 
constitutive relationship between citizen and state. Whereas liberal democracies 
                                               
437 Giorgio Agamben, following the trajectories of both Foucault and Benjamin, 
contends that what is at stake is the inclusion of life in the juridico-political order through a 
form of abandonment or subjection to death. Rather than conceiving of the originary social 
tie as a form of contract that provides the basis of participation in political life, what is 
suggested is an untying such that mere life is exposed to a subjection to death. Homo Sacer, 
(1995), 90. 
438 Ibid., 243. In the context of fate, the demonic sphere is characterized by ambiguity 
and its conceptual origins lie in pre-historical societies. See Giorgio Agamben, “Walter 
Benjamin and the Demonic: Happiness and Historical Redemption” in Potentialities: 
Collected Essays in Philosophy, (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1999), 138. 
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present public legal knowledge as a cornerstone of the way in which the rule of law 
sustains and legitimates the binding of citizen to state, proponents of Critical 
Theory suggest that this device occludes the oppressive and politically stultifying 
force of law. The philosophico-historical critique developed with Benjamin reveals 
the aporetic relation of knowledge and the rule of law, in which ambiguity and 
transitive guilt serve as operative forces in legal ordering. What emerges from a 
Critical Theoretical perspective is that notions of positive progress attributed to law 
and to history serve to perpetuate a cycle of violence and social injustice.  
The readings we have considered lend themselves to a negative or even 
destructive process that clears the conceptual ground. It is within this space that the 
juridico-political realm can be re-evaluated.  The subject of law as formed in and 
through a dynamic interpretation of past and present, illuminating the challenges 
with which public legal education grapples. We encountered the claim that the 
increasing alignment of law in modernity with the demands of technological and 
economic progress results in ever more irrational and oppressive social 
arrangements. Rather than tied to emancipatory or liberatory progress we are 
confronted by law’s most coercive aspects. The demands of competitive economic-
juridical rationality depend on the juridification of life itself, which in turn 
demands and produces sacrifice, which operates through the bodies of its subjects. 
This realization is a pivotal moment in reshaping and reimagining alternative 
political communities. The negative orientation of theory persistently reveals the 
difficulty of adopting an educative stance toward law when constructed within a 
liberal or neoliberal horizon. For example, the persistence of the maxim that 
ignorance of the law fails to offer relief from punishment; legal guilt in this sense is 
coeval with unhappy misfortune rather than foresight, as both the condition and 
consequence of judgement. Benjamin’s analysis of law and violence reveal the 
mounting historical catastrophe that piles up in the name of law and the arrested 
form of responsibility it entails. Unintended transgression is the necessary 
condition of bringing law into being, not as a consequence of religious offence, nor 
as an inauguration of a purer sphere (the justice to which law is mistakenly 
ascribed), but as a specific historical function of the threatening order of mythic 
law.439  
As we have seen, the spheres of religion and myth, according to Benjamin, 
have become entangled, and this entanglement secretly maintains itself in law. 
                                               
439 Benjamin, Critique of Violence, 249.  
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Thus, for the function of law in modernity, notions of transgression, responsibility 
and punishment are not only morally ambiguous, but serve to obfuscate the world 
as it is. When law is aligned with myth, what results is a world falsification. Rather 
than any striving toward justice as our best and most human task, we are precisely 
prevented from perceiving the world in its falsification. These ideas serve to 
illuminate the difficulties encountered for public legal education if it is to avoid 
reinscribing normative violence and if it seeks subvert the reinstitution of law’s 
colonisation of the world at the expense of alternative ways of ordering and 
relating in the world.  
We encountered the ancient idea that human beings are marked by fate.440 
The rule of fate entails the unravelling of an individual life in the net of a 
previously woven destiny. As myth becomes entangled with religion, human life is 
construed as irredeemably fallen; destined to misfortune and unhappiness.  The 
concept of fate comes to be assigned to law and religion precisely through the 
nexus of guilt.  The field in which guilt exerts its power over life is distinguished 
by fate, such that fate is the “entelechy of events within the field of guilt.”441 In 
disentangling the spheres of law, religion and myth and bringing to light the origins 
of mythic guilt, Benjamin presents the problem of responsibility and culpability in 
view of the individual and his progression in the view of law.  
This creates the urgent demand of identifying and undoing (as the foremost 
task of critique) falsifications in which the myth holds sway over law.442  It also 
foregrounds an approach to education which carries a negative utopian charge, one 
that provides an altogether different orientation for an educative endeavour in law. 
In applying a negative utopian outlook, we cleave to an idea of a dialectic in which 
                                               
440 See Anthony Winterbourne, When the Norns Have Spoken: Time and Fate in 
Germanic Paganism, (Madison, Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2004), 14. See also 
Jack Newton Lawson, The Concept of Fate in Ancient Mesopotamia of the First 
Millennium: Toward an Understanding of Šīmtu (Wiesbaden: Herrassowitz Verlag, 1994), 
7. 
441 “The isolation of the field within which the latter exerts its power is what 
distinguishes fate; for here everything intentional or accidental is so intensified that the 
complexities – of honour for instance – betray, by their paradoxical vehemence, that the 
action of the play has been inspired by fate.” Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic 
Drama, 129-30. 
442 The ‘bastardization’ of law with myth precisely postulates a nobility of law, of Recht, 
before its entanglement with myth. I’m grateful to Anton Schutz for this insight. 
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utopian thought conceives of and works for a transformation in society through a 
critique of what it is not. For our purposes, transformation entails disassembling 
the myths of liberal law in and through its origins.  
The structural theoretical problems that Benjamin offers need not 
necessarily lead to paralysis or result in defeatism. In seeking ways to interrupt the 
operation of law and reinvigorate a political and ethical stance toward human 
action and accountability, Benjamin poses potent questions about other ways of 
conceiving of sociality and political action, and how those alternatives are being 
subsumed or supressed by law. What is vital to take from this stage of the 
exploration is this: the critical philosophical-historical study of law reveals that law 
can be unmasked in its own self-assertion, along with an awareness of the fact that 
the violence that founds and preserves law is maintained precisely through the 
























Critical theory, critical pedagogy: Hope in the past  
The image of the teacher repeats, no matter how dimly, the extremely affect-laden 





The institutions of law and of education mask the political and historically 
contingent forces that attend them.444 An enquiry into the educational theories 
underpinning public legal education practices thus involves keeping in close view 
the correspondence of education with its wider social and political formations. 
Previous chapters emphasised the nexus of public understanding of law with the 
legitimation of very different historically situated forms of political and social 
organisation – from early formations of paideia in rearing Greek citizens for their 
participation in nascent democracy from the transformations from absolutism to 
                                               
443 Theodor Adorno, Critical Models, Interventions and Catchwords, trans Henry W 
Pickford (New York: Columbia University Press,1998), 183. 
444 Education and law share common traits when construed as the historical process 
through which the cultural and social reproduction of any given society is secured by 
substituting physical with symbolic violence. Hence, pedagogic action is described as 
follows “objectively, symbolic violence insofar as it is the imposition of a cultural arbitrary 
by an arbitrary power,” including all diffuse education by family members, social groups or 
institutional educational settings. Moreover, this symbolic violence usurps the imposition 
of meanings and “imposes them as legitimate by concealing the power relations which are 
the basis of its force.” Pierre Bourdieu and Jean Claude Passeron, Reproduction in 
Education, Society and Culture (Los Angeles: Sage publishers, 2000). For Adorno, the 
latent violence in the educational system is linked to its genealogical roots in the ritual of 
execution; alternatively, Foucault situates the rise of mass education in parallel to military 
training. Tyson Lewis, “From Aesthetics to Pedagogy and Back: Rethinking the Works of 
Theodor Adorno,” InterActions: UCLA Journal of Education and Information Studies 2, 
no. 1 (2006) https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6sc710z2 accessed 3 April 2018. 
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parliamentary sovereignty. 445 The central question we have continually posed of law 
and education is: What is the nature of the polity that is being produced and 
reproduced? 
The chapter begins with a consideration of educational theories elaborated 
(either fully or partially) within the rubric of public legal education. The limitations 
of the available literature prove challenging for providing a full account through an 
educational lens. Public legal education literature focused on educational 
philosophies is scant; some exists under the aegis of associated disciplines of 
citizenship education, development literature and popular education literature, 
frequently as isolated case-studies or discontinuous programmes.446 The absence of 
an analysis of educational theories in most studies also points to the political and 
value neutral exposition of liberal legality. An uncritical stance on the role and 
function of law (and public education in law) in society results in attempts to 
recuperate law as a protective or progressive agent for change, impervious to the 
structural conditions driving the juridical field in which educational practices are 
delivered.  
In this idiom, public legal education risks co-opting participants or learners 
into a mythology of rights that reinforces heteronomy and portrays those who 
suffer most from the absence of legal assistance in the wake of state retrenchment 
as responsible for their own failed status as right bearers.447 Education is 
                                               
445 For a discussion on the association of paideia and the formation of political 
constitutions see Cornelius Castoriadis, Philosophy, Politics, Autonomy: Essays in Political 
Philosophy (Oxford: Odeon, 1991), 149 and 161-62. 
446 See Lisa Wintersteiger, “Legal Need, Legal Capability and the Role of Public Legal 
Education,” (Law for Life, 2015) accessed 25 January 2018. 
http://www.lawforlife.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/Legal-needs-Legal-capability-and-the-
role-of-Public-Legal-Education.pdf. Lisa Wintersteiger and Tara Mulqueen, “Decentering 
Law Through Public Legal Education,” Oñati Socio-Legal Series 7, No. 7 (2017) 1557-
1880. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3058991  
. Don Rowe, “Law-Related Education: An Overview,” in Cultural Diversity and the 
Schools: Human Rights Education and Global Responsibilities eds. James Lynch, Celia 
Modgil and Sohan Modgil (London: Routledge, 2014).  Amy S Tsanga, Taking Law to the 
People: Gender; Law Reform and Community Legal Education in Zimbabwe (Harare: 
Women’s Law Centre, Weaver Press, 1999). 
447 On rights and hegemony see Alan Hunt, “Rights and Social Movements: Counter-
Hegemonic Strategies,” Journal of Law and Society 17, No. 3 (1990): 309-203. For a 
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increasingly articulated as the requirement or responsibility of citizens to advance 
social cohesion and integration, rather than a right that the citizen claims from the 
state in the interest of equality or freedom. This paradigm places the duty and 
responsibility of social cohesion and integration on individuals.448  
The chapter moves on to trace the intersections of Critical Theory 
emerging from the Institute for Social Research and the later critical pedagogy 
movement. The different phases of development of Critical Theory by the Institut 
have influenced the theory, practice and philosophy of education more generally.449 
The analysis here aims to the draw out the complex intersections of political and 
cultural forces impacting on the experiences of both students and educators 
working in public legal education practices. What emerges from the emancipatory 
political project that attracted critical pedagogical thinkers to the earlier work of 
the Institut is the difficulty of dislodging ideological and instrumental approaches 
to educational practices. The continuing importance of Critical Theory helps us to 
address the puzzles presented in educational practices, “[that] are not necessarily 
procedural kinks or pedagogical tangles of our own making,”450 and in rooting out 
the politically sculpted situations and contradictions stemming from the capitalist 
system in which educators work.451 Critical pedagogical approaches need to disrupt 
the logic of adaptation and socialization that education in law entails, in part 
because the question of law, (its historical-philosophical conditions) as such, is 
foreclosed. This poses the question of the political theologies that tie the subject to 
a juridico-economic order founded on an eschatology of progress.452 Moreover it 
asks how this set of rationalities is instrumentalised in public legal education 
theories. The dilemma that emancipatory education poses is what it means to be or 
become a free, autonomous, democratic subject and whether such a subject can in 
                                               
reading of public legal education and responsibility, Wintersteiger and Mulqueen, 
“Decentering Law”  
448 The transactional educational paradigm also suggests a shifting paradigm in the 
politics of learning see Biesta, “Against Learning,” 58. 
449 Nigel Balke and Jan Masschelein, “Critical Theory and Critical Pedagogy” in The 
Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Education, eds. by Nigel Blake, Paul Smeyers, Richard 
D. Smith, Paul Standish (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2008), 38-57. 
450 Ibid., 6. 
451 Brookfield, Power of Critical Theory, 6. Full citation needed 
452 The objectives of cohesion and adaptation says nothing about what kind of polity are 
shaped. See Biesta, The Beautiful Risk of Education, 68.   
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fact be a product of education. In these pressing questions, early proponents of 
Critical Theory have a continuing contribution to make.  
The interdisciplinary approach to philosophical-historical enquiry 
developed by Critical Theorists alongside their negative utopian orientation 
provides a potent source of inspiration for public legal education practices 
engaging in a counter-educational exchange with the law. Unlike their predecessors 
later  proponents of critical pedagogy would cleave to a form of utopianism that are 
explicitly not ‘Messianic’ but rather ‘anticipatory’, aimed at helping students to 
expand their capacity as agents of social change and teachers to become engaged 
‘oppositional intellectuals’ supporting students to address authority and govern 
themselves rather than simply be governed.453  Rather than adopting this positive 
utopian emancipatory vocation of critical pedagogies developed in the wake of the 
Frankfurt School, the destructive political referent for grounding critique and the 
possibility of social transformation is reimaged in this final chapter.454 
The final part of the chapter explores the pedagogical insights that can be 
drawn from Walter Benjamin’s contributions to Critical Theory.455 The idea of 
educative force (erzieherische Gewalt) that appears in the Critique of Violence will 
be developed as taking on a negative utopian hue.456 Its destructive and creative 
potential, following a Messianic reading, combine to depict a threshold, or 
gateway. A couple of preliminary points bear making. The problem of utopianism, 
linked in Benjamin’s thinking to the dialectic of human emancipation and the idea 
of messianic redemption, has no direct relation to the prevailing conditions; it is 
                                               
453 Giroux, Theory and Resistance, xxii. 
454 Henry Giroux, Theory and Resistance in Education: Towards a Pedagogy of the 
Opposition (Santa Barbara: Praeger Publishers, 2001), xxi. 
455 On the relationship of Benjamin with the Frankfurt Institute generally, see Martin 
Jay, The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of 
Social research 1923-1950 (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1996). On 
Benjamin’s influence on Adorno, see Susan Buck-Morss, The Origin of Negative 
Dialectics: Theodore W Adorno, Walter Benjamin, and the Frankfurt Institute (New York: 
The Free Press, 1979), 20-23, 136-184. 
456 The concept of negative utopianism is distinguished from dystopian or anti-utopian 
thought. For a broader engagement with utopian literature, see Fatima Vieira, “The Concept 
of Utopia” in The Cambridge Companion to Utopian Literature, ed. Gregory Claeyes, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 3-128. For a discussion of negative 
utopianism as pessimistic utopianism, see Balke and Masschelein, “Critical Theory,” 39. 
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glimpsed in flashes of the past. It can be manifested as an educative force, but only 
insofar as it forgoes the necessity of law’s self-grounding myths and the mirage of 
progress, both of which foreclose alternative imaginaries of justice and social 
solidarities. The analysis will develop a concept of study with a particular focus on 




Philosophies of education: From early civics to socially 




The tensions pervading public legal education practices today have been 
read in light of a changing paradigm, from a juridical-political relation between the 
state and the citizen, toward an economic relationship in which the state becomes 
the provider of goods and services consumed by individual citizens. This 
development is an aspect of the emergence of a concept of learning in which the 
consumer of educational goods has needs that are fulfilled by the educator and the 
content of education becomes the product or commodity to be provided.458 While 
the historical trajectory we have charted in the evolution of the public legal 
education movement demonstrates its vulnerability to co-option, de-politicisation 
                                               
457 The distinction between law and doctrine points to the etymological roots of doctrine 
as a body of teaching, Chambers Dictionary of Etymology, ed. Robert K Barnhart 
(Edinburgh: Chambers, 2008), 293. In the Benjaminian reading, we are also oriented to the 
Jewish connotations of doctrine. Gillian Rose writes, “Since the Epistles of Paul and the 
Gospels, Judaism has born the opprobrium of the evangelical opposition of Christian love 
to Pharisaical law. In the modern period, the further connotations of ‘positive’ or ‘human’ 
law (without the Christian criterion of natural law) can accrue to Torah if it is translated as 
law when it would be more accurately translated as teaching or instruction.” Rose, “Walter 
Benjamin: Out of the Sources of Modern Judaism,” in Judaism and Modernity (Oxford: 
Blackwell 1993), 187. 
458 Biesta, Beyond Learning, 13-24. 
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and the neutralizing of economic and social struggle, these are not inevitable 
outcomes.  
The following discussion of educational theories of public legal education 
is a schematic account that would benefit from much wider field work. The modest 
aim here is to reveal some of the principle challenges and opportunities inherent in 
existing educational configurations for future practitioners to develop 
transformative educational spaces in which law can be exposed in its potency and 
with all its attendant risks. Three strands will consider the civics or law-related 
education activities focused over the last several decades on young people, 
development-oriented accounts, and the framework of legal capability.  Some of 
the literature reveals progressive or transformative practices, conceiving legal 
education as a strategy of resistance to economic and social oppression, 
particularly when situated in its historical, socially and culturally contingent effects 
within the lived experience and reality of learners’ lives. This potential is explored 
as a consciousness-raising tool, and as a mechanism for galvanising collective and 
social action. The case studies offer important evaluative critiques of the political 
and moral constructions of law-making and citizen participation. Nonetheless, law 
(albeit better law) is consistently posited as the mechanism through which 
marginalised groups will be able to resist systemic inequality and oppression. 
While reformist in spirit, this largely adopts a settled account of the application of 
law as the medium of or instigator in progressive change.  
This fundamentally throws into question strategies that fail to address the 
extent to which law is used, not simply to manage disputes but to establish the 
terrain upon which disputes are fought.459 An educational paradigm which primarily 
addresses itself to applying law in and through its existing institutional structures 
inhibits wider political space for resistance and co-opts struggle to the confines of 
the regulatory state. Law is also thereby naturalised as the means for oppressed or 
marginalised group to organise resistance, re-establishing the rule of law as the 
primary means to secure recognition for social and political legitimacy and as the 
only alternative for advancing freedom. This obscures the fact that novel demands 
                                               
459 This requires a paradigm beyond that of law as the ‘mirror of society’ with which the 
law and society field has traditionally associated itself. See Brian Tamabaha, Law and 
Society, 368- 371. 
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for rights operate by integrating and subsuming power relations into the body of 
law. 
The difficulty of situating public legal education within broader socio-
political constructs and enabling a critical and transformative learning praxis 
emerges under the aegis of law-related education. Focused predominantly on 
school aged children, education programmes in this field combine knowledge of 
political and legal institutions with the skills necessary for active citizenship.  U.S. 
law-related education evolved in three phases from the early 1960s.460 The 1960s 
saw a collaboration between universities and civil liberties organisations form the 
first teaching institutes which brought interdisciplinary perspectives on the Bill of 
Rights and the Declaration of Independence together to devise teaching 
programmes for students.461  
One of the earliest radical proponents of the movement, Isidore Starr, 
recalls how case study teaching methods were brought to the fore in order to 
encourage a more critical attitude among the students: 
 
What amazed me at the time was the effect of law-related discussions on the 
interest and quality of student thinking. In time, I began to find the uses of law in 
social studies an important means of breaking through superficial textbook 
commentary to case study confrontations of value conflicts, the nature of decision 
making, and the quest for a hierarchy of values in our society.462 
 
The adoption of case study methods injected legal learning with a realism that 
became a precursor to a period of political turbulence. The second period of law-
related education is demarcated by civil unrest between 1968 and 1979. The 
assassinations of John F Kennedy, his brother Robert, and of Martin Luther King, 
student activism and the Vietnam war attested to a lack of faith in government 
structures, as well as perceptions of rising crime.463 As well as a growth in street law 
                                               
460 Sherry Weinstein and Robert W Wood, “History of Law-Related Education” (Eric 
Clearinghouse, 1995) Accessed 31 January 2018 
https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED401163.pdf.  
461 Ibid, 8. 
462 Isidore Starr, "The Law Studies Movement: A Memoir," Peabody Journal of 
Education 55, no. 1, (1977): 6-11. 
463 Weinstein and Wood, “History of Law-Related Education,” 14. 
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and community-based programmes focused on everyday legal issues, these factors 
influenced a shift toward ‘delinquency prevention’. Writing in 1971, American Bar 
Association president Leon Jaworski emphasised the goal of law-related education 
aimed "to teach the child at a receptive age why any free society must rely upon 
law and its institutions and the nature of the duties that a free society imposes upon 
its members."464 By 1977, this emphasis became formalised and the law was 
amended to specifically provide for "prevention, control and reduction of juvenile 
delinquency."465  Although ostensibly aimed at ameliorating the failure of political 
and civics education, curricula maintained a relatively narrow focus on government 
and law-making. This meant the social realities of students were largely ignored by 
curricula, which in turn fundamentally failed to achieve their appointed task of 
securing active participation in democratic life.466 Law-related education 
subsequently addressed the failure of civics education to achieve relevance by 
offering a ‘citizen-centred’ learning focus, drawing its themes from political 
science and contextualising concepts such as power and democracy through the 
application of rights and duties applicable to day-to-day life. The fundamental 
difference between the black-letter professional training of lawyers and the school 
curriculum lies in how the latter focused on students’ capacity to adapt to the adult 
world. The goal was thereby to adapt students to become workers and make a 
smooth transition into adult life.467 
An important outgrowth of the law-related education movement in 1972 
was the Street Law programme at Georgetown University, with the first clinics 
teaching law students how to teach practical law classes in schools and to the wider 
community.468 These programmes have since been developed in a number of 
jurisdictions and represent one of the most wide-ranging manifestations of public 
                                               
464 L Jaworski, President's Page. American Bar Association Journal 57 (1971) 829 cf. 
Weinstein and Wood, “The History of Law-Related Education,” 1995, 15. 
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465 Juvenile Justice Amendments 1977 amended the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 
Prevention Act of 1974 to provide the term "juvenile delinquency program", Weinstein and 
Wood, “The History of Law-Related Education,” p?. 
466 Rowe, “Law-Related Education,” 72. 
467 Ibid, 53. 
468 Margret E Fischer, “So What is Street Law Anyway? A U.S. Perspective,” 
International Journal of Public Legal Education 11, no. 1 (2007). 
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legal education practices globally.469 Their relative success has been attributed to a 
focus on the law-related issues that are commonly faced by students, as well as 
their participatory teaching and experiential learning methodologies.470 
 
Learner-centered education is often contrasted with the more 
traditional top-down, teacher-centered approach known as 
instructionism that views students as empty vessels to be filled and 
teachers as the imparters and transmitters of everything students need 
to know. With learner-centered education, students’ prior knowledge is 
valued and the teacher’s role is to help students build bridges between 
their current understandings and the new subject matter.471  
 
The programmes approached community building and teacher education aiming to 
foster a sense of collective and creative problem-solving. However, they rarely 
carry these educational models outside of the student or school environment.472 
Relatively few evaluations focus on delivery to the wider community and funding 
                                               
469 Street Law now exists in 50 U.S law schools and many other international law 
schools. Weinstein and Wood, “History of Law-Related Education.” 
470 Seán Arthurs, Melinda Cooperman, Jessica Gallagher, Dr Freda Grealy, John 
Lunney, Rob Marrs and Richard Roe, “Is it possible to go from Zero to 60? An Evaluation 
of One Effort to Build Belief, Capacity, and Community in Street Law Instructors in One 
Weekend,” International Journal of Public Legal Education 1, no. 1 (2017): 19-81 
471 Ibid, 27. Street Law adopts a Bloom taxonomy of learning which encompasses 
knowledge, comprehension, application, analysis, synthesis and evaluation. The higher 
level of thinking encouraged by this taxonomy “is reflected through the short essays based 
on hypotheticals, judgments, on mock trials or real legislation using learned knowledge of 
law, or other responses that display complex analysis.” See also Kamina A. Pinder, “Street 
Law: Twenty-Five Years and Counting,” Journal of Law and Education 27 Nno. 1 (1998): 
219. 
472 A number of evaluations focus on elements of resilience and confidence building in 
the context of juvenile crime see Bonnie Benard, “Fostering Resilience in Children: 
Protective Factors in Family, School, and Community,” (Portland: Northwest Regional 
Educational Laboratory, 1995), and Caliber Associates, “The Promise of Law-Related 
Education as Delinquency Prevention,” ABA Technical Assistance Bulletin (Washington, 
DC: American Bar Association, 2002), 19.  
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seems to have been hard to sustain.473 The focus has predominantly been on school 
aged students and on the citizen building aspects of public legal education with a 
view to socialisation and law and order compliance:  
 
PLE provides an opportunity for students to develop their practical 
skills (such as communication and problem solving skills) whilst 
involved in authentic experiences. The primary objective of PLE is 
however to educate the public in order to “empower” individuals to 
achieve solutions and promote “compliance” with obligations- in three 
words this is designed to encourage active citizenship.474  
 
Even the more narrowly construed field of public legal education in the civics 
context appears to have been vulnerable to shifting political agendas aimed at 
reproducing the normative and adaptive demands of citizenship.  
This is also apparent in the cognitive behavioural development theories 
adapted for the secondary curriculum that created educational models designed to 
naturalise moral development and normative judgments as aspects of maturation. 
Indebted to a liberal and humanist tradition following Kant, these ideas continue to 
hold significant sway in education theory and practice.  They encompass three 
models: ‘legal competence;’ the ‘developmental model’ following the work of 
Piaget and Kohlberg; and a ‘compliance model.’475 In Kohlberg’s theory, a further 
six moral stages are grouped into three major levels. In the preconventional, 
notions of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ are translated via physical consequences of punishment 
or reward. The second stage is the conventional, characterised by active support for 
authority figures and the internalisation of rules toward conformity with wider 
                                               
473 Other more recent attempts to reach a wider public are still in evidence, for example, 
Michael Urban, “Why is There a Need for Street Law?” International Journal of Public 
Legal Education, Vol 2, No 1, (2018)101-102. 
474 Sarah Morse, “Design, Development and Value” International Journal of Public 
Legal Education Vol 2, no. 1 (2017): 106. 
475 Legal competence focuses on critical enquiry into history and the values and 
application of law. The cognitive developmental approach to moral development draws 
from Dewey’s genetic, experiential and purposive reasoning. June L Tapp and Lawrence 
Kohlberg, “Developing Senses of Law and Legal Justice,” Journal of Social Issues 27, no. 
2 (1971): 76-84. 
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social groups. Finally, the postconventional stage incorporates autonomous 
judgement with what Kohlberg calls ‘constitutional’ overtones and individual 
rights focus that nevertheless encompass ethical and abstract frameworks for 
judgment and the critique of law.476 
It is worth revisiting liberal Enlightenment ideas insofar as they have 
shaped the educational theories we are discussing. Following Kant, the defining 
aim of the Enlightenment is to release man from his condition of tutelage and 
subordination, to deploy reasoned reflection and gain independence at a remove 
from heteronomy.477  Heteronomy directs the individual’s actions from the outside, 
whereas for Kant the mature, responsible and reasoning individual is capable of 
independent thought and therefore ultimately free.478 The role of education in this 
endeavour is essential (both for the individual and society) in order to provide the 
necessary direction and moral instruction to achieve maturity and rational 
autonomy, elements which provide the conditions of an enlightened civilization.  
Education can foster reason, ‘the touchstone of truth’ by shaping young minds. 
Society had yet to achieve this maturity but by raising enlightened individuals, the 
whole of society would eventually assume a democratic character.479   
Education conceived in this light was later tied to citizenship and 
significantly influenced trends in democratic education.480 Enlightenment thinkers 
                                               
476 All models exhibit a staged or structured evolution of learning competencies, 
engaging young people from the basic rule-oriented to more advanced critical stages. 
Lawrence Kohlberg, “Moral Stages and Moralization: Cognitive-Developmental 
Approach,” in Lawrence Kohlberg, Essays on Moral Development Volume II The 
Psychology of Moral Development: The Nature and Validity of Moral Stages (San 
Francisco: Harper Publishing, 1984) 170 – 206. 
477 Immanuel Kant, “What is Enlightenment?” in Kant: Political Writings ed. H S Reiss, 
Cambridge Texts in Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 56.  
For the engagement of Adorno with Kant on the problem of maturity, see Robert French 
and Jem Thomas, “Maturity and Education, Citizenship and Enlightenment: An 
Introduction to Theodor Adorno and Hellmut Becker, ‘Education for maturity and 
responsibility’,” History of Human Sciences12, no. 3 (1999): 4-10 
478 Kant, “What is Enlightenment?”, 56  
479 Although he readily admits there are other obstacles to education aimed at 
“enlightening an era.” Kant “What is Orientation in Thinking” in Political Writings, 249. 
480 The notable emphasis in Kant is of the individualistic conception of democratic 
person, Biesta, Beyond Learning, 127. 
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raised the question of the kind of subject that would be best suited to a democratic 
society. “For Kant, the democratic person is the one who can think for himself, 
who can make his own judgements without direction from another: The Kantian 
subject is therefore the rational subject and an autonomous subject.”481 In 
subsequent theories of education, the construction of the moral and rational 
individual was taken up in models developed by Piaget and Kohlberg; learning 
about the law as an aspect of citizenship education would also serve to foster moral 
judgement, moving from the egocentric and naïve orientation of the young child 
toward “orientation not only to actually ordained social rules but to principles of 
choice involving appeal to logical university and consistency.”482 
While the phases described in the cognitive behavioural models above 
assume progression between heteronomy at one pole and autonomy at another, 
most students, according to Kohlberg, fall into the first and second stages with very 
few ever attaining the third.483 This raises important concerns about the limitations 
of educational capacity to shape autonomous learners, while highlighting the 
tensions inherent in citizenship education instrumentalised on one hand toward 
independence and on the other toward crime prevention and social cohesion. 
Programmes that establish socialisation, adaptation and the pursuit of law and 
order as the primary model sought to help students become better decision makers, 
thereby “creating good citizens.”484 Public legal education in this construction can 
be understood as an aspect of the technology or technique of citizenship, which 
Rose describes as  
 
practices for civilizing human subjects by turning them into 
responsible citizens. Such projects for inculcating responsibility divide 
subjects into actual citizens, potential citizens, failed citizens, anti-
citizens on the basis of their presumed or demonstrated capacity – or 
                                               
481 Ibid., 127. 
482 Kohlberg “Moral Stages,” 171-172. 
483 Ibid., 172. 
484 Although Weinstein and Wood argue that citizenship approaches were less focused 
on delinquency in the 1980s, the literature folds in these various aspects such that they 
become matters of degree rather than kind. Weinstein and Wood, “History of Law-Related 
Education,” 31  
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lack of capacity – to exercise responsibility; or their wilful refusal of 
the demands to become responsible.485 
 
Not only is it the responsibility of each to be become reasoning individuals as an 
aspect of socialisation and inculcation into the normative demands of society, but 
the burden of any failure to have achieved requisite status is eschewed by the state. 
It falls on the individual to ‘do better’ at handling their legal issues and acquiring 
rights, thereby also assuming their role as fully socialised citizen-subjects.   
Turning our attention to development focused practices, education 
programmes have expanded in response to global rule of law advances since the 
latter part of the twentieth century. While framed in the European liberal tradition, 
they exhibit important critical approaches aiming to surface the way in which 
liberal legalism operates in post-colonial settings.  Amy Tsanga provides a detailed 
account of Zimbabwean legal services programmes, in particular legal literacy for 
Zimbabwean women. Contrasting traditional legal services with alternative 
methods grounded in critical enquiry and transformative action, she writes “it is too 
simplistic to centre strategy entirely on rights to legal aid and knowledge of law” 
because that approach “ignores the powerful social, cultural, psychological and 
political constraints that hinder the enjoyment of rights.”486 Transformative 
community legal education engages in a process of co-producing knowledge 
through dialogue, participation in the learning process and contextualisation within 
the lived realities of the women involved. This involves de-individualising struggle 
so as to enable resistance through community organising and the capacity to 
“amass power and to ultimately effect change.”487 Empowerment is defined as “the 
process of acquiring social and psychological capacities needed to bring about 
change.”488 The curriculum necessitates situating legal questions arising in 
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educational approaches in historical terms, through a critical reading of colonial 
history and gender identity: “one of the greatest challenges facing organizations 
that seek to take the law to the people is to address the tensions posed by people’s 
history and sense of identity as well as the gendered dimensions of power that are 
posed by culture.”489  
Another fruitful study in women’s rights brings together a number of education 
theories in community legal education for low-income single mothers in Chile.490 
The programme enabled women to critically evaluate the legal response to their 
situations, and to reflect on power imbalances between various actors (including 
lawyers and teachers). However, failure to link collective awareness with 
mobilisation ultimately left them unable to challenge the power structures involved 
in ineffective alimony and support laws. The link between learning and action was 
not made, and ultimately the prevailing political will dictated the capacity of the 
programme to galvanise a political response.491 The programme drew from the 
critical education theories of Brazilian popular educationalist Paolo Freire, who 
contributed a substantial body of work on critical pedagogical methods working in 
the slums of Rio. His dialogic and participative methods were influential in the 
social and political context of the period of democratic agitation in Brazil. 
However, this popular education drive in Chile fundamentally altered the 
educational locus as it related to law: 
 
Freire’s literacy campaigns in Brazil occurred within the context of 
revolutionary social change. The opportunities for collective action 
were antecedent to learning: elections were to take place, land 
redistribution was underway, and technical and financial support was 
                                               
489 Tsanga, “Taking Law to the People,” 70. 
490 Susan McDonald, “Popular education in downtown Santiago,” Convergence 31, no. 
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available for economic development. In contrast this programme [in 
Santiago] was implemented in 1993. The elections of 1989 had 
returned democracy to the country. This program for single mothers 
was one example of the Government’s work to promote (and 
effectively contain) social protest.492 
 
Taking up the themes of dominance and ideology in educational discourse, 
Paolo Freire’s work in poverty stricken north-eastern Brazil in the 1960s aimed to 
resolve the contradiction of the teacher-student hierarchy (which for him maintains 
the character of authoritarian logic). Problem-posing education sets out to 
demythologize the world through a dialogue of equals between teacher and 
student.493 Freire’s contention was that education should release the oppressed from 
the fatalism that prescribes their condition as the inevitable outcome of their social 
and intellectual subordinacy.494 Freire’s syncretic formulae brought together aspects 
of Critical Theory with a form of liberation theology.495 The belief in revolutionary 
praxis took the shape of a positive utopian belief within a religious, redemptive 
horizon of the not-yet fully actualised class struggle. The emancipatory telos and 
confidence in the emergence of a critical class consciousness was enormously 
influential in the critiques subsequently developed in the fields of postcolonial 
theory, gender studies, cultural studies and critical adult education.496  
Legal empowerment practices incorporating elements of Freirean 
inheritance have burgeoned in recent years. Goodwin and Maru describe practices 
focused not only on knowledge building but associated activities that build agency 
and a sense of group empowerment in order to foster change and reform when the 
rule of law fails to protect people’s needs: “Changes in legal knowledge may be a 
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foundation for other impacts over time, including willingness to take action in 
pursuit of remedies or other entitlements.”497 However, change within legal 
empowerment paradigms relies on the willingness of political actors to relinquish 
power, a factor that profoundly curtails their efficacy. Educational efforts sit within 
a continuum of legal advocacy, and studies struggle to differentiate the impact of 
legal education as distinct from legal advocacy or community organising.  
Conceptual components of public legal education have been analysed in 
the last decade in the UK, with the development of an evaluation framework for 
assessing the spectrum of competencies - from individual rights knowledge, skills 
and attitudinal changes to collective community organising.498 Curricula incorporate 
wider contextualised understanding of the institutional and historical aspects of 
legal systems and extend to influence and critical engagement in the wider legal 
and political system.499 Exercises and pedagogical tools involve a shift from law-
centred to contextualised critical reflections on the law: 
 
By foregrounding the experience of those we teach and focusing on 
legal capability, our approach does not simply reproduce narratives of 
law’s effectiveness or neutrality, but rather tries to use law in strategic 
relation to other domains and perspectives. Our goal is that when 
confronted with a law-related issue, those we teach should be able to 
identify it and from there have the resources and tools they need to 
make a decision about how best to proceed, whether by using the law 
or not.500 
 
Alongside the need to help individuals recognise and ‘see’ the law in its multiple 
dimensions, reform efforts tie juridico-political dimensions to the conceptual 
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framework. Yet mobilising collective and progressive approaches are often 
hampered in practice. The pressure to address legal need as the basis for 
educational interventions means practices are constrained by the logic and field of 
influence of juridification.  The growth of law, particularly in the newly won areas 
of social and economic rights, provides for a constantly growing (and changing) 
body of law that must be ‘acquired’ in order for the need to be met.  
Critical analysis of law’s social constructedness, how law is both shaped 
by and constitutes social relations, is therefore one of the crucial difficulties 
identified for education: 
 
[T]he framework of legal need obscures the fact that law is a socially 
constructed form of relation; that the need for law is only a correlate of 
the presence of law itself, which is neither necessary nor natural. It is 
important to remember that law is at once constitutive and constituted: 
it actively creates the categories it deploys, but it is also itself the 
product of social relations.501 
 
The contingent and contested power relations subsumed by law underpin legal 
innovation as well as legal stability. 502 To the extent that law (and education in law) 
provides pre-eminent modes of producing and reproducing hegemonic relations, 
the urgent task for counter-hegemonic pedagogy is for this process to be 
unmasked.503 It is in the very nature of law to claim new territory in order to ascribe 
and preserve its own legitimacy; critical awareness of this function of law and 
therefore toward law as a potential tool of resistance is the unique contribution that 
a critical educational exchange with law can open. Revealing the contradictions of 
progress and ideology in liberal legal regimes was a core focus of some of the 
leading thinkers of the Frankfurt School. Having considered some of the tensions 
that public legal education practitioners encounter, we will turn to develop the key 
strands of educational philosophy originating from the Institut. 
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Critical Pedagogy and Critical Theory  
What is needed is a radical reconsideration of the knowing individual as such.504  
 
 
The work emerging from the Institut exerted considerable influence on the 
development of critical pedagogical writing in the years following the school’s 
move to Geneva, and subsequently to Colombia.505 The following discussion aims to 
explore the continuities and important discontinuities between early proponents of 
Critical Theory and later contributions aimed specifically at the development of 
critical pedagogical approaches. A central concern will be the evolution of the 
emancipatory and utopian thinking associated with critical pedagogies. Rather than 
adopting the utopian emancipatory vocation of critical pedagogies developed in the 
wake of the Frankfurt School, this enquiry will retrieve a destructive or negative 
political referent for grounding critique that emerged from the early years of 
Critical Theory.  
Negative utopianism conceives of educational encounters that retain a 
possibility of social transformation while disavowing the tendencies of utopian 
‘progress’.  In contrast to the negative utopian orientation of the early proponents, 
the form of radical education adopted in later versions, as critical pedagogy theorist 
Henry Giroux describes it, is ‘anticipatory.’506 Pedagogy is conceived as helping 
students to expand their capacity as agents of social change with a view to their 
role as democratic citizens.507 While questions of authority, autonomy and subject 
formation are central critiques within Critical Theory, by seeking recourse to the 
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positive and anticipatory features of utopian emancipatory thought, later 
generations fail to engage with precisely the very same tendency of law, as it 
reaches for a redemptive horizon while producing and reproducing political 
communities sustained by heteronomy and oppression. 
A core premise of critical pedagogy is that educational institutions provide 
the machinery for de-subjectification, insisting on a world of economic necessity 
and foreclosing learners from the world of meaningful actions. Rather than 
allowing human agency and autonomy to flourish, education in the modern 
technological era aims at the production of goods, not persons. Teachers and 
students are subjected to commodity-driven grading and professional advancement 
in an education market exhibiting the same rationale as the stock market.508 
Educational theory operates much like social theory, having become “socialized 
semi-education, an ever present alienated mind.”509 The insights offered by critical 
pedagogy point to the correspondence of classroom and educational practices with 
the demands of the workplace, and the social embeddedness of education within a 
wider global economy with all its attendant inequalities.510  
Work spearheaded in Germany by Jurgen Habermas (a student of 
Horkheimer and Adorno) aimed to salvage the primacy of reason from the early 
Critical Theoretical writers. His over-arching social theory confirmed the broad 
diagnosis that education as a reflection of dominant political and economic 
imperatives fails to serve any higher purpose of self-realisation or emancipation. 
But the spread of democratisation, women’s and minority rights, shifting 
subjectivities and identities within groups, and the often-competing claims for 
identity also entailed a re-reading of Critical Theory. Emancipation, according to 
Habermas, requires a discourse ethic that could break with the pessimism of the 
Institut’s founders and prepare the ground for a new language of educational 
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freedom and self-determination as the general aim of education.511 His turn to 
communicative intersubjectivity sought to foster “forms of living together in which 
autonomy and dependency can truly enter into a non-agonistic relation.” Rather 
than looking to a community situated in the past, this relation to others aims at 
“experiences of undisturbed intersubjectivity.”512 In turn, this intersubjectivity 
depends on a system of communicative action predicated on mutual understanding 
and consensus. Instrumentalisation and objectification are thereby presented as 
distortions to a system of communication, to language as such, which underscores 
the drive toward mutual understanding.513  
Habermas’ riposte to his predecessors’ pessimism warrants a brief re-
evaluation in light of Horkheimer’s critique of the role of language in the 
degeneration of reason in modernity. This views language as a pre-eminent 
mechanism through which oppression is spread, having succumbed to the same 
technical rationalism that infects every system and institution of modernity. 
Language for Horkheimer has become no more than a tool “in the gigantic 
apparatus of production in modern society. Every sentence that is not equivalent to 
an operation in that apparatus appears to the layman just as meaningless 
…meaning is supplanted by function or effect in the world of things and events.”514 
The non-agonistic communicative intersubjectivity envisaged by Habermas leaves 
undisturbed the loss of meaning entailed by the dominance of subjective or 
instrumentalised reason. Rationality, overwhelmingly concerned with self-
preservation, becomes attached exclusively to the subjective concerns of atomized 
individuals with no greater end or purpose in view.515  
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The critique sought to locate something of a spirit of objective reason that 
had been lost and to consider what that loss incurred. The centrality of subjective 
concerns represents a distorted and one sided historico-philosophical development 
of the idea of autonomy as intrinsic to human progress. This contrasts with a form 
of autonomy that envisages the pursuit of freedom of the individual for and within 
society: 
 
The absolutely isolated individual has always been an illusion. The 
most esteemed personal qualities, such as independence, will to 
freedom, sympathy and the sense of justice, are social as well as 
individual virtues. The fully developed individual is the consummation 
of a fully developed society. The emancipation of the individual is not 
an emancipation from society, but the deliverance of the society from 
atomization, and atomization that may reach its peak in periods of 
collectivization and mass culture.516 
 
Underlying this argument is a critique of an abstract transcendental principle of 
person, essence or subject formation inherited from Enlightenment thought. Just as 
emancipation and individuation are only conceivable as aspects of socialisation, 
individuals are not immune to the repressive forces within a society and are 
necessarily prone to forces immanent in history and culture (for good or ill).  The 
predominance of the abstract universal subjectivity of the Enlightenment project 
means that the particular, unique individual becomes inserted into the economic 
order of advanced capitalism at the expense of the disintegration or loss of self and 
identity.  
The changing face of global capital and geopolitical formations, as well as 
the need for a more nuanced understanding of socio-political construction of the 
individual posed new and pressing problems on the mechanisms available to 
critical pedagogy to forge new directions.517 The Institut’s theorists themselves, 
having moved to establish a base in the United States in exile from National 
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Socialism, disavowed the capacity of revolutionary praxis to afford a means of 
escape, and of the existence of a universal revolutionary subject-in-waiting to 
achieve a shift in consciousness that can be lifted en masse to transgress a 
totalising reality.518 The challenge to later critical educators reappears as one of 
resurrecting a critique that both acknowledges the advances of more progressive 
elements of modernism, and that seeks more sophisticated considerations of the 
subjectivities and identities of those identified as the proletariat in Marxist, and 
subsequently Freirean discourse. 519  
Both German and U.S. branches of critical pedagogy sought to exploit 
some of the impasses presented in earlier theories, as with the resort to a ‘new 
language’ (following Habermas) in communicative action. American theorists also 
sought a radical reconception of citizenship, attempting to exploit discontinuities in 
the cultural societal nexus in which resistance could be located. The stakes, 
according to Giroux, are not simply over “a new language to rethink the modernist 
tradition” but also “the reconstruction of the political, cultural and social 
preconditions for developing a radical conception of citizenship and pedagogy.”520 
As with the more radical reform oriented law-related educational strategies 
explored above, Giroux contends that a radical pedagogy needs to combine the 
insights of critical pedagogy with theories of social action to move beyond the 
reproductive rationality and over determinism of correspondence theories, toward a 
transcendent and reconstructive education system.521  
A core critique levelled at earlier proponents of critical pedagogy thus 
centred on challenging a theory of strict correspondence between the sites of 
cultural production (such as school and the workplace). Rather, theorists like 
Giroux and Apple argue that schools offered sites of resistance and contestation 
between the formal education system and workplace settings.522 Postmodern 
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feminist discourses point to new directions that could be adapted to the challenge 
of a totalising discourse (of history and reason), arguing the subject seen through 
this lens necessarily becomes plural rather than the singular universal figure of the 
worker. Feminist educators counter the abstractions of critical pedagogy by 
refocusing the personal as political, and bringing concrete experiences to the fore 
that nevertheless arise from shifting subjectivities and identities.523  These tactics 
can, Giroux argues, reinvigorate social and political struggle.524  
Nonetheless, questions linger as to whether critical pedagogy can provide 
an effective vehicle for emancipatory practices. The difficulties encountered in the 
field of public legal education earlier are telling. In an educational market driven 
by competition, how do education programmes break with economic rationality so 
as to have practical effect in reaching communities most prone to experiencing 
oppression? This requires strategies to reach beyond the classroom and bring 
subjugated knowledge of and by those groups who are traditionally excluded from 
the academy or school to bear.525 A continuing stumbling block in the field of 
emancipatory education has also centred on the problem of authority in the 
classroom, specifically the authority of the teacher. Ostensibly, the students’ 
immersion in repressive or coercive forces requires an educator to lift them from 
their condition: “Because it is assumed that power also operates on peoples’ 
understandings of the situations they are in.”526 In the legal context, this can play out 
with some force when legal professionals predominate as teachers in community 
settings, working with groups already contending with disadvantage. Avoiding the 
reproduction of educational models built on a relation of dependency rather than 
autonomy is crucial for developing counter-hegemonic public legal education 
practices. 
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Insofar as education and autonomy or emancipation can be meaningfully 
linked, the problem of identity and subject persists for critical pedagogy. If the 
anonymous machinery of societal formations “does away with the individual,” how 
(if at all) can a less destructive individuation in keeping with notions of social 
solidarity be fostered via critical education theory and practice?527 Adorno’s critique 
takes up the line of thought pursued by Kant to show precisely how the opposite 
has occurred in modern educational contexts. Through a range of techniques aimed 
at generating conformity to the demands of industrial technological progress, 
education trains people for social adaptation into societal systems oriented to 
repression. The modern individual is thereby moulded by processes and structures 
that remain heteronomous: 
 
[T]hrough a vast number of different structures and processes, in such 
a way that, living within this heteronomous framework, they swallow 
and accept everything, without its truer nature even being available to 
the individual consciousness […] The real problem of maturity today 
is whether and how one can work against this  - and who this ‘one’ is, 
is a major question in its own right too.528  
 
From the perspective of socialisation to legal norms, and citizen’s education in law, 
the problem of self-determination becomes even more acute. The contradictions 
inherent in the universal rational subject of law and the rights bearing individual of 
modernity are shaped by adaptive demands to the normative requirements of 
society. Legal socialization, whether through formal education or in the process of 
culturally appropriated norms and rules serves as a means of inserting ‘newcomers’ 
(through birth or arrival) so that they can participate in the normative order as 
rational individuals.529 The singular individual must precisely lose their unique 
singularity to adapt and to participate. The formal and universal Kantian subject, 
for Adorno, implies the ultimate interchangeability and exchangeability of every 
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subject that is integrated into the demands of a technocratic society, rather than a 
unique and critically self-reflective individual: “Kant’s universality seeks to be one 
for all, that is to say for all rational beings; and the rational are a priori 
socialized.”530 The problem of universality (and legal universality for our present 
concerns) is posed not only as a problem of desubjectification more generally, but 
also as a problem at the heart of education. What is important about Adorno’s 
claim is that desubjectification results in the impotence of the individual to act with 
meaningful autonomy. The universal categories of humanity, subject and so forth 
undermine the capacity of singular individuals to reflect on their own dialectical 
formation within historical and societal forces in a critical way, since “to imagine a 
transcendental subject without society, without the individuals whom it integrates 
for good or ill is just impossible.”531 
Rather than advocating for a radically atomised subjectivity capable of 
achieving rational understanding as a pre-given, pre-socialised subject following 
Kant, Adorno describes the conditions for subject formation dialectically, as a 
process that occurs by and in the social and cultural environment. This subject is 
not free, according to Adorno, insofar as the institution of the normative order is 
tied to the universal and abstract rational subject; reason is always itself a product 
of historico-political conditions. From an educational perspective, the individual 
must therefore be able to grasp the limits of the conditions of their socialisation, 
and necessarily the limits to individual freedom, as an aspect of their capacity for 
critical self-reflection (what education must ultimately aim at according to 
Adorno). In the tensions and contradictions exposed by the dialectic of 
subject/object, individual/society through a critical self-reflective endeavour, there 
lies some hope for a newly conceived objective reason. “[O]nly a definition of the 
objective goals of society that includes the purpose of self-preservation of the 
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subject, the respect for individual life, deserves to be called objective.”532 In other 
words, the objective goals of society must include self-preservation but only by 
preserving the ties of social solidarity aimed at collective survival. “It is in the 
realisation of the impotence of subjective reason toward its goal that…these 
metaphysical systems express in partly mythological form the insight that self-
preservation can be achieved only in a supra-individual order that is to say, through 
social solidarity.”533 
For critical approaches to public legal education, this central critical 
questioning of law, as formed by and with society, as a questioning necessary to 
understanding the political contingency of law – and as only one version of a 
supra-individual order. Both its repressive and progressive tendencies must be 
repeatedly questioned in a continuing critical engagement with the present. While 
Critical Theory holds that a capacity for critical self-reflection is crucial, this does 
not afford an effortless move to a programme of education. Reflecting on the 
problems of autonomy and education after the horrors of Auschwitz, Adorno 
writes: 
 
The pressure exerted by the prevailing universal upon everything 
particular, upon the individual people and the individual institutions, 
has a tendency to destroy the particular and the individual together 
with their power of resistance. With the loss of their identity and 
power of resistance, people also forfeit those qualities by virtue of 
which they are able to pit themselves against what at some moment 
might lure them again to commit atrocity.534  
 
While education carries the potential of bringing to light the dangers that harbour 
in the consciousness of an atomised and administered society, this is no easy task 
since the “loss of identity and power to resist are also threatened.”535  
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One critical possibility unearthed in historico-philosphical enquiry is in the 
evolution of the concept of Bildung (translating roughly as education and 
formation, or self-cultivation). Bildung, containing both political and educational 
dimensions, emerged from the educational ideal in Greek society, one aiming to 
enquire into the constitutive features of an educated or cultivated human being: 
 
[T]he answer was not given in terms of discipline or socialization, that 
is in terms of adaptation to the existing external order. Bildung rather 
referred to the cultivation of the inner life, the cultivation of the human 
mind or soul…. the modern conception of bildung was mainly coined 
in the Enlightenment when self-bildung became defined in terms of 
rational autonomy. 536 
 
Where the tradition of Bildung had previously sought to shape and preserve “man’s 
natural existence” and was concerned with the inner cultivation of the individual, 
modern education has lost its two-sided aspect of both adapting (and taming) 
people to one another while providing “opposition to the pressure of the decrepit, 
man-made order.”537 A one-sided process of education has resulted, with a 
predominant concern for adaptation and insertion into the normative order.538 Two 
important aspects to this critique merit consideration in approaching  legal 
education models. The first relates to the institution of legal systems more 
generally and the role of the legal subject within them, and the second concerns the 
orientation to the future (that might be described as a negative utopian critique), 
aiming at transformation of the present through historico-philosophical analysis.  
Turning first to the problem of modern legal subjectivity and legal 
systems, a critique of legal rationality (and implicitly educational rationality) 
entails a consideration of how Enlightenment thinkers sought to foster individual 
freedom following the collapse of older forms of authority (religious, monarchical 
and so forth). Just as ideas of autonomy shift the terrain of authority, legal 
expansionism and a process of juridification mean that ever more norms and rules 
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are tied to the modern legal subject. Legal education described in the studies above 
exhibit two polarities - either the positivist tendency aiming to adapt the subject as 
atomised liberal subject into the existing normative order, or, in its communitarian 
orientation, as consciousness raising of the subject of an excluded class or 
oppressed group. The subject of legal education is caught in this polarity, either 
appearing in the guise of the liberal subject of rights and entitlements that can be 
armed with knowledge of their rights enabling the pursuit of legal claims, or 
conversely the communitarian embedded subject of shared meanings and social 
norms, emphasising identity politics and empowerment of disadvantaged groups 
needing to assert their collective interest (as minority rights and so forth). As 
Gillian Rose observes, neither of these two polarities escape a common totalizing 
archetype: 
These two apparently warring engagements have a lot in common…By 
maligning all putative universality as ‘totalitarian’ and seeking to 
liberate the ‘individual’ or the ‘plurality’ from domination, both the 
libertarian and the communitarian disqualify themselves from any 
understanding of actualities of structure and authority, intrinsic to any 
conceivable social and political constitution and which their opposing 
stances leave intact.539  
 
Communitarian constructions of identitarian claims are increasingly impossible to 
sustain in post-colonial fragmentation of modern, plural societies. Efforts to 
empower local or particular group interests paradoxically involves competition for 
interests and risk turning the oppressed into oppressor.  For example,  narratives 
that have sought a “pedagogical encounter to foist off the tyranny of 
authoritarianism and oppression and bring about an all embracing and diverse 
fellowship of global citizens profoundly endowed with a fully claimed humanity,” 
while espousing laudable goals consistently run up against the constitutive and 
constituting force of law.540 The subject of political or legal liberatory and reform 
movements continually threatens to be engulfed by forces of cultural and historical 
formations: “’Empowerment’ itself, as it is often imagined in education, may 
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assume the same universal and unified subject that elite accounts of national 
development emphasise with regard to politics.”541  
A critical legal education can begin to show how law’s progression is 
implicated by these forces. Its political contingency and the problem of autonomy 
are thereby intimately linked to the instituting and institutions of law (what 
Benjamin might otherwise describe as law-making and law-preserving aspects). 
The concept of autonomy, as it pertains to society and the formation of the political 
space in which individuals become part of the body politic, must first be able to 
grasp that to be autonomous means to posit one’s own laws. Following Cornelius 
Castoriadis, this can only occur when the individuals within a society recognise 
themselves as the source of their own norms – there can be no “law of law” and 
autonomy as an individual or collective enterprise is no end in itself.542 Rather, the 
institution of the political space is a continuous creative act, in which the 
autonomous individual emerges and is formed both by seeking their own laws and 
acting so as to self-limit in the interests of the Other.543 The questions of which laws 
to be governed by, what is good and just law, is the perpetual task of autonomous 
societies and the creative endeavour to which classical understanding of education 
– as paideia or Bildung– were alert. In this wider understanding of the political and 
cultural space of education, Adorno also finds the possibility that beyond 
individual institutional boundaries, education can be conceived as an endeavour 
aimed at ‘knocking down’ the deceptions by which people are kept in their 
condition of subordination:  
 
[T]he only concrete form of maturity would consist of a few people 
who are of a mind to do so working with all their energies towards 
making education an education for protest and resistance…so that to 
begin with, all we try to do is simply to open people’s minds to the fact 
that they are constantly being deceived, because the mechanism of 
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tutelage has been raised to the status of a universal mundus vult decipi: 
the world wants to be deceived.544 
 
The unfortunate slide into an elite intellectual assumption that this task must be 
undertaken by “a few people who are of a mind,” aside, cultivating education for 
protest and resistance must be established, “everywhere…in every aspect of our 
lives.”545 This is a labour of negative critique, one that takes the present and its 
demystification (or demythification) seriously.  
The negative utopian aspect of earlier Critical Theory considers the 
impossibility of simply directing education toward a positive utopian telos as a 
moment of reconciliation of what exists with what can or should be. The 
coincidence of utopian thought and education is by no means incidental, as Lewis 
observes, “education and utopia necessarily imply one another.”546 Education strives 
to shape the emergence of alternative possibilities. For this reason, the nature of 
that relation is contingent on the nature of the utopian drive that lies at the heart of 
education. For Siegfried Krakauer, the utopianism that Adorno conceives of is a 
“regulative concept”,547 it is “a concept which could never be, and was never really 
intended to be realized but rather to act as a perennial corrective against any claim 
that a natural or equitable social order has been achieved.”548 According to Adorno, 
the failure of all positive utopias takes on the character of vanity – the vision of the 
future which asserts that “things have developed differently and will continue to do 
so.”549 A narrative of the historical progress of mankind occludes the social injustice 
of the present. Thus, all positive utopias repeat the idealism which forgets that 
nature and history, and therefore individual and society, are mutually implicated 
but non-identical. The remnants that this non-identity throw into critical relief is 
the task of a negative dialectic.  
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“It [utopia], the consciousness of possibility, clings to whatever has 
not been disfigured. The way to utopia is barred by the possible, never 
the immediate reality; this is why it always appears abstract in the 
midst of existing reality. It is served by thought, a piece of existence 
that, negative as always, reaches out to that which is not.550  
Positive utopian thought erases that which has been disfigured in its search for new 
possibilities. Instead, Adorno as well as Benjamin sought to point to precisely what 
was intolerable in the present conditions of society, what was most disfigured. 
Emancipatory hope lies in the development of critical self-consciousness and the 
resurrection of what has either been lost or forgotten. By focusing on the gaps and 
discontinuities in the present which could be illuminated through a secret relation 
to the past, “Adorno saw hope for the future. But never its guarantee.”551 
Redemptive figures of the past appear repeatedly in Benjamin’s work, with more 
theological connotations than for Adorno.552 The Institut’s thinkers did not rule out 
the prospect of change – or the prospect of changing the course of history in the 
interest of social justice – in the face of suffering. This constellation of memory, 
lived experience, and the discontinuities that appear in the light of a negative 
critical enterprise offer powerful educative ideas in our contemporary critical 
educational endeavours.  
In summary, we have traced continuities and departures between early 
proponents of Critical Theory and later critical pedagogical developments. The 
potential for critical pedagogy to achieve its self-declared emancipatory ends is 
countered by the bleak assessment of the possibilities for praxis and prognosis of 
society, and the concomitant struggle for an anti-hegemonic educational form that 
can already be found in Adorno’s writing.553 At the heart of a critique of the inter-
related issues of the formation of the free, democratic subject and the positive 
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utopian telos of educational goals is a continuing resort to the instrumentalisation 
of education as the means to achieve predetermined ends.  
In order to tease out the arguments with specific relevance to public legal 
education, we have focused on the limitations of the critical pedagogy movement 
in its positive utopian orientation. This entails a turn to the possibilities of 
reinvigorating aspects of early Critical Theoretical inspirations via a critical 
appraisal of the tension associated with the modern liberal legal subject and its 
attendant institutions. In modern educational theory, de-subjectification occurs 
through a one-sided process of adapting and socialising the individual, with little 
scope for education enabling the individual to resist that process (which Adorno 
claims to have been inherent in the duality of earlier modes of Bildung).554 What we 
can detect in the tensions already visible in variously dogmatic or emancipatory 
forms of education in public legal education models, is the polarity of arguments 
still reflecting the liberal normative ideal, and its opposition to communitarian 
social ideal; each with competing claims to freedom and progress. The final part of 
the chapter will pursue this line of thought with an argument encompassing the 
concept of study arising from Walter Benjamin’s literary criticism of Franz Kafka 
and numerous exchanges and correspondences around his essays with Gershom 
Scholem and Theodor Adorno.555  
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On study: Kafka and Benjamin’s gateway to justice  
The law which is studied but no longer practiced is the gate to justice.556 
 
In the work of both Benjamin and Kafka, the underlying violence and 
inhumanity inherent in modern legal and bureaucratic systems is revealed. Each 
illuminates the demonic ambiguity attending legal processes, with secret laws and 
unknown transgressions reminiscent of much older theologico-historical forces. 
Neither share faith in progress or the advance of human civilization and its modern 
institutions of justice, since every document of civilization, Benjamin reminds us, 
“is at the same time a document of barbarism.”557 Both Kafka and Benjamin refuse a 
historicism of law as a chain of cause and effect but rather aim to read the present 
through flashes of what has passed so as to “brush history against its grain.”558 
Hence, we encounter a reading of the problem of law through the lens of the 
violent founding (and preservation) of political community.  
Their critique unveils a corrupt world in which both law and history mark 
the passing of time in unending cycles of judgment and guilt. Their orientation to a 
utopian impulse is radically negative.559 Yet both perceive in the misshapen, tired 
and malformed aspects of the world the whisperings of redemption. For the 
purposes of this final discussion, we will trace the educative elements that emerge 
from an ‘archaic modern’ perception in its studious and attentive inclination toward 
things past.560   
Benjamin sought not only to critique the legitimation of the use of force 
and concealment of the arbitrary workings of power/violence in the normative (and 
apparently peaceful) order of law. He sought to decouple life from its fateful 
entanglement with law altogether. In his early work in the 1920s, he had already 
identified law as the means by which the struggle for power is usurped and 
                                               
556 Benjamin, “Franz Kafka: On the Tenth Anniversary of His Death” in Selected 
Writings, 815. 
557 Walter Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” in Illuminations, trans. 
Harry Zorn, (London: Pimlico, 1999) 248.  
558 Ibid., 248. 
559 See Michael Loewy Redemption and Utopia: Jewish Libertarian Thought in Central 
Europe A Study in Elective Affinity (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1992). 
560 Kaufmann, “Beyond Use, With Reason,” 157. 
 188 
contained. Nevertheless, Benjamin’s essay Critique of Violence gestures towards a 
‘bloodless’ form of power or force that would not repeat and reinstitute the 
violence of law. Somewhat later in the essay he refers, (as we introduced in the 
previous chapter), to one such manifestation as an educational force (erzieherische 
Gewalt), that he describes as (bloodless yet annihilating) ‘divine violence’, serving 
to undo the mythic function of violence and law: “This divine violence is not only 
attested by religious tradition but is also found in present-day life in at least one 
sanctioned manifestation. The educative power which in its perfected form stands 
outside the law.”561 We will cleave closely to the idea that this force teaches without 
incurring the extortive violence that attends law but that somehow holds a sense of 
the nobility of law in view. This obscure reference to educative force nevertheless 
begs the question of how this force is to be given effect, since as Martel observes 
the ascription of divine violence to human actions goes against the wider thrust of 
the essay.562  
To gain insight into what might inform a pedagogic reading, it is helpful to 
cast back to Benjamin’s early student life, which exposed him to a range of 
influences, including teaching by the neo-Kantian Heinrich Rickert, whose critique 
of positivism and vitalism (the philosophical focus on life itself) would prove 
deeply influential on his thinking in relation to education.563 His Life of Students 
lambasted the delineation of academic study from the experience of life: “for the 
vast majority of students, academic study is nothing more than vocational training. 
Because ‘academic study has no bearing on life.’”564 Building on educational 
readings by Fichte and Nietzsche, this instrumentalised version of study as opposed 
to what he evokes as a “community of learning” serves not simply the production 
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of the professions, but places them firmly within the adaptive (and heteronomous) 
demands of the state: 
 
For the sign of true decadence is not the collusion of the university and 
the state…but the theory and guarantee of academic freedom, when in 
reality people assume with brutal simplicity that the aim of study is to 
steer its disciples to a socially conceived individuality and service to 
the state.565  
 
During his time at Wickersdorf, he joined a progressive educational community led 
by Gustav Wyneken, and collaboration with other, mainly Jewish, students led to a 
shift in Benjamin’s own sense of belonging to a Jewish milieu.566 This community 
championed academic and cultural reform and a model of an anti-authoritarian free 
school community on which Wickersdorf was conceived.567  
Education provides the vehicle for the transmission and reproduction of 
culture and society, and both produces and is produced by historically dominant 
forces. Benjamin’s early writing critiques these forces. Opening the essay On the 
Life of Students he writes: “There is a view of history that puts faith in the infinite 
extent of time and thus concerns itself only with speed, or the lack of it, with which 
people and epochs advance along the path to progress.”568 Rather than contributing 
to the mirage of progress, the task of education is precisely to transform the 
prevailing dominant culture and society and thus the conditions for a revolutionary 
present. This entails a reappraisal of the tradition of the oppressed that demands, 
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not only apprehension of the past, but seeks a lived connection with it.569 Hence, 
only the image of enslaved ancestors rather than the falsifying images of social 
democracy that depict an “ideal of liberated descendants” could be adequate to 
such an apprehension.570 
Faith in progress is for Benjamin entirely misplaced; the historical task is 
the excavation of the present.571 His work is charged with an insistence that 
penetrates appearance so as to gain access to the phantasmagoria he encountered 
“to break the bonds of a logic that covers over the particular with the universal.”572 
This insistence grew partly out of a response to his own cultural milieu. Hannah 
Arendt would describe the sense of unreality pervading the Jewish community of 
Benjamin’s upbringing in its relationship to Imperial Germany and the ‘Jewish 
problem’, and how deeply it affected the Jewish intelligentsia to which Benjamin, 
Kafka and Adorno belonged.573 Benjamin distinguishes his own sense of Jewishness 
as cultural Zionism; displaying an ambivalence to Zionism and Marxism that 
allowed both paths to remain open and available to him in his work. The attitudes 
that shaped his literary production over the years thus exhibited from the very 
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outset the complexity with which he viewed the question of tradition and of the 
past.574 
The transmissibility of tradition and handing down the authority of the past 
are central to both Kafka and Benjamin as writers. According to Benjamin, 
tradition is the mystical experience which forms one pole of the ellipse of all of 
Kafka’s work. Tradition is here properly understood in light of the literal 
translation of Kabbalah (tradition, transmission), a terminological awareness that 
Benjamin was alert to.575 This literature forms part of the esoteric world of Talmudic 
sages and their secret teachings, which were largely not recorded until the Middle 
Ages.576 The other pole of Kafka’s work and world is the experience of the modern 
city dweller; Benjamin perceives in Kafka “the modern citizen who knows he is at 
the mercy of vast bureaucratic machinery, whose functioning is steered by 
authorities who remain nebulous even to the executive organs themselves, let alone 
the people they deal with.”577 Elsewhere, Benjamin’s image of Kafka’s works is of a 
bow drawn taught  “on one side [with] the political and on the other the mystical.”578 
Thus, in the nature of Kafka’s parabolic writings, the light reflecting on the 
profoundly alienating experience of the modern citizen advances from the pole 
whose orientation is mystical experience.  
This mystical experience does not make itself apparent as an optic but can 
be best perceived through the sense of hearing. Examples of this appear as 
whisperings (of the messenger, Barnabas in The Castle) or in the laughter of 
Odradek (the animated spool-like creature appearing in The Cares of a Family 
Man) that sounds like the rustling of fallen leaves.579 In song or music too, tokens of 
hope or escape might be available, and so to strain the ear was a way of 
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experiencing the redemptive remnants of tradition: “Kafka lived in a 
complementary world…his experience was based solely on the tradition to which 
Kafka surrendered.  There was no far-sightedness or ‘prophetic vision.’ Kafka 
eavesdropped on tradition, and he who listens hard does not see.”580 Kafka’s 
brilliance, according to Benjamin, lies in his portrayal of the fact that tradition no 
longer transmits the wisdom that properly belongs to it, a realisation which leads 
him to hold, in the last instance, to transmissibility as such. For Kafka, wisdom is 
attributed to “truth in its haggadic consistency”, a feature that no longer obtains in 
tradition and that has lost its authority.  
Kafka’s work, Benjamin maintains, “represents tradition becoming ill.”581 
How can we understand this diagnosis insofar as the question of law is concerned? 
To explore how law and tradition can be related in this constellation, it is worth 
clarifying that Jewish law (Torah) is composed of Oral (aggadah) and Written 
(halachah) Law, each reflecting a different aspect of the truth of the Law.582 For 
Judaism, revelation is not the salvationary principle of the redeeming Christ.583 
Revelation and tradition are, Scholem writes  
[T]wo poles around which Judaism has grouped itself during two 
millennia. In the view that prevailed of Talmudic Judaism, revelation 
and tradition were both manifestations of Torah, of “teaching” on the 
shaping of human life.  Revelation here comes to be regarded as the 
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“Written Torah”, which is represented, and as the Tradition, which as 
“Oral Torah” serves as its ongoing interpretation.584  
In a mystical Kabbalistic reading, revelation takes on increasingly anarchic 
elements brought about by a crisis of tradition.585 What Benjamin expresses in his 
reading of Kafka is the disgrace of revelation that no longer transmits wisdom. 
Kafka’s world is a world of revelation that can only be read in the products of its 
decay.586 His world and work are typified by lawlessness. However, if what 
Benjamin proposes and insists on in Kafka’s haggadic orientation is correct, then 
what we encounter in Kafka’s world is the distortion of the pedagogic aspect of 
law in its doctrinal aspect – of law properly regarded as a body of teaching. 587 For 
this reason, in his letter to Werner Kraft, Benjamin opposes the concept of laws to 
the concept of doctrine. Interpretation fails precisely on this point of law in Kafka 
and can only be attempted indirectly, hence, “in case it [law] were to have a 
function in his work: in spite of everything – whether it does is something I want to 
leave open – an interpretation that takes images as its point of departure, like mine 
does, is sure to lead to it in the end.”588 Any alternative insistence on law in Kafka’s 
work is, for Benjamin, predominantly illusory  and a ‘sham’.589   
With this constellation in mind as tools for reading Kafka with Benjamin, 
let us move on to consider a notion of study elaborated by Benjamin in the 
anniversary essay on Kafka written in 1934. It brings together some of the literary 
representations of law in Kafka’s work with the thought-figure of study.590 Kafka’s 
novels repeatedly contain themes of the tortuous and labyrinthine workings of law 
and the ambiguous and arbitrary forms of guilt and punishment that attach to their 
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characters, often by what appears as some force of necessity. So much so, that we 
find that it is guilt that draws the accused to the attention of the courts rather than 
any obvious transgression.591 At the very beginning of The Trial, the principle 
protagonist, Joseph K, is arrested and warned by police sent to his home: “Our 
authorities as far as I know, and I only know the lowest grades, don’t go out 
looking for guilt among the public; it’s the guilt that draws them out, like it says in 
the law, and they have to send us police officers out. That’s the law.”592 The law 
itself seems to stipulate that guilt pervades; guilt is to be regarded as an 
inevitability that demands proceedings be instigated. 593  
The nature of the law or regulations, however, is not known, there are 
books of law but they are secret or can’t be read, a fact that serves as an indication 
of the guilt that also pervades the court: “those books must be law books” Joseph K 
declares, “and that’s how this court does things, not only to try people who are 
innocent but even to try them without letting them know what’s going on.”594 
Protestations of innocence are treated as proof of guilt, and ignorance of the law is 
met with gleeful vindication of the justice of the proceeding: “look at this Willem, 
he admits he doesn’t know the law and at the same time insists he is innocent!”595 So 
too the regulations in the village at the foot of the castle; although secretaries 
appear to know more than the “legal gentry,” the paths to the law remain secret, 
and competence to handle a case is by no means assured.596  
The hierarchies of officials, servants, secretaries and assistants are readily 
subverted. It is not clear who is in charge, “servants seem to be the real masters in 
the castle,” and with these oscillations, it is no surprise to find that “castle 
regulations are not fully binding on them in the village.”597 Accusers and accused in 
the process easily trade places. In the short story, The Penal Colony, no sooner is 
the condemned man freed from the apparatus of torture (administered for the 
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supposed crime of insubordination), in the name of a law he knows nothing of, not 
even the sentence, then the official tasked with ensuring the sentence is issued and 
carried out promptly takes his place for the sentence to be executed in the soldiers 
place.598 Similarly, in The Trial, Joseph K (already accused of his unknown crime) is 
surprised to discover the police officers, Franz and Willem, in the junk room 
attached to his offices being submitted to the whip. This punishment is endured, it 
seems, endlessly, although the finding of fault has yet to be established, since 
Joseph K made no complaint about them. As Benjamin contends, the process or 
trial itself appears to be the punishment.599 
 The problem of knowledge in Kafka illuminates the decay of the 
transmissibility of law and tradition. In The Penal Colony, we discover that the 
procedure no longer garners any support, the source of authority is doubtful: “This 
process and examination, which you now have the opportunity to admire, have no 
more open supporters in our colony. I am its only defender, just as I am the single 
advocate for the legacy of the Commandant.”600 In due course it becomes clear that 
the Commandant’s source of authority has been erased and even his followers are 
no longer permitted to be named.601 The past, no longer properly transmissible has 
lost its authority and in turn authority that no longer presents itself historically 
cannot become tradition. It thereby takes on the mythic function of prophecy.  
Mythic law knows no route to redemption and so the sentences are still being 
carried out even after the Commandant has died. The apparatus of the law is 
decoupled from any foundation; the authority of the redemptive aspects of law 
either cannot be fulfilled or the laws that are written as script cannot be deciphered 
(the machine’s design comes with its own instructions which can’t be read).602 
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Despite all that is incomprehensible, the “machine still works and operates on its 
own.”603 
Guilt and attraction to the law are thus inevitable, without foundation and 
boundless. It is here that law takes on the quality of fate, driven by guilt itself since 
fate simply advances the necessity of order. This order harks back to a ‘prehistoric 
world’ one which forecloses expiation.604  
Laws and definite norms remain unwritten in the prehistoric world. A 
man can transgress them without suspecting it and then must strive for 
atonement. But no matter how hard it may hit the unsuspecting, the 
transgression in the sense of the law is not accidental but fated, a 
destiny which appears here in all its ambiguity.605 
The nature of this order, as described in the parable, The Great Wall of China, is 
that everything is “completed piecemeal” since the design in its entirety would be 
incomprehensible, “neither book learning nor our common sense would have 
sufficed for the humble task which we performed in the great whole.”606 Similarly, 
as we also find in both The Trial and The Castle, everyone has their place in the 
order of things; every toil and labour has a role in a wider purpose, and everyone is 
connected to the ‘great organism,’607 to the workings of the court, or the castle on 
the hill. But no one appears able to grasp what the purpose of the organisation is – 
someone else is sure to know. Public and private realms collapse; proceedings are 
carried out very often at night, or on Sundays, in attics, bedrooms and 
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guesthouses.608 Of private matters “everyone already knows,”609 but the verdict of the 
court will never be made public.610 The collapse of the public and private space in 
Kafka’s novels creates a further sense of the sheer inevitability and inescapability 
of law as the immanent mechanism through which life is ordered - whether the law 
of the father, the family or of the courts.611 Power and violence are immanent in 
Kafka’s world,612 but what is at stake is the profane order of the living, “in every 
case it is a question of how life and work are organised in human society.”613 In all 
of this, we see clear parallels to the world of capital and the faceless, machine-like 
bureaucracies surrounding the modern city dweller. 
Perhaps this is why the characters are so tired; overwhelming fatigue 
accompanies the protagonists. Organisations take on the quality of a living 
organism, but only by virtue of the actors who take part: “[W]e meet these holders 
of power in constant, slow movement, rising or falling, who are always on the 
move.”614 This movement appears to oppose the decay and inertia of the institutions 
of the court.  The institutions themselves seem to be in suspense, the outward 
appearance of regularity and order of proceedings soon collapses into increasing 
decrepitude: files go missing, officials are unkempt and slovenly, rooms are dusty 
and without air. 615 Failure to pay attention and excessive tiredness in the airless 
antechambers and passages might well account for the mien of the guilty man, 
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more so than ignorance. Despite his ignorance, the Land Surveyor, K (the 
unfortunate protagonist of The Castle) conjectures “all this had only happened 
because he was excessively tired.”616 Indeed, he is so absent-minded that 
attentiveness is key to unravelling some of the vertiginous effects ascribed to the 
proceedings.617 Joseph K is also often dizzy and tired. He diagnoses his own guilt 
insofar as lack of attentiveness is “the basic rule that he was continually 
violating.”618 Reflecting on the price of inattention can but lead to the conclusion 
“that one of the most basic rules governing how a defendant should behave was 
always to be prepared, never allow surprises.”619  
Not everyone is tired however. Students, Benjamin remarks of a category of 
characters in Kafka’s novels, are awake while they study.620 The figure of the 
student and the question of study appear in numerous short stories and novels by 
Kafka.621 Students, Benjamin contends, appear at first unimportant, but eventually 
take on more influential forms: “[A]mong Kafka’s creations there is a clan which 
reckons with the brevity of life in a peculiar way…the students who appear in the 
strangest places in Kafka’s works are the spokesmen for and the leaders of this 
clan.”622  They are members of a clan of assistants and helpers that appear 
repeatedly, and not only as human figures. The students can also take the shape of 
creatures, for example in the case of the parable The New Advocate, a horse 
(Bucephalus is the horse of Alexander the Great) or the ape Rotpeter from A 
Report to an Academy. In fact, animals in Kafka’s universe are exemplary students, 
“no human teacher” declares Rotpeter in a Report to an Academy, “has ever found 
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in the entire world such a student of human beings.” 623 What unites the figures is the 
apparent uselessness of the study to which they turn their attention. In the novel 
Amerika, the most searing critique in all of Kafka’s novels of the advance of 
capitalism, we encounter the student Joseph Mendel. Joseph mysteriously explains 
that he studies “merely for the sake of consistency,” and we are left none the wiser 
about what the object of his study might be when he says, “I get very little 
satisfaction out of it, and even less hope for the future.”624 No progress is apparent in 
his endeavour. Nevertheless, their studies keep the students awake. Not only does 
this account for their reckoning with the brevity of life, it is, according to 
Benjamin, perhaps what is best about study, as being kept awake serves to remind 
them of the forgetfulness of sleep. The tireless students that appear in the city in 
the South are spokesmen; they never sleep, just as Joseph Mendel declares “I’ll get 
some sleep when I’m finished with my studies.”625  
The law to which Kafka’s students turn also seems to hold their attention 
without pause. Bucephalus is absorbed in law books. We discover that he has been 
admitted to the Bar but he has not stopped reading the law.626 Ceaseless study 
mirrors the never-ending operation of the trial and the endurance of guilt.627 The 
price of being accused in a trial is perpetual motion and for the accused it is better 
to be moving rather than still. In the Trial, the lawyer Dr. Huld advises Joseph K 
“if you are still you can be weighed in the pan of the scales without knowing it and 
be weighed along with your sins.”628 The students are also on the move, “the scribes, 
the students are out of breath, they’re fairly racing along. Often the official dictates 
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in such a low voice that the scribe cannot even hear it sitting down; he has to jump 
up, catch the dictated words, quickly sit again and write them down.”629  
The never-ending process of accuser and accused occurs in the abysmal and 
unclean world of the officials and functionaries of law and judgement seems never 
to arrive. Their dirty uniforms and shabby appearance, we are told, speak not of 
economic conditions but of their parasitic nature and the “forces of reason and 
humanity from which this clan makes a living.”630 Quite unlike the students, this 
clan is concerned with the application of law and the finding of guilt. The victory 
scored in this inherited adduction of guilt is that of the past over the future. The 
endless prescription of the prehistoric (or hetaeric) world,631 both for Kafka and for 
Benjamin, exerts its ruthless force over the present, and the form this force takes is 
that of judgement.632 The nature of the judgement however is unclear, and in this 
narrative device Benjamin offers a glimmer of hope, if not of redemption, then of 
postponement: “in the stories which Kafka left us, narrative art regains the 
significance it had in the mouth of Scheherazade: its ability to postpone the future. 
In Der Prozess (The Trial) postponement is the hope of the accused man only if the 
proceedings do not gradually turn into the judgement.”633 This recalls the tales told 
by Scheherazade to postpone her execution each night by “telling of the rulers and 
annals of long ago” that she had learned about in her studies.634  
                                               
629 Benjamin, “Franz Kafka”, 814. 
630 Ibid., 796. The forces of reason are much like those in the relation of father to son 
which “gnaw on the son’s right to exist”. Here we encounter what Kafka defines as original 
sin. The “old injustice committed by man, consists in the complaint unceasingly made by 
man that he is the victim of an injustice, the victim of original sin.” Kafka, Er?, quoted in 
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not even achieved the state of myth. Kaufman, “Beyond Use, Within Reason” 155. 
632 Benjamin, “Franz Kafka,” 807. 
633 Ibid., 807. 
634 A.S. Byatt, The Arabian Nights, Tales from a Thousand and One Nights, trans. 
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We can construe studying less as an exercise in acquisition but rather as an 
ascetic experience which necessarily involves remembering.635 Thus, Karl 
Rossman’s encounter with that student in Amerika leads to the recollection of his 
studying in his own home as a child. Benjamin points out that what is at stake in 
memory is lived experience itself, since experiences, he writes elsewhere, are lived 
similarities.636 It need not amount to much, after all, “but that are very close to that 
nothing which alone makes it possible for a something to be useful.”637 The ultimate 
experience of alienation and therefore impetus to rediscover the situation of the 
subject is, for Kafka, the experience which directs him to learning, where he may 
encounter fragments of his own existence: “He might understand himself, but what 
an enormous effort is required! It is a tempest that blows from the land of oblivion, 
and learning is a cavalry attack against it.”638 Experience gives the present a source 
of access to the oblivion of the past. For Benjamin, there are no other tools at hand 
than the object or phenomenon, the appearance of which can begin to open the 
world to a configuration of ideas, a conceptually mediated constellation that is 
always being remade. The passing away of things negates any possessive character 
to this process of analysis, often invaded by the involuntary memory that 
experience gives rise to, yet momentarily illuminating possibilities.  
In his use of allegory and parable, Kafka approaches the experience of 
alienation of the modern city dweller (his own lived sense of alienation) and the 
tortured machinations of law through the mystical tradition associated with 
Judaism. Kafka’s stories do not belong entirely to the Western canon, as they are 
more akin to religious teaching. But even these teachings lie in ruins; his characters 
and gestures are “relics to the teachings, although we could just as well regard 
                                               
635 Benjamin suggest that “the crowning achievement of asceticism is study.” “Franz 
Kafka,” 813. 
636 In a fragment written in 1931 or 1932, Benjamin writes “There is no greater error 
than the attempt to construe experience – in the sense of life experience – according to the 
model on which the exact natural sciences are based. What is decisive here is not the causal 
connections established over the course of time, but the similarities that have been lived.”  
“Experience,” Selected Writings, volume 2 part 2, 553. 
637 Benjamin, “Franz Kafka,” 813. 
638 Ibid., 814. 
 202 
them as precursors preparing the teachings.”639 The half-buried, incomplete and 
barely remembered remnants of a tradition of study which accords, in Benjamin’s 
view, with the haggadic elements of truth is the mode through which the modern 
citizen in their contact with law’s impossible demands is conveyed. This indirect or 
indistinct mode of access to the past is itself neither  “knowledge that one can 
preserve” nor “doctrine that one can absorb.”640 Although ostensible study has no 
end, and amounts to nothing, we have seen this lack of object almost amounts to a 
use.641 The  attributes of study which Benjamin points to with Kafka is akin to 
Aggadah as fragmentary theology, lore, legend, sayings, prayer and praise.642 What 
remains are remnants which correspond, according to Agamben, to the unmasking 
of mythico-juridical violence: “there is still, therefore a possible figure of law after 
its nexus with violence and power has been deposed, but it is a  law that no longer 
has force or application.”643  What has been forgotten of law is its absolute absence 
of ground. No longer attached to the promise of justice or redemption, law operates 
with all its demonic violence in the modern era. It cannot be law that is invoked 
against myth, as Benjamin observes: Bucephalus “as a legal scholar remains true to 
his origins, except that he does not seem to be practicing the law.”644  
Rather than abandoning law altogether, law transformed via the labour of study 
offers hope, but only through a path of reversal, via hope in the past.  Rather than a 
theologically determined, or indeed political-ideological recuperation of Kafka, 
Benjamin points to what remains undone in Kafka. In correspondence with 
Gershom Scholem over the essay prior to publication, Benjamin responds to the 
accusation by Scholem that in the matter of law, “the existence of secret law foils 
your interpretation: it should not exist in a pre-mythical world of chimeric 
confusion, to say nothing of the very special way it announces its existence. There 
                                               
639 Here again, Benjamin describes Kafka’s writing as taking the form of aggadah as it 
relates to halkhah, the teaching itself does not exist, “here and there we have an allusion to 
it.” Selected Writings, 803. 
640 Ibid., 141. 
641 Ibid., 814. 
642 Elman Yaakov, “Classical rabbinical interpretation,” in The Jewish Study Bible, 
1847. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) 
643 Agamben, State of Exception, 63. 
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you went much too far with your elimination of theology.”645 In response, Benjamin 
reiterates that the pupils (students) do not belong to this pre-mythical world. Unlike 
the accused for whom everything is hopeless, they belong to the clan who are 
messengers, “the unfinished and hapless” for whom there is always hope.646 
Here Benjamin locates a trace of redemptive hope in Kafka’s diagnosis. It is 
“the source of his radiant serenity;”647 for Kafka posed the problem of law as one of 
precisely this chimerical confusion. In his short prose piece On the Problem of Our 
Laws, the laws are not entrusted to the people, as they have not been worthy of 
them. They are secret and not generally known, yet people are convinced they are 
“unscrupulously administered.”648 They are so much a secret, that their very 
existence can only be presumed. The task of studying laws must be relentless for 
their fulfilment: “when the tradition and our research into it will jointly reach their 
conclusion, and as it were gain a breathing space, when everything will have 
become clear, the law itself will belong to the people, and the nobility will vanish. 
“The people are called to the collective endeavour of enquiry, As Fitzpatrick 
observes of the parable, the laws are demotically generated, “for the demotic 
majority these laws have ever to be “more formally enquired into.”649 Benjamin 
gives this task a more determined shape – one that seeks to lift law (as doctrine) 
out of the swamp of the primordial past in which redemption has no place. This 
specific reading of memory is derived from the Jewish tradition. Quoting Willy 
Hass, Benjamin argues: “Memory plays a very mysterious role as piousness. It is 
not an ordinary quality…The most sacred act of the ritual is the erasing of sins 
from the book of memory.”650 This collective task is reoriented away from law that 
is in force. The demand for the application of law to attain justice is severed and, as 
ever with Kafka, we are afforded little comfort in the present. The present is 
described as life on this ‘razor’s edge’ since the “sole visible and indubitable law 
                                               
645 Gershom Scholem letter July 9th, 1934 in The Correspondence of Walter Benjamin 
and Gershom Scholem, 122-123. 
646 Benjamin, Selected Writings, 798-9. 
647 Letter 299 to Gerhard Scholem, Correspondence, 565- 566. 
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that is imposed upon us is the nobility”651? and while there is hope, the hope is not 
for us.  
Study, educative force, in this reading takes on a negative utopian hue. It is 
depicted as a threshold, a gateway. It has no telos and cannot be instrumentalised 
since it no longer demands the practicing of the law, the violent application of 
which serves ultimately as an act of severance of law from justice. The educative 
orientation lies with a negative utopian impetus whose direction faces toward a 
redeemed past rather than an emancipated future. Later scholars would disavow 
this element of Critical Theory as either pessimism or cynicism. We find for 
example Giroux calls for ‘concrete utopianism’ which can serve as the basis for 
“an ethical basis for challenging the excessive cynicism regarding social change 
and a political referent for grounding critique and the possibility of social 
transformation.652  
Alternatively, Freire aspires to a realisable pedagogic utopia which is a 
dynamic engagement with the future, one that employs creativity and is alert to the 
dangers. Freire, for example, urges:  “rather than repetition of the present…to 
values that are lived rather than myths that are imposed.”653 That utopian call for 
education has been adapted and implemented in many places around the world, and 
cannot be ignored as a potent source of inspiration for critical educators and critical 
educational projects up to the present time, it remains caught in a logic of 
instrumentality.654 This warns of the dangers of reinstituting a relation that produces 
the problems attendant to laws’ heteronomy and violent institutions.  
We move to an alternative reading of the pedagogical possibilities in 
Benjamin’s critique of law and sovereignty. Potential lapses into re-establishing 
normative frameworks and the associated violent manifestations of authority are 
ever-present dangers and the possibility articulating educative power through a 
programmatic approach to education seems to be rejected by Benjamin. Educative 
power or force therefore sustains a decisively negative association to the 
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constitutive power of law. 655 In a further move in his essay on violence, Benjamin 
points to the “power to annihilate through the destruction of all law-making.” This 
destructive rather than positive utopian call nonetheless has the potential to render 
the world other than it is by breaking with the fateful logic that results in the 
immanence of life and law (that also determines that all things must be as they are). 
Equally, it is a force that seeks to avoid at all costs the reinstitution of a new order 
formulated along the lines of the old. Much like the example of instituting a 
general strike as distinct from individual adjustments to labour relations, the danger 
of capture within new forms of oppression means this force must stand outside the 
law in all its manifestations. Some key features of educative force then appear as 
the withdrawal of intention understood as education aimed at a predetermined or 
programmatic approach invested in and by the logic of the state or of the 
socialisation of the individual. The “aim of study is not to steer its disciples”, but it 
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The thesis began with an exploration of the substantive (and limited) 
literature available on public legal education as a field, given the predominantly 
oral and often radical practices that have defied traditions of historicism and 
recording in the legal academy. The material traces the contours of a public 
education movement or ‘discipline’ as it is increasingly recognised in 
contemporary understanding. The historical antecedents of public legal education 
were traced through the War on Poverty in the United States and the post-war 
consensus in the West. ‘Poverty law’, out of which public legal education grew in 
the twentieth century, was itself an outgrowth of the civil rights movement; it was 
conceived as a direct challenge to the systemic inequalities that the law had come 
to entrench in the legal order.657 Community education and community organising 
flourished as a way of improving knowledge of legal rights and as an aspect of 
poverty prevention delivered via neighbourhood legal services.  The more 
proactive and reform-oriented strategies were most commonly attributable to 
community based legal education championed by civil rights groups.  
Some examples encountered above promised a radical and community led 
strategy with the potential to resist social and legal hegemony.658 However, 
alongside these activist and reformist efforts came a rise in state spending for legal 
assistance programmes, soon followed by a concern with the overburdening of 
these services: “the overwhelming need and pressure on services was brought into 
sharp focus…. Burdens on caseloads served to detract attention from legal 
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education and legal campaigns by communities themselves.”659 In order to meet the 
pressing legal needs of the communities they served, neighbourhood law centres 
moved away from public legal education, toward a focus on one-to-one casework 
and advice.660 This resulted in the role of public legal education narrowing 
significantly. As Gander writes: “the job of PLE became making sure that the poor 
knew the rules that applied in their situations. Confining PLE to primary rules and 
colluding in promoting the passive role of the public in the legal system.”661 Public 
legal education has therefore occupied an ambiguous position in relation to the 
historical role of the legal profession and legal services, and to the growth of new 
rights in the 1960s and 70s, as well as in the evolution of rule of law ideals in 
which the state is entrusted with the task of informing the public about its rights 
and duties. Even at its most politically radical, public legal education was marked 
by contradictions and tensions in its proximity to and support (directly or 
indirectly) of the promulgatory function of law-making, with all its attendant 
adaptive and coercive demands.662  
The review of subsequent legal needs and access to justice studies that 
incorporate a concern with legal knowledge and public education portrayed the 
vexed space within which contemporary practices operate. While the discourse of 
rule of law and access to justice construed as ‘legal need’ added a different 
dimension to formal public promulgation of the law, these new discourses also 
entailed the growth and proliferation of law becomes a “reified social fact.”663  
 
Moreover, the legal construction of demands for individual rights at the expense of 
collective political demands simultaneously embeds wider structural inequality 
within the normative order. Alongside social welfare law, one of the exemplary 
fields of legal expansion has been in the field of industrial relations, suggesting that 
the subsumption of antagonistic social and political relations is a common feature 
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of juridification. The creation of these new areas of law, according to Bourdieu, 
therefore “legitimiz[e] victories over the dominated, which are thereby converted 
into accepted facts.”664 Legal need naturalises law in such a way that it masks a 
dialectical process in which the expansion of rights accompanies and obscures 
social antagonism.665  
            The initial agitation and political aspiration of the public legal education 
movement, accompanied by a growth in scholarship concerned with the 
interrelatedness of law and poverty, soon came to be suppressed. With fear of 
further outbreaks of unrest following the assassinations of Martin Luther King and 
John F Kennedy, and the associated fear that civil unrest might stymie global 
capital. With the retrenchment of welfarism which reduced willingness to fund 
legal assistance, there came an ever more dominant juridico-economic focus with 
which legal services also became associated. The casework oriented focus for law 
had to navigate a faltering market; poor law struggled to meet the rising demand 
for legal help. These shifts fundamentally throw into question the strategies that 
socially inspired legal activism have relied upon and continue to rely upon. The 
successful citizen becomes the putative consumer of educational and legal services, 
who requires sufficient knowledge and skills to level the playing field, overcoming 
informational asymmetries and becoming an empowered actor in the legal market. 
The role of education is considered to be adaptive in purpose: to bring the legal 
consumer into the legal market. The first chapter consequently considered how rule 
of law discourses have reoriented public legal education toward neoliberal 
exigencies for the rule of law. These constructions fundamentally altered the 
relationship between citizen and state, with an economic-juridical rationality at the 
expense of a juridical-political understanding of the binding force of law that is 
both shaped by and shapes the nature of a polity.  
An emphasis on the associations of public legal education with a variety of 
theories of state is a core feature of the subsequent historical-philosophical reading 
of public legal education and of the evolution of the concept of the rule of law. 
Chapter Two traced the shift from classical liberal discourse to the responses of 
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both the German Ordo Liberals and the Chicago school. The inter-war years 
produced a crisis of capitalism that would have enduring consequences for the re-
evaluation of classical liberal doctrine. Their reorientation of classical liberalism 
responds to the ungovernability that, for neoliberal theorists, attends a perceived 
‘excess of democracy’ and a belief that some degree of marginalisation is a natural 
feature of competitive markets.  
For influential theorists such as Friedrich Von Hayek, legal knowledge is core 
to their economic and political programme. Rather than approaching economic 
growth through the doctrine of laissez faire, we find that legal activism is core to 
their strategy. Fearful of the growth of authoritarianism as much as of the demand 
for reparations and debt relief for the global South, this new breed of liberalism 
also recognizes the role of ignorance and the concomitant necessity of some 
information realignment. This means deploying knowledge (including legal) only 
so far as to help serve basic entrepreneurial innovation. The core rules encompass 
the general rule pertaining to contract and exchange of property, and rules intrinsic 
to serving the free flow of investment capital. This aimed to foster, in Shklar’s 
words, “a rule observing ‘spontaneous order’ [which] can be expected to emerge.”666 
In a slightly different but connected vein, Foucault contends that: “The rule of law 
and l’etat de droit formalize the action of government, a provider of rules for an 
economic game in which the only players…must be individuals…or enterprises.”667 
For our present purposes, public legal education strategies are deeply implicated in 
this instrumentalisation, in which subjects are shaped through and through to adapt, 
conform and compete in this new global order. Not only are alternative political 
imaginaries suppressed, this new economisation of government and state, 
facilitated in part through legal knowledge dissemination, is a far cry from the 
various guises in which public legal education appears in earlier classical accounts.  
The thesis traversed Enlightenment thought with its aspirations for progress 
and self-determination. Already in the syncretic thought of St Thomas Aquinas, we 
noted the role that legal knowledge has (manifesting as promulgation of laws) to 
neutralise the opposition between force or violence and law with the mediation of 
knowledge. The force of law, he contends, is justified or legitimated by the 
function of knowledge. We find a shifting yet persistent valence of the legitimation 
of the force of law and the function of sovereignty in thinkers from Hobbes to 
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Locke, and Kant to Rousseau. Common to the formulations of the Enlightenments 
most prominent political thinkers, was the importance of legal promulgation in 
forming the bond between citizen and state. For Locke and Rousseau this extended 
to an awareness of the deliberative and participative precursors to the construction 
of the putative social contract.  
Yet even this possibility becomes subject to suspicion as we move to construe 
the evolution of Enlightenment through a one-sided and adaptive process of 
cultural education. This critique appears forcefully in the work of Horkheimer and 
Adorno. Law belongs to a wider shift in which the rationalities it constitutes, of 
equality, rights, freedom and so forth produce antinomies that subvert or eviscerate 
the lived experiences of alienation, marginalisation and oppression brought about 
by the economic-juridical order of law itself. The dialectic of myth and 
enlightenment in their thought illuminates how the archetype of bourgeois 
individualism traverses epochs and unleashes the most destructive forces of history 
in the name of self-preservation and the mastery of nature through economic and 
technocratic expansionism. In this light the ideals of a modernity attendant with a 
progressive and positivist science of law with any emancipatory telos dissolves.  
These features of Critical Theory, we have argued reorient theories 
underpinning public legal education in a number of ways. The negative utopian 
strands of Adorno and Benjamin’s thought in particular are highlighted, and their 
association with memory, the rejection of idealised notions of progress offer a 
corrective to passive acceptance of the inequalities of present social conditions. As 
a set of practices existing at the very margins of institutionalised legal education 
and informal community education, public legal education holds the promise of 
disrupting or interrupting the orthodoxies of liberal legal rationality.668 In their 
indirect relation to the application of law, or as practices of critically ‘decentring 
law’, these practices are afforded a force that has the potential to disrupt the 
instrumental link between law and its application, and for constructed alternative 
political spaces in which the resolution of human conflict and violence can be re-
evaluated and reimagined.669   
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To this end, we consider Benjamin’s central text on the association of law 
and violence (or force). While broadly antinomian in his stance in the Critique of 
Violence, Benjamin alludes to a curious sense of Recht (Right) which is both more 
and less than the normative order of law; it neither embodies executive law-making 
violence, nor the law-preserving violence of an administrative nature. Rather than 
subsuming every event and action, as is the case with law, as we noted above in the 
Benjaminian sense, justice must suit each singular event.670 What we retrieve is a 
pedagogical force that insists on both a radical singularity that is pervaded by a 
theological spirit that somehow lies beneath the desiccated bureaucracies of 
modernity that administer life with all their technocratic and murderous effect. 
Rather than replicating the myth of a sacred life this places an emphasis on the 
shared fragility of an all too human existence. This, then, is a secular theology that 
appears to offer nothing more than glimmers of hope through a redeemed past that 
fundamentally breaks with our understandings of the ends law with its false 
promise of justice: “redemption manifests itself in an odd way, for it seems to 
entail a complete apocalyptically destructive break.”671 In this view, every epoch 
holds the possibility of redeeming the previous. The destructive labour of 
philosophico-historical critique undertaken by Benjamin excavates the present 
from all its obfuscations and mystifications. 
Fate and guilt become core conceptual apparatus in this endeavour of 
releasing profane life from the grips of myth and mythic violence. The readings 
illuminate two different but related variations of fate in Benjamin’s wider work 
that serve our purposes. The first register of fate we encountered refers to the 
simple fatality of life in its apportionment, or distribution among mortals, which 
also serves as the basis of the normative order. This order demands that ambiguity 
and unknowability function so ensure transgression in order to promote law’s self-
perpetuation.  Following a mythic schematic, this demonic variation of fate means 
that human life is delivered over to the inscrutable realm of the gods and unending 
cycles of mythic violence as a consequence of mortality. We also encountered in a 
second register of fate the realm of historical ruin, describing a profane history no 
longer tied to the promise of redemption. This is history evacuated of the promise 
of salvation, an idea that became a crucial nexus of Enlightenment metaphysics of 
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reason and progress. In a secular world, human progress and perfectibility take on 
the task that religious ideals of salvation and redemption previously provided.672 The 
description of these two registers of fate helps us to grasp what is at stake in the 
boundaries established and guarded by law. In this view, an uncritical stance 
toward the educative locus of law as a preeminent site of the reproduction of 
historical violence remains hidden, as do the attempts to resurrect idols and false 
sovereigns in a world that has lost its gods. 
Moreover, in depicting a corrupt and abject world, Benjamin ask us to re-
evaluate the operative function of guilt (or indebtedness in the German rendering) 
in the structure of law. We explored how his analysis produces an aporetic relation 
between knowledge and law, one that has its roots in the implication of law and life 
in a bond quite opposite to the constitutive political force we consider in earlier 
chapters. This entails an exploration of the instantiation of law as the historical 
rupture of constituent political power, one that binds and constitutes a community 
which always already lies under a pall of guilt, a relation that disavows our 
assumptions of law’s intelligibility as bridging and binding constitutive power.  
Knowledge of law in this view assuages none of the guilt attached to the legal 
subject preceding any act of transgression in the readings that Benjamin offers. 
Guilt appears to be concretised in a state of ignorance.673 In the diagnosis of 
modern law and its ancient counterparts, law must sustain ambiguity so as to fulfil 
itself. This necessity for transgression for the fulfilment of law points to fact that 
law must first create the conditions for its prohibitions to have reference to life, and 
to make that reference regular (to establish its rule).  
 
Since the rule both stabilizes and presupposes the conditions of 
this reference, the originary structure of the rule is always of this 
kind: “If (a real case in point, e.g.: si membrum rupsist), then 
(juridical consequence, e.g.: talio esto)” in which a fact is 
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included in the juridical order through its exclusion, and 
transgression seems to precede and determine the lawful case.674    
 
This retributive characteristic, “if” – “then”, means that the juridical order does not 
sanction a transgressive act, as is commonly understood, but rather “constitutes 
itself through the repetition of the same act without any sanction, that is, as an 
exceptional case.”675 It is a law of vengeance that operates so as to render all acts 
first guilty and subsequently subject to legal punishment. Knowledge of the rule is 
not exculpatory since guilt must simply refer to something, some act which will 
come about. In this impossibility of deciding if it is guilt that grounds the rule, or 
the rule that posits guilt, what comes to light is the indistinction between inside and 
outside, and between life and law.676 
Since law appears to place the subject in an interminable undecidability, in 
which predicting the outcome of a case appears ever more arbitrary and subject to 
coercion, with this analysis Benjamin also enjoins us to consider what, in the 
absence of the false sovereigns we labour under, we can begin to draw from for a 
secular basis of human relations. Since the only ‘real’ sovereign can be God, what 
knowledge, what reason can provide the basis for truly human relationships? 
 
For Benjamin, the reason that states are violent (both in the usual and 
Benjamin’s particular understanding of that word) is precisely because, 
as agents of mythic violence, they have no true authentic basis. State 
sovereignty is based, as thinkers from Schmitt to Hobbes to 
Kantorowicz have noted, on a secularization of a theological basis for 
monarchy… If God is king of the universe, that kingship becomes 
actualized, in the secular model, as a human form of rule. States thus 
claim the mantle of God as a basis for legal and political authority 
(although eventually that connection is meant to be obscured without 
ceasing to be critical). Yet, as Benjamin shows, this claim is false. God 
for Benjamin is utterly unknowable except as that force which opposes 
its own mythologization.677 
                                               
674 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 26. Lex talionis is a feature of the retributive function of 
Mosaic law, “eye for eye, tooth for tooth” in Exodus 21:23–25.  
675Ibid., 26.  
676 Ibid., 27.  
677 James Martel “Why does the state keep coming back? Neoliberalism, the state and 
the Archeon.” Law and Critique 29 (3):359-375 (2018), 369 
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In his relentless critique of law lies the promise of claims to law, to Recht (perhaps 
in this sense better captured as ‘Right’) and what is at stake in that promise, which 
the English translation of law fails to adequately capture. That law continues law, 
and preserves itself through interring violence, is a basic premise of legal theory. 
However, Recht refers also to the aspirational but inapplicable claim against the 
law by the legal subject, which must nevertheless also contend with violence.678 In 
order to break the continuum of violence, the problem of locating an immanent 
mode of existence that does not seek justification from outside is one that he would 
continue to grapple with, in particular in relation to the notion of law as study.  
The final chapter returns to Critical Theory from the specific perspective of 
educational theory, and considers public legal education models within the broader 
critical pedagogy movement that grew out of the Frankfurt School. Law in 
modernity, since it pertains to instrumentalised rather than objective reason, for 
Horkheimer, only serves as an instrument of power and simply sustains the status 
quo.679 The critique of reason and the loss of a meaningful basis for the normative 
order also suggests the protections afforded to the liberal subject are as contingent 
as they are aligned to the powers that govern them. The problem of subjectivity and 
identity haunts critical education generally, but specifically critical legal 
pedagogical approaches with their claims to emancipation. Rather than being 
brushed aside as a fundamental pessimism, earlier critical theorists’ claims pose 
serious challenges for later emancipatory strands of critical pedagogy and about the 
extent to which emancipatory claims can be made for educational practices that are 
available out of the self-same assemblages of subject and society.  
Critical pedagogy thus appears to fall into the very trap that it set out to 
avoid. Both European and American strands of critical pedagogy exhibit the failure 
to free the concept of educational praxis from functional and instrumental 
demands, albeit for the laudable attainment of liberation or emancipation from 
oppression.680 This logic of a technological project underlying the educational praxis 
                                               
678 Walter Benjamin, “The Right to Use Force,” Selected Writings, Volume 1, 232. 
679 Horkheimer, Eclipse of Reason, 33 
680 A number of different approaches to emancipation appear in critical pedagogical 
writings, these include ‘edification’: as a process of social development of the species 
following Habermas; as self-reliance and self and co-determination following Klafki; and 
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means critical pedagogy “remains itself subject to the same instrumental logic that 
it deplores at the heart of the capitalist system.”681 The fundamental problem of 
conflating means and ends, where ends are construed as either the formation of the 
autonomous subject or the recipient of emancipatory interventions, fails to disrupt 
the logic of emancipation with its relations of dependency and inequality.  
Emancipation assumes the need by the oppressed minority of an 
intervention from the outside that will lead the subject to a future position of 
equality and freedom. As a consequence, modern emancipation, 
 
is not only based on dependency – it is also based on fundamental 
inequality between the emancipator and the one to be emancipated. 
According to the modern logic of emancipation, the emancipator is the 
one who knows better and best and who can perform the act of 
demystification that is needed to expose the working of power.682  
 
Wider critiques of critical pedagogy include the failure to produce an effective 
paradigm of education that bridges theory and practice, in particular when placed 
in an institutionalised education environment, and therefore risks simply offering a 
critical approach producing nothing other than critique. After all, the Institut’s own 
thinkers are thinking from within institutional educational contexts. Adorno 
certainly was not unaware of this; “the heart of Adorno’s dilemma is that he wants 
educationalists to possess enough authority to pull authority down – or at least 
render it transparent.”683 To take any position of critique necessitates a position 
within advanced capitalism and therefore a space in which critique itself is 
commodified; “education for critique can turn in to the new orthodoxy.”684 
                                               
setting people free from the compulsion of material power and ideologies through critique 
following Adorno.  Misschelein, “Critical Theory”, 74 
681 Ibid, 50. 
682 Gert J.J. Biesta, The Beautiful Risk of Education (London: Paradigm Publishers, 
2013), 83.  
683 Adorno and Becker “Maturity and Education” 9. 
684 Adorno and Becker, “Education for Maturity”, 6 
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Critical pedagogic analysis of cultural and social reproduction made 
important contributions to understanding the nexus between inequalities in 
education and inequality in wider society, although these too have met with 
criticisms.685 Some critical pedagogical insights are visible in the literature on public 
legal education theories, but little considers the nature of education as a site of 
social or cultural reproduction and thereby the particular ways in which legal 
education may be a vehicle for the transmission of wider power relations, either in 
terms of classroom practices or in wider cultural and social relations.686  
A different, perhaps indirect, method takes a counter-hegemonic approach to 
public legal education, turning to the constellation, formed by the thinking between 
Benjamin and Kafka. It rejects a positive utopian drive, but seeks urgent and 
ceaseless attention to the present, to what is disfigured and hidden in the present. It 
traces the lines of utopian negativity as a regulative principle only insofar as “a 
concept which could never be, and was never really intended to be, realized but 
rather to act as a perennial corrective against any claim that a natural or equitable 
social order has been achieved.”687 Benjamin’s oeuvre, and to some extent Critical 
Theory more widely, thus provides nothing more than glimpses of utopia by 
providing an account of negative utopia, or a negation of utopia understood as a 
historical progress, law ascribing justice or a range of other formulations that 
emulate and rely on the mystification of the present.  
What we traced with Benjamin and Kafka is a pedagogy of inoperativity and 
uselessness, but nevertheless a determined praxis of learning. Agamben describes 
the contours of what remains of law following Benjamin and Kafka:   
What is found after law is not a more proper use and original use that 
precedes law, but a new use that is born only after it. And use that has 
                                               
685 We will discuss these concerns in more detail below, however one such criticism is 
attributed to Giroux who point to the limitations of theories of social reproduction in 
education, which are rooted in over-determination. He argues that they fail to adequately 
understand the function of agency by the various actors in schools and engages a 
reductionist view where struggle and conflict are entirely overcome through a one-sided 
process of cultural domination. Henry Giroux, A Theory and Resistance in Education: 
Toward a Pedagogy for the Opposition, 87-111.  
686 Bourdieu and Passeron. Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture Theory, 
2000. 
687 Adorno, Critical Models: Interventions and Catchwords, 218. 
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been contaminated by law, must also be freed from its own value. This 
liberation is the task of study.688 
In this, Rose suggests, Benjamin’s reading comes near to the idea of Talmud Torah 
when he contrasts the commandment as a guideline (not a criterion) along with its 
educative potential.689  
Benjamin’s philosophical approach not only deploys theological categories 
but also brings human experience to the fore in the dialectical arrangement with the 
representative of ideas, an element that also provides educational potential. Rather 
than relying on the intuitive concept produced from the understanding or from 
abstract universal concepts, all philosophical truth for Benjamin arises from the 
central concern with concrete phenomena of experience:  “For Benjamin 
everything habitually excluded by the norms of experience ought to become part of 
experience to the extent that it adheres to its own concreteness instead of 
dissipating this, its immortal aspect, to the schema of the abstract universal.”690 In 
the task of representing ideas, the subject has a conceptualising agency, acting as 
mediator arranging phenomenal elements so that they can become visible, for the 
idea to be formed.  Crucially, rather than submerging phenomena or objects in 
concepts, Benjamin’s approach aims to allow the phenomena to shine forth as 
ideas, as their objective interpretation and their virtual arrangement: “Ideas are 
related to phenomena as constellations are to the stars.”691 Meticulous attention to 
the minute was a hallmark of Benjamin’s work, and reflected his suspicion of the 
sterility of traditional philosophical method and mistrust of the universal 
abstraction that authorised what he referred to as inductive method that led 
nowhere.692 
This suggestion gestures toward a very different pedagogical insight and 
approach to questions of law than the orthodox methods associated either with 
theoretical postulates to be analysed according to specific applications, or indeed 
the empirical framing of legal cases into a broader jurisprudence offered in 
positivist frames.  Placed within a praxis of education, this sheds new light on 
                                               
688 Agamben, State of Exception, 64. 
689 Rose, Walter Benjamin, Out of the Sources of Judaism, 189. 
690 Adorno. T.W Introduction to Benjamin’s Schriften in Walter Benjamin Critical Essay 
and Recollections Gary Smith ed., 4 
691 Benjamin The Origin of the German Trauerspiel, 34. 
692 Ibid, 39. 
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learners’ capacity to bring their concrete experience of law to a re-examination of 
the grounds of law, its paradoxical appearance as both totalising: “the law is all 
over”693, and the absence of knowledge of law in everyday life.694 The nexus for the 
interrogation is of the specific content of legal knowledge, verifiable facts and 
cases, and the constellation of ideas that surround law deriving from the rich 
multidisciplinary sources that we have encountered.  For the purposes of bringing 
the idea of law to bear in the educative field, the starting point remains the 
concrete, lived experience of conflict or dispute in social interactions.  
Rather than merely entering the experience as a subjective ‘re-living’, the 
tools to draw out and rearrange the various elements of the concrete phenomena 
can be activated. These necessarily involve the dialogical and discursive method of 
critique in community settings that often reflect the misery and alienation that 
marginalised communities express in their encounters with the law.  But they also 
concern a withdrawal, a movement away from immediate experience toward 
specific historical associations and locations that permeate experience. In addition, 
identifiable lived moments serve not only to illuminate “ the causal connections 
lived over time, but the similarities that have been lived”695, that can shed light on 
the example or phenomena at hand.  These are rich, creative and recreative 
resources, originating from participants themselves, that open a wide array of 
perspectives to the task of learning about the law and how it operates in and forms 
lived experience in and through time.  
While public legal education is frequently instrumentalised or indeed 
reified as a signifier of belonging to or constituting sovereign constitutionality, we 
can begin to reimagine political community. This fundamentally rejects the idea 
and intention of returning the excluded subject, the individual without access to 
law, to the interior of knowledge and thereby to be the individual possessor of 
rights and the holder of the mechanism to apply rights toward formal remedy. The 
approach to non-application via a negative dialectical enquiry carries with it a 
resort to patient and ceaseless study; study of law as means but not an end to 
grasping new configurations of living in community. 
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